

**EUROPEAN LAND FORCES INTEROPERABILITY CENTER**

**Finabel**

Quartier Reine Elisabeth

Rue d'Evere

**B-1140 BRUSSELS**

Tel Col RAMIERE: 02/701.41.04

Tel Mr. BLOKKEN: 02/701.41.03

FAX : 02/701.71.78

E-mail : psecfinabel@gmail.com

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LTC Gilles RAMIERE

Head of Finabel

Permanent Secretariat

# Finabel



Promulgation of report Finabel Study Nr A.25.R-T.37.R

“European Union Battlegroup Manual”

Guidance for operational preparation and tactical use

Definition of generic missions which can be entrusted to the EU BG

→ *What to do with an EU BG?*

Conceivable employment doctrine(s) for an EU BG at tactical level

*→ How to conduct an EU BG deployment?*

## BIBLIOGRAPHY PAPER

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION</b>	
<p><b>1. <u>Finabel References:</u></b></p> <p>1/2007 PME meeting: FQ5</p>	<p><b>2. <u>Other references:</u></b></p> <p>The EU Battlegroup Concept, Oct. 2006</p> <p>Launching EU Battlegroups</p> <p><i>(A RUSI European Security Programme Study)</i></p> <p>LINDSTROM, Gustav, “Enter the EU BG”, EU–ISS Chaillot Paper no 97, February 2007</p>
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<p><b>11. <u>Summary:</u></b></p> <p><b>T37R GENERIC MISSIONS AND TASKS FOR AN EU BATTLEGROUP</b></p> <p>The aim of this study is to inform those member states providing elements of the EU Battlegroup (BG) what activities, missions and tasks the BG might be required to undertake. This will allow them to prepare and train the EU BG to meet these challenges. It will also ensure that all Member States (MS) have a common understanding of the meaning of these Activities in order that there is coherence across the member states when providing this capability. It also highlights some of the</p>	

challenges that each member state might encounter.

**A.25.R** Conceivable employment doctrine(s) for an EU BG at tactical level

Finabel studies cover a large spectrum of land operations issues. A common understanding of some principles can be useful to Finabel member states and to the works of EUMS planners and third party states. The aim of this study is to inform the EU BG planners, at strategic level, about the real capabilities, courses of action, and limitations of the EU BG at land level. It could also give useful information to the Finabel and EU national planners, who are in charge of setting up, training and certifying the EU BG made available within the framework of military missions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

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# **1. GENERIC MISSIONS AND TASKS FOR AN EU BATTLEGROUP**

## **1.1. INTRODUCTIVE REMARKS**

### **1.1.1. BACKGROUND**

The EU Battlegroup (EU BG) Concept<sup>1</sup> was conceived as a means of encouraging continued improvements in deployable and employable European capabilities, thus widening the scope for burden sharing between European partners. This kind of high readiness capability meets EU requirement for forces which are able to respond rapidly according to European Headline Goal (EHG) 2010 to an emerging crisis under a UN mandate, and thereby demonstrates European willingness to fill a crucial global capability gap.

These Battlegroups are held predominantly, but not exclusively, to be used in response to a request from the UN (under a UN mandate) to undertake rapid intervention. This might include acting to prevent atrocities in a hostile environment or helping with the provision of urgent humanitarian aid. This activity<sup>2</sup> is particularly applicable in failing or failed states. Recent examples in Africa (such as the UK's operational experience in Sierra Leone and the French in Côte d'Ivoire, EUFOR RD Congo) have not only illustrated the need for such a capability, but demonstrated how a relatively small force can have a significant effect in a short period of time, provided they can be deployed rapidly with the appropriate integrated support; often as an Early Entry Force (EEF). Another type of example is the French "SERVAL" operation in Mali, which was previously established and coexists with a European training mission, and also reflects many of the characteristics required to EU BG.

### **1.1.2. AIM**

The aim of this paper is to outline those activities, missions and tasks that an EU BG may have to undertake during its stand-by period.

### **1.1.3. METHODOLOGY**

The manual will describe the overall concept, composition, activities, missions and challenges for the EU BG before stating the tasks they must be able to undertake to accomplish such missions. Those tasks are divided between operate, prepare, project, command, inform, protect and sustain. Operate tasks are found within the main body of the text while the others are in annexes A to F. This study was conducted by a land environmental working group and for completeness a similar study should be conducted by those responsible for the other environments.

## **1.2. THE CONCEPT**

The BG initiative will realize the ambitions set out in the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal for the EU. The BG initiative concentrates on small, high readiness forces, which are rapidly deployable, mobile and self-sustainable. BGs will undertake activities in support of the Common Security and Defense Policy

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<sup>1</sup> Agreed amongst 25 EU Member States in the EU Military Committee on 6 Oct 2006

<sup>2</sup> Activity is used in the document to align with current NATO terminology.

(CSDP), which is a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), are based on the European Security Strategy. Due to the nature of the BGs these activities will be of limited duration and combat intensity.

The key elements of the initiative are:

- Stand-alone BG-sized forces (around 1,500 strong, including combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)) and an associated Forces Headquarters (F)HQ and Operation HQs that will have to operate within a coalition context.
- After an EU Council decision, the forces should be mission ready within 10 days- Self-sustainable for at least 30 days (but extendable up to 120 days if resupplied appropriately).
- Deployable over 6000km from Brussels (this is the planning target but not a limitation).
- Two concurrent operations; the deployment phases for each may have to be conducted separately and successively (it is unreasonable to expect the EU to conduct the deployment phase for two BGs simultaneously over extended distances).
- EU Battle group concept is based on the principle of multinationality, therefore interoperability is vital.

Rapid response forces need not necessarily be large but they do need to be militarily effective, credible, coherent and capable of stand-alone operations. EU BGs are composed of the generally accepted minimum force elements necessary to meet such requirements.

#### 1.2.1. MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS

The Military Capability Commitments Conference on 22 November 2004 drew commitments from many EU Member States (MS), and a number of supporting niche capabilities, to be available by 2007. In January 2005 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on the EU BG was declared. Full Operational Capability (FOC) was declared in 2007, with the European Union being able to undertake two concurrent single BG-size rapid response operations. Since Jan 2007 EU BGs have been trained and held on standby for possible EU operations.

#### 1.2.2. ROLE OF THE FRAMEWORK NATION

The Framework Nation (FN) is responsible for ensuring that the EU BG is ready to undertake its commitment. When the BG is constituted from a number of different states the aspect of force generation and force preparation cannot be underestimated. Of particular significance are the roles of both the Force Headquarters ((F)HQ) and the Operational Headquarters (OHQ)<sup>3</sup> which must be involved with the BG's preparation throughout. The MOU between EU and NATO states that NATO will provide EU BG with the strategic transport capability. Technical interoperability, in particular in the domain of command and control, needs special attention. The tool for FN to notify the EU that they intend to be responsible for an EU BG is the bi-annual EU Battlegroup Coordination Conference (EU

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<sup>3</sup> The OHQ may not be from the Framework Nation.

BGCC), which must take place as early as possible in order to get the Battlegroup Force Package ready for the mission.

### 1.2.3. EU BATTLEGROUP AND NRF

The activities for which the NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU BGs are designed are complementary, rather than being duplicative. The NRF is designed to participate in the full range of Alliance operations, up to and including high intensity war-fighting. This may include a show of force, stand-alone use for crisis response, or initial forcible entry for a larger operation. EU BG is a part of the EU's total effort to mitigate or solve a crisis and therefore it should be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale.

### 1.2.4. OUTLINE FORCE COMPOSITION

The following definitions are applicable:

**EU Battlegroup Package:** A BG package consists of a (F)HQ, a BG and associated pre-identified operational and strategic enablers.

**EU Battlegroup:** The BG itself consists of a combined (joint) arms battalion sized force reinforced with CS and CSS elements.

An EU BG package is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations and includes (e.g.):


- (F)HQ, including dedicated Staff- and CIS-Support and Augmentee Staff
- Battlegroup (approx. 1500 troops)
- Additional strategic and operational enablers

Although the outline force composition shows an order of battle (ORBAT) with subordinate units, it gives little information on the capabilities of the Staff / HQ. The combat support and combat service support is relatively heavy compared to the 3 Infantry Companies. This is a logic consequence of the nature of stability operations which require relatively more CS / CSS capacity. To ensure the right logistic support it has many advantages to have a NSPA member in the logistical part of the staff.

The (F)HQ must have the capabilities to ensure a comprehensive approach to operations. That means that it is suited to use diplomatic, military, economic and civil instruments of power in an integrated and coordinated way. To establish this, all these instruments of power must be represented in the staff, at least on the liaison level. In a stability operation, a senior diplomat in the command group is an essential asset. Proper expertise (legal, political, cultural and CIMIC staff elements) should<sup>4</sup> be incorporated and trained together towards the mission.

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
<sup>4</sup> This does not fully apply to IT policy. From IT perspective it should read might.



This and the following table are based on the EU BG Concept modified by Finabel

- \* = depending on the characteristics of the operation not all listed capabilities of CS and CSS are necessarily under direct command of BG HQ!
- \*\* = in some MS support weapons are centralized within one Company
- \*\*\* = in some MS MedSpt is provided by a Medical Service
- \*\*\*\* = in some MS (e.g. SP) CIMIC is a part of CS according to the national doctrine

Associated pre-identified operational and strategic enablers



- \* = depending on the characteristics of the operation
- \*\* = DEU medical support is not part of logistics and provided by the Medical Service
- \*\*\* = in some MS regarded as a police task not at the responsibility of the armed forces

### **Chain of Command.**

**OHQ** (Operation Headquarters, military strategic level). The OHQ is responsible for the military strategic planning and the conduct of the operation. The OHQ is not deployed in the area of operations.

**FHQ (F)HQ** (Force Headquarters, operational level). The FHQ (F)HQ is generally deployed in the area of operations, it is responsible for planning and command.

**Battlegroup HQ** (National/multinational command unit, tactical level). The BG HQ is responsible for the training of its constituent elements and the preparation for certification according to EU agreed standards and procedures, and for conducting operations according to tasks given by the (F)HQ.

#### 1.2.5. SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

There are presently five OHQs<sup>5</sup> available to support an EU BG. The relation between FHQ and OHQ therefore, will be in most of the cases a multinational relation. Clear lines between FHQ and OHQ need to be established, especially on planning, preparation, standardization and force package issues. Nevertheless it should be understood that the size and composition of a BG goes beyond the command and control capabilities of a battalion staff. There is no limit to the size of the overall force package but it is likely to range between 1,500 up to 2,500 personnel.

Every MS has gaps in their military capability and might struggle to produce all the resources that are required to undertake the tasks; this will be exaggerated whilst they are involved in other activities. There is a possibility that a MS might either take a risk with this capability gap or fill it by 'double hatting' already committed forces. The FN is responsible for ensuring that all required capabilities are available from the time its EU BG is declared operational; often through assistance from other member states. Due to on-going operations and the "single set of forces" a stronger link between the crisis response of NATO and EU should be taken into consideration.

#### 1.2.6. COMBAT TROOPS

The heart of any EU BG will be the combat element which is most likely to be based on an Infantry Battalion (or equivalent) with a minimum of three infantry or equivalent companies, a support weapons company and integrated logistics and C2 elements. It should have the ability to manoeuvre tactically in the area of operations, and some form of protected mobility may be required, including, if necessary, mechanized vehicles.

#### 1.2.7. COMBAT SUPPORT (CS)

CS troops will be required in their primary roles when an EU BG is involved in combat operations. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and respective Standing Operating Procedures/Instructions (SOPs/SOIs) should be established to conduct combined joint fires. This requires a certain level of

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<sup>5</sup> DE, EL, FR, IT, UK and additional capacities according to other arrangements: SHAPE and EU Ops Centre

interoperability amongst the joint fires assets and capabilities of the troop contributing nations (TCN) and robust C2-arrangements on BG level and as well (F)HQ-level.

