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18 June 2009

FIN/SEC/27.280-T

DISPATCH NOTE

SUBJECT	Promulgation of report Finabel Nr T.36.R
TITLE	A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE LAND OPERATIONS OF FINABEL COUNTRIES – DOCTRINE LAND OPERATIONS MANUAL
REFERENCE	FIN/SEC/27.278-T dated 18 March 2009
OBSERVATION	The above-referenced document may be destroyed.

(Original Signed)

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Promulgation of report Finabel Nr T.36.R

**A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE LAND OPERATIONS
OF FINABEL COUNTRIES – DOCTRINE LAND
OPERATIONS MANUAL**

DATE OF PROMULGATION : JUNE 2009

Finabel



FOREWORD:

This study largely relies on a Dutch document (RNLA [draft] Army Doctrine Publication on doctrine land operations, version October 2008), itself based on NATO doctrine (AJP 3.2 RD2 issued for ratification in October 2008) from which it takes many elements.

The aim of this study is mainly to bring additional and relevant considerations as well as to look for new useful perspectives, supported by contributions of WG TANGO.

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1. <u>References</u> : Minutes of the PME Meeting II/2007	2. <u>Other references</u> : NATO AJP 3.2, RD July 2008 US Army FM 3-0, February 2008
3. <u>Promulgation</u> : 18 June 2009	4. <u>Revisions</u> :
5. <u>Number of Pages</u> : 82	6. <u>Classification</u> : unclassified
7. <u>Title</u>: A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE LAND OPERATIONS OF FINABEL COUNTRIES – DOCTRINE LAND OPERATIONS MANUAL	
8. <u>Originator</u> : The Netherlands, Land Forces Doctrine and Training Centre	9. <u>Address</u> : Ltc Harry Konings SO1 Doctrine Land Operations Bernhard Barracks, PO BOC 3003 3800DA Amersfoort, The Netherlands
10. <u>Key words</u>: Doctrine, Campaign Themes, Land Operations, Operating Environment, Actors, Military Activities, Threats.	
11. <u>Summary</u>: The study describes common conceptual and doctrinal understanding to be shared by the land forces of Finabel member states, with a particular focus on those which can be utilised in an EU Battle Group. Finabel studies cover a broad spectrum of issues concerning the land operations of Finabel countries. Although Finabel does not write doctrine as such, these studies establish a common understanding among troop contributing nations, and form the basis for the planning and conduct of all kinds of operations. Since the doctrine is the basis for planning and the conduct of all operations, a common understanding of all conceptual and doctrinal principles can contribute positively to Finabel studies and forms the core of this study.	

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.

ADVICE TO THE READER

0101. The world is in a constant state of change. Many developments have implications for the way in which countries deploy their armed forces, and thus their armies. This means that doctrine must be updated regularly. Military units are deployed in dynamic, and therefore often complex, environments. Consideration must be given not only to physical factors, such as terrain and climate, but also to the fact that in almost all cases personnel on operations have to perform their tasks in collaboration with other partners, thereby forcing them to think and act at different levels, either simultaneously or consecutively. In addition to the traditional military focus, a soldier on operations must also be aware of the political reality.
0102. In recent years many doctrine publications (as well as the national directives and manuals based on them) have concentrated primarily on collaboration with other services (joint) and with other armed forces (combined). However, too little attention is given to collaboration with other partners (interagency). In addition, existing publications frequently make a very clear distinction between combat operations, peace support operations and national operations.
0103. Recent deployments have shown that this strict division does not reflect the reality of operations. Military personnel carry out specific military activities at all times and in all locations in an environment which is constantly changing. Within a single unit some members may be engaged in reconstruction in relatively peaceful surroundings, while at the same time others may, in a particular place and for a limited time, encounter the need to use force against an opponent. These circumstances may arise in the same geographical area, separated by time or space. During a deployment a soldier may suddenly be confronted by a totally different situation and/or threat. During training and instruction a great deal of attention is paid to all the factors that play a key role in planning, preparing and executing operations. Current doctrine publications, incorporating lessons learned, play a significant role.
0104. **Aim of the study¹** :
- To establish a common conceptual and doctrinal understanding to be shared by the land forces of Finabel member states, with a particular focus on those which can be utilised in an EU Battle Group. This study should be used as a basis for future studies of all Finabel Working Groups ;
 - The study is in the first place based upon NATO AJP 3.2: Joint Doctrine for land operations. Other developments have recently occurred. Some elements of an approved new US Army publication (FM 3-0: Operations) have been inserted as well ;