#### 1.2.8. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISTAR)

The ISTAR capability should cover a right mix of complementary assets (e.g. Ground reconnaissance troops, Field HUMINT unit, UAS, SIGINT and Electronic Support Measures (ESM)) which should allow the limited size of the EU BG to achieve its effects most efficiently and should be a core component of all EU BGs. Techniques such as reach back will enhance any ISTAR capability but will rely on robust secure communications and may be conducted through national chain of command.

#### 1.2.9. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)

No EU BG will be able to undertake any activity without robust CSS. However, the logistic tail of any force will place its own burden on the operation and so it should be kept to a realistic minimum. The timely and sufficient provision of combat supplies will contribute significantly to the success of the mission. Sufficient Medical Support is essential for the success of EU BG.

#### 1.2.10. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

The (F)HQ will control the operations in theatre when an EU BG operates autonomously; this will require staff capable of undertaking the full range of command functions (including CIMIC, Information Ops, an Air Coordinating Element (ACE etc.). It is most likely that the (F)HQ will have to operate closely with non-military organizations from within and outside the UN. The OHQ must have sufficiently robust CIS to communicate with the (F)HQ. At times a forward tactical HQ might be deployed to the military area of operations if the main (F)HQ needs to be positioned close to the political and economic centre of the Host Nation (HN).

#### 1.2.11. AIR AND AVIATION

As an EU BG is limited in size and firepower it may rely heavily on offensive air and aviation to increase its potency. This capability may easily lie outside the capabilities of the Framework Nation. Therefore the contribution of air assets should be coordinated on the highest level. On EU BG both tactical and operational staff level Air Ops must be a part of the operations section. Air and aviation are both logistically difficult to support but this burden can be eased if they are based on either a secure and well-resourced airfield or on a sea based platform. The balance between the two will vary according to the type of mission and the force deployed. TTPs and respective SOPs/SOIs and C2-arrangements should be established to integrate air and aviation assets into combined joint fires. Once deployed it is most likely that a BG will require battlefield helicopter support for movement, resupply, MEDEVAC, reconnaissance and Close Air Support (CAS).

#### 1.2.12. STRATEGIC TRANSPORT

The FN is responsible for organizing the strategic transport with co-operation from the contributing member states. The amount of air transport required to deploy and sustain a military force of over 1,500 personnel cannot be overestimated. Without sufficient air transport the deployability of an EU

BG within the given timelines will be limited. Co-ordination pan-European air transport can be improved through early liaison with the European Air Transport Command (EATC) which will manage all EU air strategic deployments. It is most likely that the air lift will have to be supplemented by sea, rail or road transportation under the responsibility of the FN with help from the EUMS.


### 1.2.13. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

EU MS support the concept of the Comprehensive Approach to operations. This is only possible if the military are trained and equipped to work with other governmental organizations (GOs), international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs) and other civilian agencies, and that those agencies organizations are willing and prepared to deploy and work alongside their military counterparts.

### 1.3. ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS

An EU BG is likely to be deployed on one of the specific Illustrative Scenarios shown below. However, the BG should be prepared to undertake additional or other tasks as the situation develops.

‘An activity can be defined as a system or composition of tactical tasks that can be assigned to a unit or formation in order to guarantee that the necessary effect, in relation to the specific activity, can be obtained or achieved<sup>6</sup>’.



Tasks that are normally carried out by Host Nation (HN) security forces may have to be undertaken by an EU BG if the HN's forces are incapable of carrying those tasks and in accordance with the mandate. This should be done in support of HN authority and handed back to the HN as soon as possible.

<sup>6</sup> Proposed NATO definition. These abbreviations are used from the EU Battlegroup Concept.

### 1.3.1. CONFLICT PREVENTION (CP)

**Conflict Prevention.** A peace support [activity] employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and – when necessary – military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

In Conflict Prevention an EU BG may be employed to take the timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of conflict. This is most likely to be as a show of the UN and EU's intention to engage in the area rather than as a force capable of tackling the root cause of the tension. If the violence in the area of operations is wide spread it is unlikely that a force of this size will have a significant effect; therefore the rapid deployment to the region before violence is established is likely to have the greatest chance of achieving the desired effects.

#### *1.3.1.1. MISSIONS*

Possible missions in Conflict Prevention:

- Early deployment of forces to prevent the build-up of armed factions.
- Key point defence.
- Disarmament.
- Monitoring and intelligence gathering.
- Show of force.
- Support to elections.
- Support to local authorities.
- Training and Assistance (military/civilian).
- Crowd and riot control<sup>7</sup>.

#### *1.3.1.2. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS*

Many of the following might be taken into considerations:

- HN requests support of EU or at least approves of the deployment of EU military forces.
- Mandate is issued by UN.
- Government control is limited or just about to break down.
- Effective decision-making and influence structure in theatre is not clear”
- Domestic or international tensions (border disputes).
- Regional tensions between non-state actors.
- Tensions between state and non-state actors.
- Ethnic tensions or fighting for resources or territorial claims.

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<sup>7</sup> Not in all Finabel member states a task to be conducted by military units but rather police force.

### 1.3.1.3. SECURITY SITUATION

The following security situation might exist:

- Local unrests / riots / attacks likely to lead to regional conflict in which armed force is openly employed.
- An Insurgency is in its infancy but gaining support.
- Weak governance of HN and its inability to ensure law and order.

<i>1.3.1.4. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING CONFLICT PREVENTION<sup>8</sup></i>
Negotiation and mediation.
Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
Plan operations to enforce rule of law in conjunction with the HN.
Secure, protect and administer an APOD / SPOD.
Establish border security. <sup>6</sup>
Establish and maintain check points.
Patrolling.
Support public order.
Cordon and search.
Exercise powers of search and detain <sup>9</sup> as necessary and prisoner handling in the framework of the given mandate.
Ensure freedom of movement.
Separate hostile / belligerent forces.
Enforce out of bounds areas.
Enforce curfews.
Conduct information operations.
Interact with the media.

<sup>8</sup> The table is not exhaustive.

<sup>9</sup> In some MS this is a military police force responsibility. In DE, the military police is not part of the army.

### 1.3.2. SEPARATION OF PARTIES BY FORCE (SOPF)

Operations carried out to enforce and maintain or rebuild peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.

In the early stages of a localized conflict an EU BG could interpose itself between two or more adversaries who are engaged in a limited encounter. This would have to be quickly supported by diplomatic and economic activities. Again, the limited size of the BGs will only make it viable when the warring parties are not well armed or not in such numbers that the BGs could soon become overrun.

#### *1.3.2.1. MISSIONS*

Possible missions in separation of parties by force:

- Forced separation of hostile formations.
- Surveillance and security tasks.
- Establishment of limited protected zones.
- Key point defence.
- Securing Lines of Communications (LOCs).
- Crowd and riot control.

#### *1.3.2.2. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS*

Many of the following might be considerations:

- HN requests support of EU or at least approves of the deployment of EU military forces.
- Mandate is issued by UN.
- Government control is limited or just about to break down.
- Tensions between state and non-state actors.
- Ethnic tensions or fight for resources or territorial claims.

#### *1.3.2.3. SECURITY SITUATION*

The following security situation might exist:

- Local unrests / riots / attacks are leading to local conflict in which armed force is limited.
- Country of deployment is limited in its ability to ensure law and order.

<i>1.3.2.4. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING SEPERATION BY FORCE</i>
Negotiation and mediation.
Separate hostile/belligerent forces.
Delineate cease-fire lines, zones of separation and control zones. ((F)HQ level).
Establish and supervise protected/safe areas.
Able to conduct observation and monitoring.
Observe and monitor zone of separation, control zones and assembly areas.
Provide protection to individuals, commanders and installations.
Execution of powers of search and detain in the framework of the given mandate. <sup>10</sup>
Plan operations to enforce rule of law.
Patrolling.
Public order.
Cordon and search.
Provide route protection.
Enforce out of bounds areas.
Enforce curfews.
Assist civil organizations with the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons.
Plan and transfer responsibility for security and control to other appropriate HN or other organizations.

<sup>10</sup> In some Finabel MS considered as a police task.

### 1.3.3. STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY ADVICE (SR)<sup>1</sup>

Establish a secure environment and a degree of law and order. Tasks are likely to be conducted in a coordinated effort with other governmental departments and other civilian actors.

The EU BG is not suited to the more enduring stabilization, reconstruction (SR) and military advice scenarios. However, in the event of a deterioration of such situations BG involvement within the terms of the other illustrative scenarios is conceivable.

#### *1.3.3.1. MISSIONS*

Possible missions in Stability, Reconstruction and Military Advice:

- Security of key points and infrastructure.
- Secure APODs / SPODs for other agencies.
- Convoy escorts.
- Distribution of humanitarian aid.
- Limited disarmament of military or civilians.
- Crowd and riot control.
- Assist Security Forces (advising, mentoring, partnering or training).
- Advice and support local security forces.
- Assistance and Support to International Humanitarian Organizations.

#### *1.3.3.2. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS*

Many of the following might be considerations:

- Operations with the consent or support of the HN (permissive environment).
- Mandate is issued by UN.
- Government control is limited but holding.
- Regional tensions between non-state actors.
- Tensions between state and non-state actors.
- Ethnic tensions or fight for resources or territorial claims.
- Situation of the public authorities on local, regional and national level.
- Population streams.
- Economic situation.
- Social situation of the population including support infrastructure.
- Possibilities and limitations of the mandate including the C2 of the whole Op.<sup>11</sup>
- Other actors in the area capable to influence the situation.

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<sup>11</sup> These consideration should be taken into the permanent evaluation of the environment.

#### *1.3.3.3. SECURITY SITUATION*

The following security situation might exist:

- State authorities are not able to fully ensure security; they may have lost control over law and order in parts of the country.
- Violence amongst some elements of the population.

<i>1.3.3.4. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY ADVICE</i>
Enforce existing HN criminal laws and support powers.
Plan operations to enforce rule of law.
Conduct patrolling.
Plan & initiate DDR of belligerents
Able to conduct public order.
Cordon and search.
Provide key installation protection.
Provide route protection.
Separate hostile / belligerent forces.
Enforce out of bounds areas.
Enforce curfews.
Execution of powers of search and detain in the framework of the given mandate <sup>12</sup> .
Establish and run temporary detention facilities <sup>13</sup> .
Assist civil organizations with movement of refugees and internally displaced persons.
Advice/train the local security forces.
Mentoring actions/partnering actions along with local security forces.

<sup>12</sup> From the DE perspective this is a Military Police task. Military Police is part of the Joint Service Support (JSS).

<sup>13</sup> In some MS this is not a task for Military Forces.

#### 1.3.4. NON COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)

NEO is designed to rescue and evacuate non-combatants who are under threat of violence in a foreign country to a place of safety. Frequently Evacuations are conducted in rapidly deteriorating conditions, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. They may be in circumstances where the Host Nation government or other authorities, overwhelmed by disaster or defeat, have ceased to function effectively, or have been overthrown without replacement.

An EU BG has the capacity to undertake NEO in both permissive and non-permissive environments. However, the ground troops would need considerable support from both air/aviation and naval forces to provide mobility for the military force as well as transport for the evacuation of civilians.

##### *1.3.4.1. MISSIONS*

Possible missions in evacuation:

- Security of key individuals.
- Security of groups of non-military.
- Point defence / facility protection.
- Security of key routes.
- Protection of personnel redeployment, e.g. evacuation of an observer mission (UN, EU, OSCE or other), IO, GO or NGO and / or material.
- Evacuation of EU nationals or citizens of other states.
- Crowd and riot control.
- Secure APODs / SPODs.
- Convoy escorts.

##### *1.3.4.2. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS*

Many of the following might be considerations:

- Operations with or without the consent or support of the country of deployment.
- Evacuation is conducted to a friendly country (safe haven).
- Evacuation conducted to friendly shipping.
- State-wide unrest may exist.

##### *1.3.4.3. SECURITY SITUATION*

The following security situation might exist:

- State authorities are not able to fully ensure security, they may have lost control over law and order in parts of the country.

- Law and order are fading.
- Violent mood among some elements of the population.

<i>1.3.4.4. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING NEO</i>
Gather all available information on Entitled Personnel (EP) and the situation.
Establish Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) in theatre of anticipated Non-Combatant Operations (NEO).
Establish initial CIS framework.
Establish Forward Operating Base (FOB), APOD, SPOD, evacuation points and reception centre.
Secure vital points and key terrain.
Secure routes authorized for evacuation.
Support to evacuation centre.
Evacuation of EPs.

### 1.3.5. ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS (HA)

Situations which create or exacerbate existing humanitarian emergencies may, if not addressed rapidly and effectively at an early stage, lead to regional instability. When appropriate, and at the request of the EU the armed forces contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations (HA), normally as part of a coordinated international effort.

Acting as a force for good an EU BG can provide security as well as participating in the delivery of humanitarian aid and specialist engineering support. This is likely to be as part of a coordinated operation to assist in areas of humanitarian crisis or natural disaster. As with stability tasks, it is key that the BGs can co-ordinate their activity with civilian agencies operating in the same environment.

#### 1.3.5.1. MISSIONS

- Preliminary operations to secure/monitor seaports and/or airports as a prerequisite for the delivery of relief supplies.
- Protection of transport and distribution of relief supplies, refugee movements and refugee camps.
- Protection of other important objects/facilities as e.g. food stores, water points etc.
- Crowd and riot control.

#### *1.3.5.2. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS*

- Operations with the consent and support of country of deployment (permissive environment).
- Very limited support by the host country.
- IOs, GOs and NGOs are likely to be in the country of deployment.

#### *1.3.5.3. SECURITY SITUATION*

- Government control is fading.
- Danger of looting.
- Potentially a violent mood among the population.
- Internal security can no longer be ensured completely.
- Threats posed by plagues/epidemics and other natural hazards

#### *1.3.5.4. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS*

Plan and execute directed operations to relieve human suffering.
Initial restoration of essential services.
Assess the extent of the disaster and offer limited technical advice.
Maintain security of assigned assisting forces.
Respect the independence of aid agencies and other supporting IOs/GOs/NGOs.
Share humanitarian information with other aid agencies and IOs/GOs/NGOs.
Provide assistance for the distribution and delivery of humanitarian aid.
Comply with UN or stated mandate to provide humanitarian relief.
Build disaster response upon local capacities and capabilities, where possible.
Build humanitarian response upon local capacities and capabilities, where possible.
InfoOps.
Facilitate the rapid access of IOs/GOs/NGOs to disaster victims/areas.
Facilitate the timely flow of relief goods to disaster victims/areas.

### **1.3. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

## 1.4.1. EMPLOYMENT

### *1.4.1.1. IN THEATRE EMPLOYABILITY*

The distinctive characteristic of the EU BG is that it will be both rapidly *deployable* and quickly *operational* with respect to IOC/FOC and, consequently, time to conduct deployment and in-theatre preparation, force integration and acclimatization all remain limited. The rapid configuration and integration of different structures and systems is likely to be a considerable challenge. It should be noted that an underpinning assumption is that there will be both an APOD/SPOD and some host nation support (HNS) available to the force in theatre. There may, however, be a requirement to protect the APOD/SPOD once established. In certain circumstances (i.e. an EO) there may be a requirement to ‘fight off the ramp’. Traditional maritime and air strengths of re-assigning very high readiness force elements offer significant potential in driving down deployment time. NATO/NATO Support Agency (NSPA) has possibilities to prepare a support structure of Commercial Support Solutions for the Troop-Contributing Nations. NSPA can only be addressed by a NATO/NSPA member. Therefore it is advisable that a NATO member is part of the logistic staff.

The employment of the BGs on these operations will most likely be in one of three methods:

### *1.4.1.2. AUTONOMOUS ACTIVITIES*

An EU BG must have the ability to operate autonomously when the security situation allows. Even though it will be capable of undertaking combat operations its size will limit its effectiveness in non-permissive environments. However, when the situation is largely benign a BG should have the capability to operate for at least 30 days without having to rely on external support (up to 120 days with access to reliable logistic support).

### *1.4.1.3. EARLY ENTRY FORCE*

Finabel definition: An Early Entry Force (EEF) is a force capable of responding quickly to an emerging crisis and is designed and equipped to prevent the development of the crisis or if that fails contain the crisis and create the conditions for the deployment of follow-on or re-enforcement forces. EEF must have the capability to carry out precursory limited activities, such as the deployment and support of Special Operations Units.

The main capabilities for an EU BG acting as an EEF are:

#### 1.4.1.3.1. STRATEGIC DEPLOYABILITY

EU should be able to take the decision to launch an operation within five (5) days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and that forces start implementing their mission on the ground no later than ten (10) days after that decision. In reality this means that a BG has IOC on the ground within 10 days or less after the EU Council has approved the CMC. It is the EU ambition to declare FOC NLT 45 days after that decision. This short timeline might require certain military activities (from OHQ: military strategic information gathering team (MSIGT) from (F)HQ: operational liaison reconnaissance team (OLRT), preparation, deployment of fact finding teams) before the CMC is

officially approved. Such activities require direction by the responsible bodies of the EU as early as possible days before an operation can be launched.

#### 1.4.1.3.2. CREDIBLE COMBAT POWER

An EU BG must have sufficient combat power to achieve the mission it has been given. Without this it quickly runs the risk of losing credibility which will lead to mission failure.

#### 1.4.1.3.3. STAND-ALONE ISTAR

For an EU BG an organic ISTAR capability is vital. Besides an all sources analysis cell and a Collection Coordination and Information Requirements Management (CCIRM) cell, this could include integral assets such as HUMINT, ground reconnaissance, SIGINT capacities and RPAS but will also benefit on reach back for much of the intelligence processing.

#### 1.4.1.3.4. SUSTAINABILITY

All elements of the EU BG must have the ability to be self-sustaining on early entry operations for periods of at least 72 hours. The EU BG must be able to sustain itself for a minimum of 30 days.

#### 1.4.1.3.5. COMPLEX TERRAIN

There is high probability that an EU BG will deploy to theatres that include widely urbanized areas or rough terrain (e.g. mountain, desert). The requirement will be then for a high level of unit training to enable the unit to conduct operation in complex environments.

#### 1.4.1.3.6. SELF-PROTECTION CAPABILITY

An EU BG must possess a robust self-protection capability from the effects of direct fire, indirect fire and the hazards of the environment. While this requirement applies to every military unit, it becomes a priority for entry forces that will not be able to take advantage of a higher force protection network, already in place in mature theatres of operations.

#### *1.4.1.4. A BRIDGING FORCE*

In some circumstances an EU BG may, by exception, be used to reinforce troops already on the ground on an on-going EU/UN Mission. This should only be for a limited period and for specific tasks that would give the EU or the UN time to prepare and deploy other forces that would take over these tasks on an enduring basis. Bridging activities are most likely when an existing operation is expanding or changing (e.g. Operation *ARTEMIS* in DRC).

#### 1.4.2. DEPLOYING AN EU BATTLEGROUP

There are a number of challenges facing the EU in its ability to meet the criteria it has placed on its BG concept. Even though some are political in nature this chapter concentrates on the practical aspects of preparing for and executing EU BG operations.

#### *1.4.2.1. AT DISTANCE*

To deploy an EU BG over 6,000km within 10 days might require the lead elements of the force to be deployed by air. Freetown in Sierra Leone is 5500 km from Rotterdam by sea and a single fast (15 knots) container ship would require a minimum of 10 days to move between the two ports. This does not take into account loading and unloading as well as congestion caused by other ships on the same operation. Obviously an operation inland would then require the movement of the force from the port of disembarkation to the area of operation.

#### *1.4.2.2. STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT*

An EU BG will deploy using all available strategic means, likely to be principally air transport assets to move its personnel, materiel and stocks. It is highly desirable that deployable platforms be 'air-transportable'. The ability to deploy a force strategically directly from Europe to an in-theatre APOD will be governed by operational priorities and could also utilize commercial spot charters (CSC). Determining the desired order of arrival, informed by existing readiness states, will be critical to ensuring successful and rapid action. This must prompt further analysis on how the air transport fleet might become more effective and the air/sea mix of strategic lift for the build-up of follow-on forces. Analysis conducted by the UK so far strongly indicates that current levels of air transport must be supplemented by parallel sea-deployment to meet policy targets. Sealift readiness profiles, pre-deployment warning time, an early decision to prepare will all be critical in the efficient use of shipping, as vessels could be loaded and sailed from the home base while the political process is ongoing.

#### *1.4.3. STANDARDS AND TRAINING*

Commonly defined and agreed, detailed military capability standards for the EU BGs are a necessity. Whenever possible such standards should be the same as those required for similar formations assigned to the NRF (NATO-standards). The necessary training and preparation of the forces to meet these defined requirements remains the responsibility of the FN and other TCNs. In order for the EU to have confidence in the ability of the BGs there must be clear set of standards against which they can be assessed. These will vary across many dimensions but, collectively, will indicate whether a particular BG can successfully undertake the tasks expected of it.

##### *1.4.3.1. NATIONAL TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES*

Even though all contributing states will understand EU and NATO doctrine they will all interpret it in slightly differing ways. It is unreasonable to expect that they should have to adapt these to a centralized European system for the duration of their tenure as an EU BG.

##### *1.4.3.2. NATIONAL TRAINING STANDARDS AND METHODS*

All states will make contributions to the EU from existing forces. They will, therefore, approach their time as an EU BG from a different background and have different training standards. These will be adapted to the tasks of an EU BG but flexibility needs to be retained as to how the various states adapt their forces—one size will not fit all.

#### *1.4.3.3. BEST PRACTICE*

Centralized systems rarely allow for development of best practice.

If all the contributing states are able to undertake their own certification of their Battlegroups there will soon be a number of differing experiences as to how this was done; lessons learned will have been identified and be shared.

#### *1.4.3.4. DRAWBACKS*

Even though a self-certification process is currently used it has some major drawbacks:

**Differing Standards.** Whilst some states may have high standards in some areas other may have vastly different standards in others. This, again, may only become apparent when a BG is committed.

**Interoperability in Multinational Battlegroups.** Unless the multinational BGs have sufficient time to train together there is a risk that interoperability issues become their greatest weakness when committed to an operation. There are no EU exercises yet to test these issues but it is up to the FN to address these challenges.

#### *1.4.4. INTEROPERABILITY*

There is a strong possibility that an EU BG could be employed as an initial entry force or alongside already deployed forces. Procedures and equipment need to be in place that will allow the BG to operate together with these other forces. Both internal the EU BG, as in combination with other forces, priority should be given to the command and control domain. Technical interoperability of communication equipment is a prerequisite for all communication.

##### *1.4.4.1. COMMAND AND CONTROL*

Standardized command and control procedures should be strived for but challenges in this area can be reduced through the exchange of liaison officers. The framework nation should realize that this requires extra capacity, both to send as to receive liaison officers. It is unlikely that all the tactical battlefield systems can be made interoperable with other states but there are a number of systems used at the formation level that might be. Therefore the training for all staff for the same systems should be provided by FN.

##### *1.4.4.2. CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE*

There are many differing concepts and doctrine for similar activities amongst EU members. For example: the definition of stability and the tasks therein differ widely. It will be the role the OHQ to ensure that these differences are not a hindrance to the tactical aspects of carrying out the operations. There would be a big advantage for all EU TCN to follow EU and NATO concepts and doctrine.

##### *1.4.4.3. LOGISTICS*

Different equipment types bring their own interoperability issues; each EU BG needs to be independently supportable. Since the BG is made up from more than a single state, clear responsibilities must be in place to ensure that equipment can be robustly supported. Interoperability issues go beyond equipment but this is the area where the BG is most vulnerable to failure. The general logistic support will be provided by the generated capabilities, whilst the specific logistic support should be provided by the unit/nation which provides the capability that requires the specific support, since this procedure seems to be usual in multinational logistics environments. But the aim must be to reduce the logistic footprint in the theatre by a streamlined multinational approach in order to decrease the expense of deployment/employment of logistic forces, to save personnel, to save costs and finally to streamline structures and procedures.

#### *1.4.4.4. TRAINING*

In order to have a high chance of success EU BG made up from more than a single state must have completed combined arms training together. This will not only prove the competence of the troops to work together but also give the commander confidence in his forces. The same applies for the entire staff.