¹ Arranged by PMEs' 2/2007 meeting : The unifying theme for all FINABEL groups – « To promote and develop the interoperability of land capabilities, with a particular focus on those which can be utilised in an EU Battle Group, in order to optimise operational effectiveness. »

- The aim of the study requires a regular review in order to be able to implement developments in the conceptual and doctrinal understanding on land forces that will have their influences on the use of the land forces of the Finabel member states. This review should be prepared and executed by Working Group Tango ;
- The study does not discuss the deployment of military forces of Finabel countries on national territory.

0105. **Justification of the study** : Finabel studies cover a broad spectrum of issues concerning the land operations of Finabel countries. Although Finabel does not write doctrine as such, these studies establish a common understanding among troop contributing nations, and form the basis for the planning and conduct of all kinds of operations. Since the doctrine is the basis for planning and the conduct of all operations, a common understanding of all conceptual and doctrinal principles can contribute positively to Finabel studies and forms the core of this study.

SECTION 1 : LAND OPERATIONS

0106. Conflicts² will not be solved by the military only. In order to safeguard their security, states make use of various instruments of power, in order to reach an intended end-state or to safeguard national interests. The military instrument is just one of these. Using an optimal mix of these instruments in all stages of a crisis, both at home and outside the country, offers states the best chance of success. These instruments are :

- The diplomatic instrument ;
- The economical instrument ;
- The civilian instrument ;
- The military instrument.

0107. Military forces of Finabel countries (possibly in the form of a EU battle group) should therefore be aware of the constant need to prepare for deployment more or less anywhere in the world and in all phases of a crisis and at any point on the spectrum of conflict. In an actual deployment they will be confronted with the fact that they are by no means the only actors on the field. In most situations and circumstances it will be these other actors who have the key role, with military forces playing 'only' the role of an enabling force. However, there are other situations, in which only military forces, with their specific skills and capabilities, will be able to establish and maintain a secure situation so often needed in a crisis or conflict area. **Land operations are very varied in nature.**

0108. In the past armed forces focused mainly, or even entirely, on destroying the armed forces of enemy states during inter-state conflicts. Nevertheless, they can also be deployed before a crisis reaches conflict in order to obtain a politically desirable resolution. Nowadays military deployment in crises and intra-state conflicts is more usual, but deployment in a major inter-state conflict still remains a possibility.

² Conflicts has to be read, throughout the document, as conflicts and crises.

0109. Although it may seem as though this new situation would require a more limited contribution by armed forces, experience shows that deployment has in fact become more complicated. The reason for this is that in order to achieve a suitable outcome, the military has to work closely and co-ordinate their efforts with other non-military actors such as International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations within a comprehensive approach.
0110. It should also be noted that armed forces are expected to deploy where the population is present, rather than in areas more suited to operating military equipment. The decisive points in military operations are likely to be centred on those areas where population density is at its highest. Military deployments will necessarily have to develop and retain the ability to operate 'amongst the people' as a matter of routine whilst retaining the capability of operating independently of population centres. Armed forces will also almost always be responsible for the protection and security of these populations. When planning military actions and the use of military resources there is a constant, urgent need to take into account whether achieving the desired effects also involves undesirable side effects.
0111. In order to provide the contribution demanded of him, a military commander must have a clear understanding of the role he is expected to fulfil during his deployment. This understanding must be maintained throughout the operation and must be shared with all other actors. Only a coordinated, harmonised and cohesive deployment by all actors involved will lead to the desired end state and be approved by the local population, world opinion and public opinion in the troop contributing countries.
0112. During any military operation troops may be obliged to use force. In order to retain public support this must be done in a measured, proportionate and responsible manner. Self-control and tact are therefore essential qualities for all forces deployed. A clear understanding of internationally recognised rules of law and codes of conduct, and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which apply to the particular situation can be of great help to a soldier on operations, and all military activity must be governed by these.
0113. The environment in which military personnel is deployed is almost always complex, and the situation governing it is almost always in a state of flux and sometimes, it can change extremely quickly. The attitude and approach of the other actors involved may also vary greatly. It is essential for military personnel on deployment to be agile in their thinking and flexible in their approach.
0114. It is not inconceivable that a unit deployed in such a diverse and complex environment will be confronted with setbacks (including casualties among its own personnel). In practice resilience and stamina will prove to be indispensable characteristics of any military deployment. This applies not only to military personnel but also, and perhaps more so, to their families and the domestic population as a whole. **Land operations are invariably a demanding military activity with, potentially, high levels of attendant risk.**