#### *1.4.4.5. LEGAL / RULES OF ENGAGEMENTS*

The legal aspects and rules of engagement (ROE) issues should not hinder the rapid deployment of an EU BG. Many of these issues should be discussed and understandings reached during the work-up training; if possible, legal memorandum of understanding should be signed by all EU States in advance. But it should be desirable that there is a ROE/MOU signed between the EU and the countries within the EU BG's Area of Operations (AOO) before it is deployed. The commander of the EU BG may have a Legal Advisor in his staff. On his turn he needs his own staff and support of the higher HQ. It has to be taken in consideration that the more a BG will get involved in the stabilization of a country, the more legal aspects will occur.

#### *1.4.4.6. WORKING WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES*

There is a strong possibility that civilian agencies might be in the AOO before the BG deploys; if not they are likely to be there soon after. These include HN security forces, IOs, GOs NGOs and private security companies. The commander and his staff are responsible for ensuring that co-ordination with other agencies is carried out at all levels. This will require a CIMIC staff element.

### **1.5. SUMMARY**

The tasks have been divided into a framework of operate, prepare, project, command, inform, protect and sustain. The paper lists those tasks that an EU BG should be prepared to undertake. This gives the guidance required to the FNs and TCN (MS and third states) providing the troops in order that they can train, equip and prepare the various force elements in a coherent fashion.

## ANNEX A: GROUPS OF TASKS RELEVANT TO ALL ACTIVITIES

### PREPARE

All tasks necessary to define resources and deliver military capabilities, within graduated readiness criteria, for operational employment. This is to be completed before the BG is certified as being FOC and enters the standby period.

The FN, supported by TCNs, should be able to:

<b>TASKS</b>
<p><b>Force Generation</b></p> <p>Force generate all elements of the BG before the training period begins. Force generation is the process of designing, enlisting and providing suitably trained and equipped forces and their means of deployment, recovery and sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks, within required readiness and preparation time.</p>
<p><b>Certification</b></p> <p>Certify that the BG is capable of accomplishing all potential missions</p>
<p><b>Conduct Equipment Preparation</b></p> <p>Ensure that equipment is maintained in a serviceable and functional condition by the BG. Equipment will also need to be prepared and held for the deployment phase (movements by air / land / sea) and subsequent conduct of operations within the readiness.</p>
<p><b>Conduct Materiel Preparation</b></p> <p>Ensure that all materiel preparation includes all activities related to ensuring that the BG, sub-units or/and individual personnel is correctly provisioned with an endorsed and serviceable scale of equipment and consumables appropriate to role and probable task.</p>
<p><b>Conduct Personnel Preparation</b></p> <p>Ensure that all personnel are ready to deploy. This will not only require them to be trained but also made and administratively prepared to deploy into regions which might have virulent diseases.</p> <p>Medical and Dental fitness is at the responsibility of the TCNs.</p>
<p><b>Training</b></p> <p>Ensure all personnel are trained individually and collectively in all the tasks they may be required to perform. However, multinational and national training should continue whilst the BG is committed. Organising the collective training is the task of the FN.</p>

## ANNEX B: PROJECT

The deployment and recovery, in a timely manner, of a tailored force package, in order to achieve a stated objective.

The BG should be able to:

<b>TASKS</b>
Plan and execute theatre entry to form a bridgehead for subsequent operations or to allow follow on forces to be introduced into theatre.
Develop a movement plan at the operational level in conjunction with all transport agencies operating in theatre.
Control all aspects of BG movement.
Provide coordination and monitoring of movement and the control of movement facilities for the deployment sustainment and recovery of the BG.
Control transport agencies within a theatre, to enable maximum efficiency and economy in movement.
Provide effective liaison with other agencies providing and operating transport within theatre.
Provide effective liaison with other national forces providing and operating transport within theatre.
Provide effective liaison with HN or other agencies providing and operating transport within theatre.
BG/formation must be able to plan and produce movement staff tables.
Conduct theatre transportation and movements.
Establish and maintain ports of disembarkation and control forward mounting bases..
Prepare a force for, and conduct intra-theatre and tactical movement.
Conduct reception, staging onward movement/integration.
Be equipped and capable of establishing and administrating a point of entry and forward mounting base.
Provide access to life support services.
Provide a sufficiently trained and equipped theatre activation group.
Be capable of concurrently receiving, sustaining, mounting and recovering forces en route to and from a theatre of operations.

Understand, or if necessary provide, a country study. Train soldiers in cultural awareness.

## ANNEX C: COMMAND

The Authority for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces.

The EU BG should be able to:

<b>TASKS</b>
<b>Plan</b>
<p>Conduct an estimate.</p> <p>Basic mission analysis.</p> <p>Evaluation of factors and development of courses of action (COAs).</p> <p>COA development takes account of enemy COAs, mission analysis and the commander's direction.</p> <p>War gaming is conducted (depending on available time) to validate a given COA.</p> <p>Commander's decision</p>
<p>Develop and review the plan.</p> <p>Main Effort depends on the type of operation.</p> <p>ROE are integrated in the plan and understood at all levels.</p>
<p>Time appreciation</p> <p>One third / two thirds rule at every level in order that subordinates have time to conduct their own planning.</p> <p>Plans and orders are produced and delivered in a timely fashion (see above) and are clearly understood.</p>
<p>CS and CSS factors considered throughout.</p> <p>Combined joint fires TTPs/SOPs/SOIs in place and respective C2-arrangements established</p>
<p>Contingency planning will be conducted iteratively whilst current operations are being executed.</p>
<b>Control</b>
<p>Exercise the functions of the EU BG HQ required to support the commander.</p>
<p>Undertake the staff processes required to achieve those functions are articulated and understood.</p>

Manage appropriate staff branches which should be manned correctly.
Have sufficient redundancy to allow for 24/7 operations.
Ensure that all staff is fully trained.
Have the procedures in place to fully integrate augmentees and liaison parties.
Ensure that SOPs & SOIs are current, articulate all the functions and processes of the (F)HQ or EU BG HQ, and are distributed appropriately.
<b>Liaise</b>
Ensure the liaison appropriate to the level of command and the nature of the operation.
Ensure the liaison officer/detachment fully understands the commander's intent, concept of operations and plan.
Ensure suitable communications are available and effective.
Have the appropriate administrative procedures in place to support the liaison officer and staff.
<b>Air/Land/Sea Coordination</b>
Ensure the SOIs of the aircraft/ships being supported are available and understood as far as they affect the land force element.
Personnel have received training appropriate to the level of support being provided.
<b>Civil and Military Integration</b>
Make sure the BG can provide liaison in crisis, peace or war between military forces and the civilian authorities, organizations and populations in an area where a military force is deployed.
Comprehensive Approach: Take into account all actors in the planning and the conduct of operations.
<b>Command Support</b>
Ensure robust Command Post functionality.
Ensure effective communications is maintained.
Protect all command and control nodes.

## ANNEX D: INTELLIGENCE

The Intelligence staff should work in line with NATO AJP-2.0 „Intelligence,, and ATP-3.2.1. “Allied Land Tactics”. Counter-Intelligence and Security Regulations according to NATO standards should be taken into account.

The following schedule gives an overview on the highlights of the most important aspects of the Intel process and is not complete. Detailed information is to be found in the respective AJP and ATP.

<b>TASKS</b>
<b>Direction</b>
<p>Develop Priority Intel Requirements (PIR) and define timeframes for their provision.</p> <p>Develop an Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) displaying how the Intelligence Requirements (IR) will be satisfied.</p> <p>Issue the Requests for Information when not able to collect required information.</p>
<b>Collection</b>
<p>In accordance with ICP, task the appropriate collection capability and send appropriate RFIs.</p> <p>Manage the sent and received RFIs.</p> <p>Store all the data, info and Intel in a common shared database.</p> <p>Manage the collection operation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Task collection assets / send new RFIs as needed.</li> <li>2. Update the ICP if needed.</li> </ol> <p>Ensure the timely delivery of the requested and collected data into the processing phase.</p>
<p>Ensure Medical Intelligence.</p>
<p>Data Base Management.</p>
<b>Processing</b>
<p>Collate, evaluate, analyse, integrate and interpret all data, Info and Intel.</p> <p>Produce intelligence to meet the PIR of the ICP.</p> <p>Constantly review the intelligence situation and initiate new Intel cycles to meet the new Intel requirements within ICP or urgent requirements.</p>

Feed the targeting process with intelligence on potential targets.
<b>Dissemination</b>
Distribute the relevant Intel to the entitled personnel within the right timescale and under the right format.
Provide Intel parts of briefings to Cdr and Staff.
Issue INTSUM.

Before the staff begins planning of the operations, it has to be aware of the situation in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The Intelligence section/branch is in the lead of the “Comprehensive Preparation of the Operations Environment” (CPOE) cross-functional board and gives the situational awareness briefing to the staff.

“The CPOE<sup>14</sup> is a crisis-specific cross-headquarters process, led by the intelligence/knowledge staff, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment covering all PMESII<sup>15</sup> domains, including associated potential threats and risks, in support of planning and the conduct of a campaign or operation. It develops an integrated understanding of the main characteristics of the operational environment including its land, air/space, maritime dimensions, as well as the PMESII systems of main adversaries, friends and neutral actors that may influence joint operations. CPOE products will be developed as necessary to support the work of the operational OPP phases”.

Due to the short time between CMC is agreed on and IOC of EU BG, such a CPOE has to be developed as soon as possible by the Intel branch of the OHQ, which is the most likely to be designated.

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<sup>14</sup> Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) Interim V2.0 – 04 Oct 13

<sup>15</sup> Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information

## ANNEX E: PROTECT

The capability to conserve the fighting potential of a deployed force by countering the wider threat to its elements from adversaries, natural hazards, and fratricide.

An EU BG should be able to:

<b>TASK</b>
Conduct a Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process that identifies threats to force.
Articulate force protection measures and enforce them.
Ensure that force protection measures are adequately resourced.
Identify and disseminate areas of risk.
Maintain a risk register and take measures to mitigate risk where appropriate.
Have a system in place to monitor existing and identify new threats.
Ensure MedIntel on every level to establish a medical picture and holistic medical situational awareness.
Ensure medical fitness of all contributing personnel.
Establish a sufficient system to ensure drug, medical product and food safety.
Ensure and control hygienic conditions.
Monitor endemic human and animal diseases.
Monitor microbiological and chemical water quality.
Take physical force protection measures.
<b>CBRN</b>
Establish a system to monitor CBRN and environmental health threats and disseminate guidance on appropriate posture (dress states etc.).
Ensure all personnel understand drills for employment of protection equipment.
<b>Air Defence</b>
Plan and coordinate integrated air defence measures.

Control air defence assets.
Deploy air defence assets to provide necessary protection.
Ensure that actions on enemy air vehicles are understood at all levels.
Have procedures for warning and reporting that are known at all levels.
Ensure that post attack measures are known and executed correctly.
<b>Counter UAS</b>
Plan and coordinate integrated air defence measures to counter UASs.
Control air defence assets to counter UASs.
Deploy air defence assets to counter UASs.
<b>C-IED</b>
Have a common understanding of the Comprehensive C-IED Approach and the available capabilities.
Incorporate required C-IED capabilities in HQ structures to ensure full staff participation C-IED.
Monitor and identify current and emerging threats.
Ensure an effective Understanding and Intelligence.
Disseminate intelligence on IEDs and related adversary TTPs quickly and modify friendly TTPs to be as up-to-date, appropriate and effective as possible.
Establish a proper EOD Capability and Capacity. An EOD Cell in the BG HQ is required. <sup>16</sup>
Implement C-IED Information Management procedures and architecture among the nations.
Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM).

<sup>16</sup> In some MS it includes also an IEDD capability.

## ANNEX F: SUSTAIN

The maintenance of the necessary level of combat power for the duration required for a force to achieve its objectives. It is a combination of logistics, medical support, administration, resources and organization.

EU BG should be able to:

<b>TASKS</b>
<b>Transport and Movement</b>
Consider Logistic planning factors (demand, distance, destination and duration) and impact on operations during estimate process.
Identify external lift capacity required.
Identify main supply routes and capacities as appropriate.
Establish and protect APODs and SPODs as required.
Estimate APOD and SPOD capacities as applicable.
Provide relevant force protection for all resupply activities.
Consider and integrate transport and movement operations into sustainment plans.
<b>Materiel Support</b>
Receipt, store and distribute materiel as required.
Re-distribute materiel to meet operational needs commensurate with the BG role.
Ensure personnel involved in provision of materiel support possess relevant competencies/qualifications.
<b>Equipment Support</b>
Allocate available spares assets in accordance with the J3/7 operational and training priorities.
Provide the scaling of spares and the forward repair pool of engines and major assemblies in support of the operational and training priorities.
Monitor co-ordinate and report spares availability problems and cross servicing with the chain of command.

<b>TASKS</b>
Manage the local purchase, direct supply or exchange.
Provide specialist advice to the chain of command on equipment support material matters.
Plan and co-ordinate the management of materiel in all phases of operations in order to maintain tempo and freedom of action.
<b>Medical</b>
Establish medical C3.
Ensure medical timelines.
Establish sufficient according to casualty estimation, meteorological endemic and geographic situation.
Establish a sufficient CASEVAC/MEDEVAC System.
Provide a Medical Concept.
Conduct sufficient Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) training for all troops.
Establish a sufficient Health Protection System.
Ensure medical supply chains and maintenance capacities.

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<p><b>3. Promulgation:</b></p>	<p><b>4. Revision:</b></p>
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<p><b>8. Lead nation:</b></p> <p>FI</p>	<p><b>9. Address:</b></p> <p>ARMY COMMAND FINLAND</p> <p>P.O. BOX 145</p> <p>FI 50190 MIKKELI</p>
<p><b>10. Key words:</b></p> <p>Activities, Missions, Tasks, Employment, EU BG Concept, Multinationality, Interoperability</p>	
<p><b>11. Summary:</b></p> <p>The aim of this study is to inform those member states providing elements of the EU BG what activities, missions and tasks the BG might be required to undertake. This will allow them to prepare and train the EU BGs to meet these challenges. It will also ensure that all Member States have a common understanding of the meaning of these Activities in order that there is coherence across the</p>	

member states when providing this capability. It also highlights some of the challenges that each member state might encounter.

**12. Abstract :** (same classification as the study)

### **INTEREST / USEFULNESS OF THE STUDY**

Many of the Finabel States are likely to contribute to implementing the EU BG Concept. This study provides guidelines for the planners in force generation and preparation of the BG, as well as explaining which tasks the BG must be able to undertake at the tactical level.

### **MAIN ASPECTS**

In May 2004, the European Headline Goal was updated by the Headline Goal 2010 stating that autonomous two EU BGs, which would be kept at a high alert state, were to be generated to react to crises through rapid deployment and, if necessary, intervention. Even though the main Activities that the BGs might be expected to undertake were explained the actual tasks that made up these activities were not detailed. This was considered to be a gap which Finabel could fill; the study attempts to articulate these tasks.

### **METHODOLOGY**

The paper describes the overall concept, composition, activities, missions and challenges for the EU BG before stating the tasks they must be able to undertake to accomplish such missions. Those tasks are divided between operate, prepare, project, command, inform, protect and sustain.

### **KEY ELEMENTS**

The key elements of the initiative are:

- Stand-alone BG-sized forces (around 1,500 strong, including combat support and combat service support) and an associated Force and Operational HQs (F)HQ that will have to operate within a coalition context.
- The force should be on mission within 10 days of an EU decision to launch an operation.
- Sustainable for 30 days (but extendable up to 120 days).
- Deployable over 6000km from Brussels (this is the planning target but not a limitation).
- Two concurrent operations; the deployment phases for each may have to be conducted separately and successively (it is unreasonable to expect the EU to conduct the deployment phase for two BGs simultaneously over extended distances).
- BGs are based on the principle of multinationality, which means that interoperability is vital.

## **ACTIVITIES**

The 5 Activities that the BG should be able to undertake are :

- Conflict prevention.
- Separation of parties by force.
- Stabilization, reconstruction and military advice.
- Evacuation.
- Assistance to humanitarian operations.

## **CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The paper considered the following challenges and recommendations:

### **In Theatre Employability**

The rapid configuration and integration of different structures and systems is likely to be a considerable challenge.

The employment of the BGs will most likely be in one of three methods:

#### **1. Autonomous Activities**

An EU BG must have the ability to operate autonomously when the security situation allows. Even though it will be capable of undertaking combat operations its size will limit its effectiveness in non-permissive environments.

#### **2. Early Entry Force**

The main challenges for an EU BG acting as an EEF are:

- Strategic deployability.
- Credible combat power.
- Stand-alone ISTAR.
- Sustainability.
- Complex terrain.
- Self-protection.

### **3. Bridging Force**

In some circumstances an EU BG may, by exception, be used to reinforce troops already on the ground on an EU/UN Mission. But the temptation to use an EU BG to fill gaps on an enduring operation must be resisted.

#### **DEPLOYING AN EU BATTLEGROUP**

There are a number of challenges facing the EU in its ability to meet the criteria it has placed on its Battlegroup concept.

##### **At Distance**

To deploy an EU BG over 6,000km within 10 days might require the lead elements of the force to be deployed by air.

##### **Strategic Deployment**

Strategic Deployment challenges require further analysis on how the air transport fleet might become more effective and the air/sea mix of strategic lift for the build-up of follow-on forces.

##### **Standards And Training**

In order for the EU to have confidence in the ability of the BGs there must be clear set of standards against which they can be assessed.

##### **Interoperability**

There is a strong possibility that an EU BG could be employed as an early entry force or alongside already deployed forces. Procedures and equipment need to be in place that will allow the BG to operate with these other State's forces. Key challenges are:

- Command And control
- Concepts and doctrine
- Logistics
- Training
- Legal / ROEs
- Working with civilian agencies

##### **TASKS**

The Tasks are divided into a framework of operate, prepare, project, command, inform, protect and sustain. The paper lists those tasks that an EU BG should be prepared to undertake. This gives the

guidance required to the States providing the troops in order that they can train, equip and prepare the various force elements in a coherent fashion.

## **2. CONCEIVABLE EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE(S) FOR AN EU BATTLE GROUP (EU BG) AT TACTICAL LEVEL**

### **2.1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

The aim of this study is to contribute to specifying which could be the effects expected from an EU BG in a military land heavy activity, in which it could take part autonomously, in accordance with the agreed EU BG concept.

### **2.2. EMPLOYMENT OF AN EUBG**

#### **2.2.1. COMPLEX SCENARIOS**

We can consider that EU BG will have to operate in complex scenarios. A scenario is considered complex when there is the possibility of the occurrence of simultaneous operations of different intensity and nature (conventional military operations, operations against asymmetric enemies and humanitarian operations, for example), and when different actors to those habitually involved in a conventional armed conflict intervene or are present (such as international organizations, NGO's, tribal militias, criminal organizations, etc.). Also, the local civilian population will probably have cultural values and standards of living quite different to those of the states that constitute the military force.

In general terms, the following characteristics can be determined about this kind of scenarios:

- There is the presence of other actors actively involved in the resolution of the conflict such as representatives of the UN or other civil administrative organizations, GOs, IOs, NGO's and armed personnel of security companies, etc., as well as personnel of the international mass media. These actors have different attitudes towards the force, which can range from total acceptance and cooperation to hostility. Also, these actors can have quite distinct objectives leading to rivalry amongst them. Therefore, guidance from strategic and military strategic levels on interaction is crucial to be able to show force coherence.
- The majority of the force's objectives are to be found in built-up areas, where civilian populations are located.
- Operations will be executed normally by small units acting independently.
- The values, customs, cultural references and perceptions of the civilian population are very different to those of the force. Also, the social structure may not be much evolved and other stronger forms of authority exist (tribal, ethnic, religious, etc.) parallel to the established civil administration.
- The opponent/threat is likely to be mixed with the civil population and therefore it is very difficult to identify and also very difficult to detect its activities and support.
- There is a need to co-ordinate the military operations with the action of a civilian administration (local or international).

The force finds itself restrained by political control from home territory, resulting from the impact public opinion has over the outcome of operations.

### 2.2.2. CORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE LAND COMPONENT

<b>OFFENSIVE</b>	<b>DEFENSIVE</b>	<b>STABILITY</b>	
Attack	Defence	Security and Control	
Raid	Delay	Support to Security Sector Reform	
Exploitation		Initial Restoration of Services	
Pursuit		Interim Governance Tasks	
Feint			
Demonstration			
Ambush			
Breakout			
Reconnaissance in Force			
<b>ENABLING</b>			
Reconnaissance	Link-Up	Retirement	
Security	Relief of Encircled Force	March	
Advance to Contact	Relief of Troops in Combat	Obstacle	
Meeting Engagement	Withdrawal		
Breaching/Crossing			

### 2.2.3. EXPECTED STRATEGIC END STATE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE EU BG

The EU, possibly together with the wider international community, will set the strategic end state based on political requirements. This will be synthesized in the CMC at the strategic/operational level to create a Crisis Management Concept (including all levers of national power) to address the crisis or conflict. The military strategic planning will then result in an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) which, after political decision, will result in direction to an OHQ to translate it into military strategic planning. This planning is linked to the civilian components, in order to achieve the end state. At this stage it might decide on the military objectives to be achieved at the tactical level. These military objectives will be able to be achieved for the EU BG being the only force present at the Operations Theatre (stand-alone force) or the EU BG will have assigned partial objectives as an entry force the AOO enabling the rest of the force deployment (follow-on forces).

#### 2.2.4. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE RACTIVAL EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG

The tactical employment of an EU BG is dependent on some constraints and limitations.

Constraints:

- The core of the EU BG should be made up of about 1500 troops (including Combat Support and Combat Service Support). The (F)HQ and operational and strategic enablers are not included in these numbers.
- Notice to move (NTM) within 5 - 10 days; the force should have the capability to start implementation of the mission within 10 days of an EU decision to launch an operation.
- Sustainable for 30 days (but extendable up to 120 days).
- Deployable over 6000 km from Brussels.
- Support by air and naval forces if necessary
- The number of states involved in an EU BG: the concept allows for the establishment of national, bi-national or multinational BG.

Limitations:

- Technical, tactical, and CSS interoperability  
Constraints in combat power, operational and tactical mobility, AOO size and FP due to its “battalion” size a BG must consist of ground forces but does not have to be a joint unit.
- Limitations concerning the use of force e.g. ROE.
- National caveats.

#### 2.2.5. PRINCIPLES OF THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG

Agility	Ability to react to different changes in the situation occurring at the same time (three block war) This involves being broad-minded and developing simple plans with alternative solutions. Maintaining an appropriate reserve is essential for tactical flexibility.
Credibility	Perception of all parties in the crises of the force as being able to deal with the mission. National popular support adds up to the strength and will achieve the mission.  Activity of the BG must meet the expectations created by the decision to launch the operation and public information on intent and capabilities, both in the country of employment and throughout the rest of the world.
Legitimacyand	The employment of force is based on international agreements,

Proportionality	laws and ROE's. Military capabilities should be applied with appropriate precision (Minimum Force Required).
Initiative	Recognizing and exploiting unexpected opportunities that arise during operations and contribute to achieving the commander's intent. This principle is emphasized by the fact that most of the actions are to be developed by small units.
Information superiority	Influence the opponent's situational awareness and decision making process and protect one's own.
Mobility	Give priority to mobile combat operations during the deployment into the country of employment and during tactical operations (combining movement and the use of weapons) This principle is emphasized by the fact that a big AOR for the EU BG will be usual.
Security and protection	Of deployed armed forces, international organizations and the country's civilian population
Concentration of Force	Deployment of assets as effectively as possible (concentration of effort, force ratio and echeloning).
Cooperation	Cooperation of EU BG with other armed forces and civil authorities. Basic cooperation aspects are willingness, a common purpose and a clear and previously agreed distribution of responsibilities, as well as understanding others' capacities and limitations.
Objective	An EU BG mission should be aimed at achieving clearly defined, decisive and attainable military objectives (it is important to avoid "mission creep").