SECTION 2 : DOCTRINE

0115. Doctrine is the formal expression of military thinking, valid for a particular period. It describes the nature and characteristics of current and future military deployment, the preparations for such deployment and the methods for successfully completing military operations. Doctrine is general in nature and describes fundamentals, principles and preconditions for military operations at the various operational levels. Doctrine also forms the basis for the techniques and procedures used in the various functions of military deployment. The figure below sets out the aspects described by doctrine.




Figure 1-1: Doctrine pyramid

0116. Doctrine forms part of the conceptual component of military power. In addition we recognise a mental and a physical component. The mental component describes leadership, motivation and the responsible organisation of the operation. The physical component describes the operational capacities of a force: manpower, equipment, collaborative deployment, operational readiness and sustainability. These three components will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
0117. Doctrine provides a framework for understanding and defines a common approach to operations. It can help frame a force's requirements in terms of organisation, personnel, instruction, training and equipment for future deployments. The development of doctrine is based on experience gained in past military operations, but also draws heavily on lessons learned from current military engagement. For doctrine to have longer-term utility, it must define common operating principles which remain constant despite developments in world affairs.
0118. **The delineation of doctrine in the land environment.** Land operations involve other players besides just land forces. For example, there may be numerous other military and non-military actors involved in the crisis, and this mix is further extended when the crisis response is conducted within a multinational context. With such a complex of actors and diverse participants involved in crisis resolution, there is a need for commonly understood principles, and for a well-defined doctrine to guide response activity.

Units from other operational commands (naval forces, air forces, and military police) may perform operational tasks which form part of the land operations, and civilian agencies, other government departments and a complex of international organisations are also likely to be involved. This applies both at home and abroad. The situation at home is important to be mentioned, since any issue happening in the home country will influence the troops in an expeditionary environment. In some situations, the correct response to a particular crisis would demand a civilian lead, and this would mean that civilian agencies take the lead, with the military performing a supporting role. In this context, as well as in the context that demands an initial military lead, being familiar with and following a common doctrine for land operations is a prerequisite for a successful outcome.

SECTION 3 : TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

0119. In order to guarantee the mutual and clear understanding on the contents and meaning of terms and definitions with respect to all Finabel studies, terms and definitions are being used in the sense of :

- The current approved version of the NATO glossary of terms and definitions - AAP-6 and appropriate glossaries as a for example AAP-38, AAP-39, Stanag 2287 (Mission Task Verbs) etc... ;
- All administrative and operational NATO STANAGs for military operational procedures which have been agreed by Finabel countries ;
- Other appropriate reference documents as a for example EUMS documents and Allied operational publications ;
- References to doctrinal developments coming out of draft NATO or national documents can be used in Finabel studies with the assumption that a reference footnote is inserted with concrete title and paragraph of the document, one is referring to.

SECTION 4 : STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

0120. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will examine the dynamic and complex operating environment in which military units are deployed. It will begin with a look at the political dimension. At political level NATO recognises four distinct campaign themes : deployment where the chance of force being used is low or non-existent (peacetime military engagement); deployment where force has to be contained (peace support); deployment with the aim of ending the use of force by insurgents (counter-insurgency) and deployment in a large scale armed conflict (major combat). However, in practice the distinction between the various types of operations no longer applies. A separate section outlines the legal framework for military operations on national territory and elsewhere. The next section covers the specific factors related to terrain and climate. The following section is devoted to a detailed discussion about the population, both in the theatre of operations and in the country of origin. The changing nature of the threats that may occur in the possible areas of operation is described in the next section. The final section describes a number of characteristics affecting land operations.