## 2.3. CHARACTERISTICS

### 2.3.1. STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL MOBILITY

Mobility describes the capability to move forces overland, by sea or by air. It comprises of both strategic and operational deployability as well as tactical mobility of forces and assets in the joint area of operations. Strategic and operational deployability as well as tactical mobility of forces and assets in theatre are indispensable for achieving quick and direct effects during an operation and being able to conduct strategic and operational deployments in the context of force projection. Rapidly deployable and robust forces are required for this purpose.

- Strategic deployability is the prerequisite for fielding, augmenting and supplying forces in distant operational areas. The strategic deployability needed for this purpose requires adequate, timely and securely available air, sea and land transport capacities and procedures. A precondition is deployable forces, ready to deploy. Strategic deployment needs to be planned on a joint and multinational basis, using all modes of transport for expeditionary operations, including civilian resources.
- Operational deployability allows for a fast move across large distances and a shifting of focus as part of a land, air or sea operation. It includes movements in spite of poorly developed infrastructure and even under threat, if applicable.

Tactical mobility by own means is the prerequisite for an effective deployment of forces and constitutes the basis for the conduct of operations. It permits movement by own means within the area of operations even under geographically and climatically difficult circumstances, in an environment with a poor infrastructure, overcoming barriers and obstacles and even under opponent fire and with the required protection of own forces.

### 2.3.2. MULTINATIONALITY

Multinationality is a visible feature of international solidarity and an expression of the will to collaborate for the benefit of shared values. Multinational cooperation may take place in alliances. The broad spectrum of military capabilities required for this purpose can hardly be provided in the face of limited national resources. Complex military operations that have to be sustained for an extended period of time cannot be conducted by one state alone. Multinational cooperation allows a better and more effective use of existing resources. The fact that forces are multinational increases the political and military impact of their action and deprives a potential adversary of the possibility of putting single states under pressure or of isolating them. Multinational cooperation permits resorting to a larger capability profile and thus raises the options for action, increases sustainability and reduces risks. Additionally, it allows for decreasing redundancies by the distribution of tasks, by role specialization, the establishment of pools or the joint operation of facilities.

The disadvantages of multinationality become particularly clear whenever armed forces of an alliance or a coalition do have deficits in terms of interoperability that cannot be reduced. Therefore, interoperability capability is of utmost priority for the composition of multinational contingents.

The defined standards and procedures should be complementary to NATO (NRF) documents, nevertheless taking into account the characteristics of the EU. They must also enable the conduct of a hand-over to follow-on forces under the authority of other organizations, e.g. the UN. This should be expanded to include the obvious logistical problems associated with multinationality as well as issues of training and preparation.

### *2.3.2.1. LEVEL OF MULTINATIONALITY OF UNITS*

For the core Battalion (Bn)<sup>17</sup> and all other units below company level multinationality would not be appropriate. For other elements (the (F)HQ, CS, CSS of the BG and the operational and strategic enablers) a specific level cannot be defined as this depends on effectiveness and interoperability.

This statement is based in the fact that at the tactical level actions to be developed by the EU BG need close coordination among all their elements, as well as a common training to attain required efficiency and an excessive multinational organization below the level recommended may be harmful. We consider that the level of multinationality could descend to lower echelons only when very specific capabilities are required and their tasks do not involve a high level of collective training (CBRN teams, bridge platoons, signal, MPs, PSYOPS, etc.).

### *2.3.2.2. NUMBER OF STATES FOR AN EU BATTLEGROUP*

Theoretically there is no limit on the number of different nationalities that can contribute to a single BG. In multinational operations every state provides forces and capabilities within the scope of its capacities. It must be reviewed whether a BG can be set up mainly consisting of national and/or bi-national elements. Emphasis should be on ensuring a well-balanced combination of multinationality, in the sense of burden-sharing and military effectiveness, aimed at mission accomplishment. For this purpose, a 2+1 form could be considered, i.e. a bi-national BG and a partner having niche capability. For ease of training and force preparation, however, it is suggested to keep the number as small as possible.

For the same reason the core Battalion, should primarily be national or should be at least composed of elements that have an existing relationship of affiliation or cooperation in order to minimize frictions in a situation of hardship.

### *2.3.2.3. PROS AND CONS OF NATIONAL/MULTINATIONAL C2*

In view of the close interaction between (F)HQ and the core of the EU BG the highest possible degree of interoperability is required. Therefore, the objective will be to have both elements provided by the same lead nation. The lead nation should provide for the necessary command and control systems. In this case, the interoperability of the command and control system would be guaranteed.

Multinationality may impact on effective communication and therefore on effective C2.

There are several layers in the chain of command from the (F)HQ down to the lowest level. When systems are not interoperable the responsibility to provide communication means is one level down. If several layers are provided by different states due to multinationality duplicity of terminals and other communications means would usually be the result, unless a lead state provides the command and control system to more levels down. The latter solution however would involve a previous training period.

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<sup>17</sup> The EU BG concept speaks about “Infantry Bn”, while in this study the term “core Bn” is used to reflect all options that can be used to form up this capability (mostly combat troops).

Another important point is the fact that if states have contributed to EU BG with some elements, they would usually be required to provide liaison(s) to the (F)HQ and/or Bn CP. Establishing excessively multinational BGs would lead to oversized command posts and serious delays in the decision-cycle, effects that will obviously have to be avoided.

Considering the above the number of participating states should be limited. A bi-national BG or the 2 + 1 form mentioned in the previous paragraph provide the most reliable option for effective command and control if resourcing a BG from a single nation although possible is unlikely. In such a BG the lead nation providing the (F)HQ should provide the command and control system to the core of the BG (the Infantry Bn) and the CS- and CSS-elements. In view of the close interaction between (F)HQ and the core Bn the aim should be to have the same lead nation. It is possible to include more nations to an EU BG. This however requires extensive preparations and training prior to deployment.

#### *2.3.2.4. GUIDELINES FOR THE COMPOSITION OF OHQ/(F)HQ*

It is assumed that the OHQ should provide the military-strategic command of the operation, and the (F)HQ should provide operational command. Clear command and control arrangements are needed to ensure the unified command. It is necessary to clearly establish the authority of the multinational commander over the forces assigned to him by clear command relationships. The establishment of an (F)HQ in addition to the OHQ ensures a stringent and effective command and control and is therefore an expedient measure. All troop contributing states should be adequately involved in the establishment of the (F)HQ (mainly) and the OHQ<sup>18</sup>.

In general terms, the OHQ should be to plan and execute the Campaign Plan to achieve the military strategic objectives, including strategic enablers. The (F)HQ should operate at the operational level organizing and synchronizing the EU BG operations including the operational enablers supporting them. However, the EU BG must observe the conduction of ongoing operations and their effects on the current operations.

The (F)HQ should adjust to a normal NATO HQ (J1, J2, J3.....) structure, and should have the capability to incorporate functions such as: strategic communications, political and legal assessment, liaison capabilities with civil authorities, GO, IO and NGO, INFO OPS, targeting, movement control, air and naval elements according to the enablers assigned, Intelligence feedback, etc.

#### *2.3.3. FLEXIBILITY*

The complexity of conflict implies that military plans should be designed for simplicity, so that subordinates can act purposefully in confusing situations; and for flexibility, so that a plan can be adapted to meet changing conditions. Flexibility applies to both individuals and to a land force as a whole. Individual flexibility is largely mental, requiring an enquiring mind and the ability to consider alternatives. Physical flexibility is the ability of a force to move from one activity to another. It should be nurtured through grouping, training, good battle procedure and robust and well-practiced drills. It

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<sup>18</sup> The OHQ is manned from a system of augmentees from all MS.

requires control systems that permit, for example, the swift massing and switching of indirect fire. It relies on fast and effective decision-making, and good staff work.

#### **2.3.4. ROBUSTNESS AND SELF RELIANCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT**

The EU BG needs personnel that shows initiative, is well trained, efficient, willing to give the best and is convinced of their mission. Their qualification, motivation and job satisfaction are key factors for operational readiness. The stress caused by operations requires soldiers to cope with physical and mental pressure. During operations in particular resolute manner assuredness and assertiveness are just as important as ethical responsibility, intercultural sensibility and language skills.

#### **2.3.5. ABILITY TO OPERATE IN COMPLEX TERRAIN**

Operations will be mostly conducted outside Europe. They can take place in surroundings characterized by unfamiliar environmental conditions, unfamiliar terrain and types of vegetation, climatic conditions, a volatile situation, destroyed infrastructure and often violent confrontation. We therefore need preparation to cater for the respective operational environments and an extensive support system in place to assist deployed forces. In many countries the way of life and thinking and the patterns of behaviour differ substantially from those of Western states. Ethnic compositions, strong social differences, religious and political convictions and legal interpretations dictate the range of prevailing norms, cultural values, customs and habits. They determine the political, economic, social and military order of the foreign social system. These often complex interrelations complicate relations of friendly forces with the population and the parties to the conflict. A violation of these norms and cultural values, for example, can be understood as an act of disparagement, disdain or discrimination. The suspicion that this act is intended to change the social order might even be regarded as a threat. Both can evoke disapproving or even hostile reactions. Knowing these foreign norms and respecting them – whenever possible and tenable – is therefore an important prerequisite for gaining acceptance and for a successful implementation of measures.

Lessons learned from recent conflicts also prove that operations are increasingly taking place in an urban environment, allowing technologically inferior opponent forces to find cover and be more effective, while operational forces are often subject to constraints out of consideration for the local population. Different types of conurbations must be taken into account. The different types of conurbations range from metropolises with a highly developed networked infrastructure to large, extremely complex ancient town centres or slum areas with a high population density and rudimentary infrastructure. Every conurbation has its specific characteristics which have a very strong impact on the size, composition and capability profile of the forces employed.

### **2.4. ANALYSIS OF MISSIONS BY COMBAT FUNCTION**

All scenarios with the possible exception of the evacuation operation meet the current trend of dispersed operations (having to cover larger areas with fewer troops) in an ever changing environment (3-blocks war). In conjunction the military is challenged with having to perform ‘non-military’ stability activities in the initial stages of operations until handover to the appropriate department or agency. As a rapidly deployable force the EU BG will most likely encounter both of these challenges.

In dispersed operations by a BG-sized force the emphasis might be on activities at low level (company, platoon, section). Due to the (potentially) unstable environment these elements will require support to be attached or, as a minimum, pre-arranged: Engineer Search, EOD, fire support, medical support etc. All, or at least a substantial number of these elements must also be highly mobile in order to be able to concentrate forces or project back-up forces in time and over longer distances if the situation so requires. Effects are ultimately achieved in the mind. The activities of the BG are perceived by the population and the media. To successfully contribute to the desired end state or situation the activities must meet the expectations of the actors involved. To keep or turn opinions in favour of the BG operation expectations and – where possible – perceptions need to be managed. This requires effective communication, backed up by credible actions.

The Commander of an EU BG should have a tactical reserve. This is an essential part of a tactical layout of forces. A reserve is able to intervene in support. The size of a reserve depends on the situation.

#### 2.4.1. COMMAND

The command and control structure is a very important factor as most of the scenarios described include civil actors, air and maritime forces resulting in the need for liaison. Furthermore, special advisory bodies (political, cultural, legal, religious, etc.) will be required. For this reason, liaison teams for establishing contacts with civil actors, air and maritime should be part of the (F)HQ structure with the Command Post (CP). On the other hand the core Bn CP should merely comprise personnel required for the conduct of operations. As it is based on the CP of a battalion, it is designed to plan and conduct military operations at the tactical level. The complexity of a stabilization operation will demand a large staff. The platform of a battalion CP is too small to support the command of a BG up to 1500 soldiers. This is not only a matter of quantity regarding the strength in personnel, but even more the diversity of a staff taking part in a stabilization operation. In practical terms the staff of an EU BG will have the size of a brigade HQ.<sup>19</sup> The possibility to conduct network enabled operations is also to be ensured. For command and control secure data links are of utmost significance. Next to that dispersed operations will increase the demand for (secure) long range communications and for means to communicate with air/maritime assets or Special Forces at a lower level (platoon).