0121. Chapter 3 examines military power as one of the instruments of power available to a state. The various components (mental, conceptual and physical) are examined in turn. This chapter also considers a set of fundamental principles for military operations, based on a wide range of experience gathered in the past. The final section looks at how these can be applied cohesively in practice.
0122. Chapter 4 is entirely devoted to all the actors who play a relevant role before, during or after a crisis. For the purposes of this study a crisis is defined as serious disruption of the basic structures of a social system and/or interference with its fundamental norms and values. In the event of a crisis the protection of the vital interests of government and society is crucial. Four vital interests have been identified: the national and international rule of law and public and economic safety. The chapter will consider briefly how cooperation can ensure the protection of these vital interests. It will then outline the particular roles played by other partners.
0123. Chapter 5 will discuss cohesion with other actors, within the military operations and within all military actions carried out as part of the military operation. Concepts such as the core functions, the operational framework and the military functions will be examined in turn.
0124. Chapter 6 considers the phenomenon whereby operations can no longer be strictly divided into categories. Wherever military personnel are deployed, and whatever the operation, they are always expected to have a good understanding of their job. Generally speaking military units are expected to be able to carry out four types of military activities: offensive activities, defensive activities, stabilising activities and enabling activities. Information operations will also be examined.

ADVICE TO THE READER

0125. The study has been developed to create a common understanding on doctrinal issues that form the basis for land operations in which Finabel countries may deploy their forces. It is good to realise that these doctrinal issues are generic and have to be read in conjunction with international and national doctrine. As far as the international doctrine is concerned, the focus lies with NATO doctrine. It is therefore not a stand alone study and offers a common framework for multinational understanding. Since this study describes generic principles and characteristics it does not offer ultimate solutions for commanders at the tactical level and does not touch upon techniques and procedures.

CHAPTER 2: THE DYNAMIC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

SECTION 1 : INTRODUCTION

0201. During crisis response, the environment into which military units deploy is generally characterised by a high degree of complexity and is constantly evolving. This chapter provides a description of this complex and highly dynamic environment.
0202. An armed force is an instrument in the hands of a state³. The decision on where, when and how to deploy its armed forces is a political decision, based on considerations of national and international security policy. In a democratic society, decisions are not taken in isolation; rather they are taken in collaboration with other government departments of a single state, or in concert with the international community. With military advice, and in line with the recognised mandate, politicians decide what equipment is issued to the armed forces in general or to particular units about to be deployed. This decision-making process involves regular consultation between all branches of government and other interested parties. The control framework plays an important role here. Section 2 looks at the political dimension of the environment in which units have to operate. This section gives some special attention to the role and the importance of the political and military institutions of the EU.
0203. Every time a state deploys its armed forces, either on its own territory or elsewhere, the legal context must be considered. The use of force or weapons by military personnel is particularly significant and must be subject to strict rules and control. Section 3 looks at these aspects.
0204. Experience shows that the deployment areas (the physical environment) where units have to operate can be far from the home country. The climate and geographical conditions in such areas may be very different from the country of origin. The way in which these aspects influence the deployment is examined in Section 4.
0205. Crisis prevention and resolution involve the unit working together with many other actors. Two groups of actors – population and opponents - need special attention and are covered in this chapter. In section 5 the indigenous population is described. As it is very hard to describe the possible opponents in a comprehensive manner, this study follows the approach of describing the changing nature of possible threats first, followed by a number of **tendencies** that can be discerned in relation to the opponent. Section 6 gives the changing nature of the threat, while section 7 describes the tendencies.
0206. The eight, and final, section discusses a number of enduring characteristics that have, and will continue to have, an influence on the deployment of units.

³ In the framework of Finabel one can state that the EU Battlegroup is an instrument in the hands of the EU. The actual deployment is a political decision, based on the considerations of the European Security Defence Policy. Further detail can be found in section 2 of this chapter.