#### 2.4.2. INTELLIGENCE

Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of operations. Intelligence is the product of the organized efforts of commanders, staffs and ISTAR collection assets to gather, analyse, and distribute data/information about the adversary, neutrals and friends and within the operational environment. Data/Information requirements are turned into intelligence through the intelligence process and the use of ISTAR assets at each level of command. These information requirements are refined into a collection plan. This plan provides the basis for acquiring information, either through the coordinated use of ISTAR assets held at that level of command or from those held at other levels of command. Additionally data/information are received from strategic level and other players (e.g. UN). The data/information received is then collated, evaluated, analysed, integrated and interpreted. The

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<sup>19</sup> See EU HQ Manning Guide 2011.

process should be timely and responsive to support decision-making, and flexible enough to support the requirements of the whole force.

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) from EW assets, HUMINT capabilities and SIGINT assets have become increasingly important as a means for collecting information. In many potential EU BG scenarios the use of UASs for intelligence collection purposes will be of great significance as well as information gathered by HUMINT. All soldiers must be aware that they can always obtain information while conducting their respective tasks. They must be trained in “tactical curiosity” or the ability to identify the relevant information within their daily Ops environment (relationships, personalities, etc.). Finally, the counterintelligence cell becomes very important, since it is responsible for maintaining OPSEC and controlling local interpreters and civil personnel in their service.

#### 2.4.3. FIREPOWER/INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Firepower represents more than lethal fires. It is the capability to reach out and affect the behaviour of the various elements and actors by influencing their understanding, will and capability. Therefore firepower ultimately aims at the psychological domain. The purpose of fires is not to simply destroy capabilities through attrition but to undermine will and shatter cohesion in order to affect behaviour. Next to lethal fires influence activities seek to directly shape the understanding, perceptions and ultimately will and behaviour of adversaries and other actors.

##### **(1) Fires**

Firepower destroys, neutralizes and suppresses. It is essential in defeating an opponent’s ability and will to fight and has utility in both decisive and shaping operations. In its broadest sense firepower includes conventional maritime, air- and land-delivered munitions, as well as offensive EW assets. The application of firepower should be judged by the effect required on the opponent, be it neutralization, suppression or destruction. This prompts consideration of the volume, duration and lethality of fire, and the precision and range of the munitions. The appropriate mix of weapons systems can then be chosen to achieve the desired effect. A combination of systems should be used to deliver firepower, thus complicating the opponent’s response. Airborne fire support must be available as field artillery may not always be available or within range. Because airborne fire support cannot always be delivered immediately the infantry companies – preferably every platoon - should have integrated fire support assets (e.g. mortars).

Related to close air support, it’s important that the EU BG has to be provided with enough forward air controller (FAC) teams in order to have this capability at least at the Coy or Platoon level depending on the situation taking into account that sometimes these human resources could be critical.

##### **(2) Influence Activities**

To keep or turn opinions in favour of the BG operation expectations and – where possible – perceptions need to be managed. Influence activities have many shapes and forms as they need to be tailored to the target to be effective. But communication is crucial to all of them. Though our messages

are sent in many ways, physical capabilities for effective communication are PSYOPS, CIMIC and Public Information (PI).

Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of intelligence, resources such as linguistic support, graphics and print capability, broadcasting capability and other delivery mechanisms. Message presentation methods include print, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face contact, the Internet, faxes, pagers and mobile telephones. Beside the employment of own assets local media services may be contracted.

EU BG will require a CIMIC unit that might be composed of a coordination centre and different CIMIC teams. Depending on the scenarios and missions, this unit will require specialized personnel for different areas of reconstruction. The tasks of this CIMIC unit will include liaison between military and civil agencies (to include IOs, GOs, NGOs, etc.), support of the civilian population and civil support of armed forces.

Although PI is primarily focused on the need to inform and educate audiences its impact is much wider. It results in maintaining EU public support and hence freedom of action. Therefore, it is essential that PI staff and INFO OPS staff work closely together to ensure that a coordinated message is delivered to the intended audiences.

#### 2.4.4. MANOEUVRE

As it applies to firepower, manoeuvre must not only be considered in terms of physical activities with combat forces but also in terms of influence activities. As such manoeuvre is not only focused at the opponent but at various elements and actors.

When it comes to physical combat offensive activities may be directed against the front, flank or rear of the opponent and may be conducted from the land, air or sea. Any combination of these is possible. Normally the point of main effort is placed where the opponent is weakest or where the terrain offers possibilities of breaking deep into his defensive area. This is done through the manoeuvre of forces. Manoeuvre is defined as: employment of forces on the field through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the opponent in order to accomplish the mission (AAP 6). This firepower may be direct fire, indirect fire support or a combination of the two. It is the means of concentrating land forces at the decisive point to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt opponent cohesion through surprise, psychological momentum and dominance. Manoeuvre will be planned with fire support as an integral component at all tactical level. Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (STAR) sensors should be arrayed and tasked so as to allow maximum manoeuvre out of contact.

Depending on the environment and the scenario EU BG should have helicopters for facilitating manoeuvre. These helicopters will provide EU BG with tactical mobility, as well as with QRF reaction time, and can be employed for reconnaissance and transport tasks.

In addition, the employment of Special Forces (enablers) might be necessary. Also, these units could be employed for obtaining information and military assistance.

#### 2.4.5. PROTECTION

Protection covers the conceptual, mental and physical component of fighting power. It aims at reducing the chance and the effect of all possible threats to force effectiveness. It is first of all a mindset and achieved in the plan through the coordination of the six other combat functions. It results in procedural, physical and non-physical measures. However, specific (physical) measures may be taken with the primary aim of protecting fighting power. The measures include: mobility and counter-mobility; survivability measures; counter battery and air defence; CBRN defence; tactical security, consequence management and health & environmental protection.

- EU BG engineer units should be able to perform reconnaissance and route clearance tasks. They will need an EOD unit capable of neutralizing any type of ammunition and IED.<sup>20</sup> As far as counter mobility is concerned they require assets for creating obstacles such as perimeter defences, checkpoints, roadblocks etc. Depending on the scenario there may also be a requirement for specific military capabilities such as demolitions.
- To increase survivability the EU BG should have the capability to create field fortifications and shelter. The most effective means to reduce the number of potential casualties in cases of attacks with mortars, rockets and other aerial delivered weapons is timely detection and warning. Such a capability requires radar or a weapon locating system linked – physically or procedurally – with an alarm system. These are usually part of integrated air defence or counter battery systems. Whether these systems have to be deployed in full depends on the scenario.
- The risk of the continued existence, and even proliferation, of CBRN weapons, particularly amongst unconventional adversaries, and the chances of encountering toxic industrial hazards in underdeveloped regions during operations, requires that the EU BG should have capabilities for detection, identification and warning, physical protection and medical countermeasures.
- Security comprises personnel security, physical security, operational security and information security. Especially security of the Lines of Communication and installations may absorb quite a lot of combat power. Therefore all soldiers of the BG are to be trained as riflemen and the operational and strategic enablers must have integrated support (including guard details) so they don't have to draw from the BGs scarce resources.

In scenarios with an asymmetrical threat, force protection becomes very important since the opponent will try to cause casualties among our forces in order to influence the public opinion.

#### 2.4.6. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)

The mission of logistics is to ensure materiel readiness. The most important task of logistics is the timely provision of capabilities and logistic assets and of the required type, quantity and quality of supplies, in accordance with the operational and tactical demands, at the place required by the user with as little effort as possible. Consequently, it contributes to the sustainability and mobility of the

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<sup>20</sup> In some MS the neutralization of any type of ammunition and IED is at the responsibility of the Engineers.

armed forces. This mission is valid for the entire task spectrums of an EU BG. Tasks are performed on a mission-oriented and resource-optimized basis as part of close interaction between Army, Navy and Air Force.

The assignment of means of transport will depend on the resources assigned in the area, although mission particularities must be considered such as humanitarian aid.

In the case of a multinational EU BG, the needed previous agreements should be encouraged to attain logistic principles of authority, clarity, economy, simplicity, continuity, opportunity and flexibility. Also, these agreements should establish the lead/specialised state at all suitable logistic functions. Besides, depending on the mission and the operational environment, potential HNS should be taken into account.

Logistics is complemented by HNS, TPLSS<sup>21</sup> and CSO<sup>22</sup> to its maximum extend if possible. During planning, the most appropriate stock level for every type of resource and for the different logistic units should be determined for the different phases of operation.

The combat service support of an EU BG should be rendered by the lead state responsible for the logistical infrastructure. Upon request by the lead state, the states participating in the BG provide personnel/materiel.

#### 2.4.7. OTHER CAPABILITIES

It is not necessary that specific units in the EU BG should be dedicated to crowd control tasks, although at least some units of the EU BG should be highly trained for this commitment. For this aim, when necessary, units designated will reorganize ad hoc and will be provided with appropriate assets and material for the execution of this task. Depending on the given mandate, an EU BG may also be able to provide military assistance and security forces trainers and experts if necessary.

Special support applying the reach-back principle can increase planning depth and production output.

### 2.5. INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability is the ability of systems, equipment or procedures to operate in synergy, also the ability to exchange information between information systems. Interoperability comprises equipment, systems, procedures as well as organization. It is aimed at ensuring the joint accomplishment of the mission. Interoperability is achieved, among other things, by standardizing structures, policy, procedures and materiel. The disadvantages of multinationality become particularly clear whenever armed forces of an alliance or a coalition do have deficits in terms of interoperability that cannot be reduced.

Therefore, interoperability capability is of utmost priority for the composition of multinational contingents. Especially in terms of technology interoperability is of paramount importance. As far as

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<sup>21</sup> TPLSS – Third Party Logistics Service Support.

<sup>22</sup> CSO – Contractor Support to Operation.

EU BGs are concerned, all doctrine and training should be NATO standardized to ensure the necessary cohesion. Other standardization procedures for achieving best interoperability may be:

- The EUMS should provide assistive guidelines available to the states. These guidelines should include aspects about training.
- Enhancing the contacts with NATO.
- Refinement of doctrine studies by bilateral or trilateral working groups proposing solutions to other EU members.
- The valid standards for training and set up of an NRF should be synchronized with EU BG standards and be further developed.

Detailed military standards and criteria for BGs and associated capabilities need to be developed.

#### 2.5.1. INTEGRATION OF AIR UNITS, MARITIME UNITS OR CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE BG

It is likely that maritime and air forces have to support ground forces for strategic and/or operational deployments. Therefore, at military-strategic and operational level, a joint approach seems appropriate and respective cells/liason elements should be established in the (F)HQ, including Special Operation Forces through a SOCCE embedded in the (F)HQ depending on the type of mission and mandate.

Obtaining HNS is to be aimed at. Additionally, operations should constantly be supported by personnel from the civilian organizational areas and by civilian organizations. This may be achieved by the integration and/or exchange of liaison elements.

Maritime and Air will provide the Land Component with the biggest force multiplier. The use of air delivered weapon systems, use of maritime logistics all mean that they are an essential part of our inventory at the tactical level. At the least we need adequate liaison structures. At best we need in the (F)HQ an Air Support Operations Cell (ASOC) e.g. to control the ASM of the Air, Maritime Air Operations Teams (MAOT) to control the movement of maritime support helicopters, specialized planners for air and maritime (amphibious) forces.

#### 2.5.2. POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE TRAINING STANDARDS

Manpower, equipment and organization are converted into deployable capability by training. Initial training forms a baseline capability and generates common understanding. Collective training forms trained individuals into cohesive formations and units, and greater individual experience. As combat is complex, so are the skills required to conduct it. Such skills fade over time, both for individuals and units. Training should therefore be individual and collective, progressive and conducted in an appropriate frequency.

EU BG forces should be composed, trained and prepared under national responsibility. Requirements concerning capability profile and level of training should correspond as much as possible to NRF requirements and could be prepared and issued by the EUMS. Certification will remain a national responsibility of the respective troop contributing states. The certification standards should be recommended by the EUMS and developed in cooperation with the member states. EUMS could

monitor the certification and provide guidance to national units in command and control and training matters. The only way to achieve common standards of training are to have them clearly defined (a common training syllabus) and assessed (through some sort of certification).