SECTION 2 : THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

0207. The primary responsibility of any democratic government is to maintain an adequate level of security within its borders so that prosperity may grow and a state of peaceful coexistence with its neighbours may prevail. The state is to maintain this desirable form of equilibrium (the status quo). This relates not only to the country itself, but also to those regions in the world considered important in the context of collective security policy. It is a question of safeguarding interests. A state has access to a number of instruments which it can use to protect those interests. When this equilibrium is disturbed, thereby causing a crisis, the state will employ these instruments (including of course the military instrument) to re-establish the balance (the status quo ante).
0208. States see their armed forces as an instrument that can be deployed not only to settle armed conflicts on national territory or in the immediately surrounding area. An armed force as an instrument of power can be employed far more widely.
0209. It is in the interests of the international community to intervene when a crisis threatens to develop. Within the context of the international community in general and the European Union in particular, it may be desirable to act in a pre-emptive manner in order to prevent an escalation of violence. In the EU's case, it can call upon the EU BG. In other cases, the EU may decide to deploy the EU BG in an active role **after** the crisis situation has developed as this may be the best course of action.
0210. A more detailed description of the role of the EU political and military institutions is inserted in the following points.
- **European security defence policy (ESDP).** The ultimate aim of a EU as a global actor, is to be ready to share responsibility for global security. The main external instrument for fulfilling this ambition is the ESDP as a major element of the “ Common Foreign and security policy ”. The capacities and structure of ESDP are expressed in European system of “ Conflict prevention and crisis management ”. This system is divided into three components :
 - * Military crisis management: “ Headline goal 2010 ” (European military capabilities – EU Battlegroup concept) and permanent structures (PSC, EU MC and EU MS). At international level the EU collaborates with international actors, namely - NATO, OSCE and UN ;
 - * Civilian crisis management: ensuring peace and stability – providing policemen, judges, prosecutors and teams for civil protection ;

- * Conflict prevention and rapid reaction mechanism: coordination of all EU instruments, identify and combat causes of conflict, to improve the capacity to react to nascent conflicts, to promote international cooperation in this area, rapid financing for crisis management and use of sanctions or restrictive measures.
- The EU Battlegroup concept was formulated primarily as a means of encouraging continued improvements in deployable European military capabilities. This will in turn broaden the pool of European high readiness capabilities available not only to the EU but also to NATO and, specifically, the NATO Response Force. In addition, this kind of high readiness capability meets the UN's requirement for forces that are able to respond very rapidly to an emerging crisis under a Chapter VII mandate, and thereby demonstrates European willingness to meet a crucial global capability gap in support of the United Nations ;
- **Complementarities with NATO**
 - * In relations between the EU and NATO was agreed that the Battlegroup will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), each providing a positive impetus for military capability improvement. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups are analogous to those defined within the NRF. Correctly managed, there is considerable power for synergy between the two initiatives;
 - * The types of mission for which the NRF and Battlegroups are designed have to be complementary, rather than being duplicative. The NRF is designed to participate in the full range of Alliance missions, up to and including high intensity war-fighting. This may include a show of force, stand-alone use for crisis response operations, or initial entry for a larger operation. On the other hand, EU Battlegroups will in most cases be deployed in response to a UN request and will be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale. Likely missions include local suppression of hostilities, separation of parties by force and humanitarian assistance.
- **EU Military crisis management**
 - * **Political and Security Committee (PSC)**
 - The Political and Security Committee (PSC) monitors the international situation in the areas covered by the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). It plays a central role in the definition of and follow-up to the European Union's response to a crisis ;

- In the event of a military response, the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction. On the basis of the opinions and recommendations of the EUMC, the PSC evaluates strategic military options, the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the operation plan (OPLAN) to be submitted to the Council. Before the launching of an operation, the PSC sends the Council a recommendation based on the opinions of the EUMC. On that basis the Council decides to launch the operation within the framework of a joint action.

* **Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC).** The Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) is the supreme military body within the Council of the EU. It is the forum for military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. The EUMC exercises military direction and gives military instructions to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). More specifically, it :

- issues, at the PSC's request, an initiating directive to the Director-General of the EUMS (DGEUMS) to draw up and present strategic military options ;
- evaluates the strategic military options developed by the EUMS and forwards them to the PSC, together with its evaluation and military advice ;
- authorises, on the basis of the military option selected by the Council, an initial planning directive for the operation commander ;
- provides advice and recommendations to the PSC, based upon the EUMS evaluation, on the operation concept and draft operation plan (OPLAN) drawn up by the operation commander ;
- Gives advice to the PSC on the termination option for an operation.