For example training could be delivered in different forms with a variety of methodologies and be divided in the following categories:

- CPX OHQ-(F)HQ.
- CPX (F)HQ BG-“ENABLERS”.
- DEPEX (F)HQ-BG.
- LIVEX (F)HQ BG-“ENABLERS”.
- Seminars and lectures.
- Coaching.
- Project Groups.
- Simulation training.
- Workshops.
- Internet-based Distance Learning (IDL).
- “On the job” training.

Training should be aimed at accomplishing the different missions assigned to the EU BG. One of the missions selected for training exercises should be a demanding one, since if an EU BG is trained for the most demanding mission, it will be able to adapt to less demanding ones. All training is related to time. Therefore it is important to make the right timeframe for all training aspects. The training cycle should be closed with evaluation.

<b>PREPARATION</b>	<b>EXECUTION</b>	<b>EVALUATION</b>
Workshop/Seminar/Education/Internet	Stand by	After Action Review
Exercises CPX/FTX		Lessons Identified
Distance Learning		Lessons Learned
Training		
Certification		

## **2.6. RECOMMENDATIONS**

To summarize this study, we consider giving the following recommendations:

- As determined by the EU BG Concept with a strong focus on the core Bn, EU BGs must be capable of covering the entire range of tasks they can be assigned. It will not be possible to specialize a BG to fulfil only specific tasks. For this reason, the most realistic and pragmatic solution is constitute EU

BG with medium capabilities allowing it to face any scenarios included in Headline Goal 2010 and European Security Strategy. This involves that they have to be designed considering a medium effort for the most demanding scenario, with adequate flexibility to assign or reduce assets suitable for the mission to accomplish.

- Due to the size of an EU BG, the mission given must be aimed at achieving a clearly defined, decisive and attainable military objective. We have to be aware of the fact that an EU BG deployed as a stand-alone force in a scenario where the violence is wide spread has not the capabilities to achieve the effects desired.
- In general terms, multinationality level should be fixed at Battalion level for the core Bn and at Coy level for CS/CSS. Multinationality at lower levels should only be considered when very specific capabilities are required and their tasks do not involve a high level of collective training.
- It is necessary to clearly establish the responsibilities among the different levels of Command (OHQ, (F)HQ and HQ BG) in order to avoid interferences among them.
- Related to the capabilities of the EU BG, we remark the following points:
  - It is important not to oversize the CP of the EU BG and it is desirable that EU BG and (F)HQ are provided by the same lead state.
  - EU BG needs high tactical mobility in order to facilitate the manoeuvre. Helicopters are desirable, especially for short reaction times in an extended AOR.
  - Related to intelligence, all soldiers must be aware of the fact that they can always obtain information while conducting their respective tasks. Besides, it is necessary that in most scenarios organic ISTAR assets and in certain scenarios, specific assets such as UAVs and EW are available.
  - Special support applying the reach-back principle increases intelligence and PSYOPS capabilities.
  - Fire support should have the capability of employing smart and high-precision ammunitions with the aim of reducing collateral damage.
  - In scenarios with an asymmetrical threat, force protection is a key capability. For this reason, C-IED assets and protection against RAM (rockets, artillery and mortars) are essential.
  - EU BG Engineer units should have capacity to support mobility on LOC. Thus, they will develop reconnaissance and route clearance tasks, identifying alternative transit routes and clearing them.
  - EU BG will require a CIMIC unit capable of carrying out “quick impact projects” (QIPs).
  - EU BG has to be able to deal with crowd control tasks<sup>23</sup>.
  - The EU BG force package must be capable of planning and delivering Influence Activities in support of campaign mission objectives.
- Training becomes a key element to achieve the cohesion desired among the different units of the EU BG and to work properly between the different levels of command. Related to this aspect, we consider the following points:
- Doctrine and training should follow NATO standards and EUMS could make guidelines available to the states. For the OHQ the AJP 5 “Guidelines for Operational Planning and the AJP 3.2 “Allied Land Operations” are of specific interest. For the EU BG ATP 3.2.1 and ATP 3.2.1.1 resp. “Allied

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<sup>23</sup> In some Finabel MS riot control is not at the responsibility of the Armed Forces.

Land Tactics“ and “Guidance For the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks” are fundamental documents.

- The training should include CPX and LIVEX.
- Training should foster initiative of commands at the lowest levels.
- Training should increase the individual flexibility and the flexibility of the land force as a whole.

Training must include instructions on the ROEs and on the cultural awareness aspects. EU BG has to be familiar with the complex interrelations of the society located in the area of operations as well as the international laws.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY A.25.R

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION A.25.R</b>	
<b>1. References:</b>  1/2007 PME meeting: approved title study A.25. R	<b>2. Other references:</b>  EU MS: EUROPEAN UNION-BATTLEGROUP CONCEPT, Oct. 2006
<b>3. Promulgation:</b> 27 Jun 14	<b>4. Revision:</b>
<b>4. Number of pages:</b>  19 (with annexes)	<b>5. Classification</b>  Unclassified
<b>6. Title:</b>  Conceivable employment doctrine(s) for an EU Battlegroup at tactical level	
<b>7. Lead nation:</b>  FI	<b>8. Address:</b>  ARMY COMMAND FINLAND  P.O.BOX 145  FI MIKKELI
<b>9. Key words:</b>  Missions, Tasks, Employment, EU Battlegroup, Characteristics, Combat functions, EU Battlegroup Concept, Multinationality, Interoperability.	
<b>10. Summary:</b>  Finabel studies cover a large spectrum of land operations issues. A common understanding of some principles can be useful to Finabel member states and to the works of EUMS planners. The aim of this study is to inform the EUMS planners, at strategic level, about the real capabilities, courses of action, and limitations of the EU BG at land level. It could also give useful information to the Finabel and EU national planners, who are in charge of setting up, training and certifying the EU BG made available within the framework of military missions of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP).	
<b>12. Abstract :</b> (same classification as the study)	

a. Interest/usefulness of the study

All Finabel states are likely to contribute with military forces to implement the EU Battlegroup Concept. This study could provide some guidelines for the planners in the force generation and preparation process, as well as possible employment of the EU Battlegroup at land and tactical level.

b. Main aspects

In May 2004, the European Headline Goal was updated by the Headline Goal 2010 and small, autonomous EU Battlegroups with a high alert state were established to react to crises and conflicts at an early stage.

The contents of this study deals with the following aspects: missions and tasks, employment, characteristics, combat functions and interoperability.

c. Main conclusions

EU BGs must be capable of covering the entire range of tasks that can be assigned and therefore their specialization to fulfil only specific tasks is not desirable. For this reason, the most realistic and pragmatic solution is to constitute EUBGs with medium capabilities allowing them to face any scenarios included in Headline Goal 2010. This involves that they have to be designed considering a medium effort for the most demanding scenario, with adequate flexibility to assign or reduce assets suitable for the mission to be accomplished.

d. Main recommendations

In the conclusion, the study lists the main recommendations which are related to the level of multinationality, the capabilities required by the EU BG and training, amongst others.

The following recommendations are given:

- Due to the size of an EU BG, the mission given must be aimed at achieving a clearly defined, decisive and attainable military objective. We have to be aware of the fact that an EU BG deployed as a stand-alone force in a scenario where the violence is wide spread has not the capabilities to achieve the effects desired.
- In general terms, multinationality level should be fixed at Battalion level for the core Bn and at Coy level for CS/CSS. Multinationality at lower levels should only be considered when very specific capabilities are required and their tasks do not involve a high level of collective training.
- It is necessary to clearly establish the responsibilities among the different levels of Command (OHQ, (F)HQ and HQ BG) in order to avoid interferences among them.

- Related to the capabilities of the EU BG, we remark the following points:

- It is important not to oversize the CP of the EU BG and it is desirable that EU BG and (F)HQ are provided by the same lead state.
  - EU BG needs high tactical mobility in order to facilitate the manoeuvre. Helicopters are desirable, especially for short reaction times in an extended AOR.
  - Related to intelligence, all soldiers must be aware of the fact that they can always obtain information while conducting their respective tasks. Besides, it is necessary that in most scenarios organic ISTAR assets and in certain scenarios, specific assets such as UAS and EW are available.
  - Special support applying the reach-back principle increases intelligence and PSYOPS capabilities.
  - Fire support should have the capability of employing smart and high-precision ammunitions with the aim of reducing collateral damage.
  - In scenarios with an asymmetrical threat, force protection is a key capability. For this reason, C-IED assets and protection against RAM (rockets, artillery and mortars) are essential. This must forcefully include protected mobility for rifle and infantry support elements.
  - EU BG Engineer units should have capacity to support mobility on LOC. Thus, they will develop reconnaissance and route clearance tasks, identifying alternative transit routes and clearing them.
  - EU BG will require a CIMIC unit capable of carrying out “quick impact projects”.
  - EU BG has to be able to deal with crowd control tasks.
  - The EU BG force package must be capable of planning and delivering Influence Activities in support of campaign mission objectives.
- Training becomes a key element to achieve the cohesion desired among the different units of the EU BG and to work properly between the different levels of command.

## ANNEX: ABBREVIATIONS

### A

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
ACE	Air Coordinating Element
AOO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
ASM	Airspace Management
ASOC	Air Support Operations Centre

### B

BG	Battlegroup
Bn	Battalion

### C

C2	Command and Control
CAS	Close Air Support
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CID	Combat Identity
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
COA	Course of Action
CP	Conflict Prevention Command Post
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRAM	Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar
CS	Combat Support
CSC	Commercial Spot Charter
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSS	Combat Service Support
CSO	Contractor Service Support to Operations

### D

DEPEX Deployment Exercise  
DDR Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration  
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

## **E**

EATC European Air Transport Command  
EEF Early Entry Force  
EHG European Headline Goal  
e.g. for example (exempli gratia)  
EO Evacuation Operation  
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
EP Entitled Personnel  
ESM Electronic Support Measures  
etc. et caetera  
EU European Union  
EU BGCC EU Battlegroup Coordination Conference  
EUMS European Union Military Staff  
EW Electronic Warfare

## **F**

FAC Forward Air Controller  
(F)HQ Force Headquarters  
FN Framework Nation  
FOB Forward Operating Base  
FOC Full Operational Capability  
FP Force Planning  
FPU Foreign Police Unit  
FTX Field Training Exercise

## **G**

GO Governmental Organization

## **H**

HA Humanitarian Assistance  
HLG Headline Goal  
HN Host Nation  
HNS Host Nation Support  
HQ Headquarters  
HUMINT Human Intelligence

**I**

ICP	Intelligence Collection Plan
IDL	Internet-based Distance Learning
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IEF	Initial Entry Force
IM	Information Management
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
INFO OPS	Information Operations
IO	International Organization
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
IR	Intelligence Requirements
ISTAR	Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

**J**

J1 - J9	Staff Department 1 – 9
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JFS	Joint Fire Support
JSS	Joint Support Service

**L**

LIVEX	Live Exercise
LOC	Line of Communication

**M**

MAOT	Maritime Air Operations Team
METOC	Meteorology and Oceanography
MHE	Material Handling Equipment
MILO	Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MS	Member States

**N**

NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation  
 NGO Non-Governmental Organization  
 NRF NATO Response Force  
 NSPA NATO Support Agency  
 NTM Notice to Move

**O**

OHQ Operational Headquarters  
 OPP Operational Planning Process  
 OPSEC Operations Security  
 OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
 OTF HQ Operation Task Force Headquarters

**P**

PI Public Information  
 PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement  
 PSYOPS Psychological Operation(s)

**Q**

QRF Quick Reaction Force

**R**

RAM Rockets, Artillery, Mortars  
 ROE Rules of Engagement  
 RSOM Reception Staging and Onward Movement

**S**

SOI Standing Operating Instruction  
 SOP Standing Operating Procedure  
 SOPF Separation of Parties by Force  
 SPOD Seaport of Debarkation  
 SR Stabilization, Reconstruction  
 STAR Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

**T**

TCN Troop Contributing Nations  
 TPLSS Third Party Logistics Service Support  
 TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

**U**

UAS

UN

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

United Nations