* **Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS).** The Military Staff of the European Union (the only EU permanent military integrated structure) is the source of the EU's military expertise. It performs early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersburg tasks (humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and crisis management) and all EU-led operations. EUMS provides support, upon the request of the Secretary-General/High Representative or the Political and Security Committee (PSC), for temporary missions in third countries or international organisations. It also ensures the link between the EUMC and the military resources available to the EU. It is responsible for monitoring, assessing and making recommendations regarding the forces and capabilities made available by the Member States to the EU. It identifies European national and multinational forces for EU-led operations, coordinating with NATO. More specifically, the EUMS is responsible for :

- monitoring crises ;
- carrying out the military aspects of strategic advance planning ;
- organising and coordinating procedures with national and multinational HQs including those NATO HQs available to the EU ;
- programming, planning, conducting and evaluating the military aspect of the EU's crisis management procedures ;
- establishing permanent relations with NATO ;
- hosting a NATO liaison team and setting up an EU team in NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) ;
- contributing to the military aspects of the ESDP and the fight against terrorism ;
- With regards to crisis management, the EUMS requests and processes specific information from Member States' intelligence organisations and other sources.

0211. Campaign themes

- At the politico-strategic and military-strategic levels NATO has identified four predominant campaign themes⁴ :
 - * peacetime military engagement ;
 - * peace support ;
 - * counter-insurgency⁵ ;
 - * Major combat.
- The above described approach on predominant campaign themes is a phenomenon that is not only used in NATO. UK and USA use this approach as well, although they may define the themes in a somewhat different way. The USA uses in its FM 3-0 (Army Doctrine for operations) the operational themes of major combat, irregular threats, peace support, limited intervention and peace time military engagement.

0212. **The campaign theme** is a useful tool for commanders that dictate the predominant type of operation being conducted at any time within a joint command's AOO. It has implications for force structures, allocation of resources, force protection, and the tactical tasks assigned to subordinates. Each has a differing set of basic rules of engagement, principles of force application, and desired end state. While there are four major themes there may be a requirement to conduct operations across all themes simultaneously and in very close proximity.

⁴ Reference AJP 3.2 RD 7th July 2008, page 1-3

⁵ Counter-insurgency, in the approach of AJP 3.2 is one of the predominant campaign themes. However, insurgency and therefore COIN, may be seen as an irregular threat, being a part of the overarching campaign theme of irregular warfare. The US Army describes irregular warfare as an operational theme – having the same explanation as a campaign theme – with insurgency and terrorism as main elements. In section 7 some more thoughts on this approach are revealed.

0213. Campaign themes should not be confused with tactical operations, tasks or activities. Tactical tasks are the specific application of doctrine to solve particular tactical problems, and are used to assign missions. Campaign themes themselves are too broad to assign missions. They describe the prevailing conditions that exist in an area of operations, and provide a set of principles that act as a guide to planning and action as the campaign progresses. Different approaches to military tasks are therefore required for the different types of campaign theme, and this should be well understood by commanders at all levels.
0214. The deployment of military forces when there is no crisis may be referred to as **Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)**. This type of deployment often has a specifically national character and is thus strongly influenced by national rules and legislation, and any deployment will always be governed by mutual agreement, either bilaterally or multinational. The political objective is usually to monitor and safeguard the stability of a country or a region. Typical activity within the context of a PME would be an exchange programme, joint training and exercises, the provision of advisors and other specialist training teams. PME tend to be long-term engagements, and have the lowest level of risk attached to them, and their aim is to encourage local or regional stability and to build and develop capacity with a friendly country's security apparatus.
0215. If actors in a given region begin using force to realise their aims, and the local authorities are unable to prevent this, there is a possibility that the security situation will deteriorate. In some cases, the international community may choose to intervene in a local domestic crisis of this type because it may have more far-reaching destabilising effects. Operations in this phase of a crisis are referred to as operations in the framework of **Peace Support**. The aim of a campaign in this part of the spectrum is to avoid the further spread of violence. Containing the crisis at an early stage can reduce the tension between the parties to the conflict, allowing the situation to be stabilised. Operations within this campaign theme require restraint, impartiality, the approval of the authorities of the country in question and the tightly governed use of force. Stabilisation is the most important aim of these operations. It is important to realise that stabilisation will not always lead to a peaceful end state. During the process of stabilisation the general situation can deteriorate, which could alter the campaign theme to COIN or even major combat.
0216. In some cases, stabilisation is impossible to achieve and the security situation may continue to deteriorate. Typically in such circumstances, an insurgency may develop. An insurgency may be described as: *“an organized, ideologically motivated group or movement that seeks political changes in a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population of a region through violence, subversion and propaganda⁶”*

⁶ See SD1 AJP 3.4.4 : Counter-insurgency

0217. Insurgents tend to carry out well targeted and often small-scale acts of violence aimed at causing maximum impact on a population or society. They seek to create an impact out of proportion to the scale of the attack. Operations in response to this sort of crisis are referred to as operations in the framework of **counter-insurgency**. The primary objective in this case is to neutralise the insurgents in order to start reconstruction and peace support. The population is the centre of gravity.
0218. A crisis with an extremely high level of violence can be referred to as **major combat**. Operations within this campaign theme are characterised by the frequency, level and scale of violence. The most important military contribution in major combat is to carry out offensive and defensive (combat) activities and tasks on a large scale in order to defeat the enemy and return to a peaceful situation as soon as possible. A contribution to reconstruction is also frequently necessary.
0219. When determining the campaign theme, and prior to units being deployed, the situation is almost never clear and unambiguous. Military operations do not proceed across the spectrum in a linear fashion from high to low or vice versa. They often begin when the situation is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. During an operation the level of violence may vary across the area of operations. As time progresses the level of force may also change within one part of the area of operations, as illustrated below.




Figure 2-1 : Campaign themes

0220. Both in the period before a crisis, and the period following it, states increasingly use their armed forces to carry out a wide range of roles and tasks. Crisis response must be the simultaneous and coordinated use of all instruments of national power – Diplomatic, Economic, Military and Civil. In some cases the military instrument was and is still used as a last resort. This new method of crisis management is often referred to as the Comprehensive Approach, involving, as it does, a whole of government approach. Using a common analysis of the crisis, various ministries work together in a pro-active manner to develop a strategy that sets out a clearly articulated end-state. In this strategy all the parties involved have the same objectives and work together to achieve them. Only in this way can they all fulfil their own role, while at the same time contributing to the roles of the others. Each ministry is responsible for using its own specific expertise to make an active contribution to a cohesive strategy. It is no longer enough for the armed forces to consider how a particular mission could be carried out in isolation. Bearing in mind the political objectives and the agreed end-state, they must examine how they can contribute and what resources will be required.

The figure below sets out the relationship between desired end state, objectives, effects and actions




Figure 2-2: The Comprehensive Approach

0221. In the recent past, most Finabel states have had no, or at least, much less need to deploy their armed forces to maintain security at home and, as a result, their armed forces have become primarily an instrument for external use. When they have occurred, military deployments at home have been limited mainly to military assistance and support at the request of another government ministry or a local authority.
0222. The ever-present international irregular threat may also be directed at national interests, leading to actions on national territory. For this reason national security will continue to be an area of interest to armed forces. The armed forces may also be called upon in the event of natural disasters, catastrophes or violent situations on national territory. They are constantly available and trained to operate under difficult circumstances. They also have specific capabilities enabling them to make an important and often indispensable contribution, such as the availability of specialist units, the provision of communications and the purification and distribution of water in crisis circumstances. The armed forces are often also responsible for protecting the airspace and lines of communication. In some countries, they may also be called upon to guard vital infrastructure such as ports and industrial complexes. This is a permanent role for the armed forces. As a result land forces are expected to prepare for this task and, when required, to contribute to national security⁷.

⁷ The role of land forces of Finabel member states with respect to national security is not discussed within this study.

SECTION 3: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

0223. Military personnel have long been the armed representatives of every (Finabel) state⁸. There is a realistic chance that various parties, both from within and outside national borders, may use, and threaten the use of force to destabilise a society or replace a government. In such circumstances, the state may authorise their armed forces to deploy in response. The legal aspects of an armed deployment and the use of force are very important.
0224. In principle there are two important legal aspects: the basis for the deployment and the legislation and jurisdiction. The basis is the legal foundation for the military deployment. The law and jurisdiction govern the rules applicable during the operation. In order to gain greater insight into the legal framework for the most probable forms of the use of military force a distinction must be made between operations within national borders and those outside. Operations within national borders and the corresponding legal framework are not covered in this study.
0225. **The deployment of armed forces outside national territory** is the subject of international legislation. Unless its national survival is directly threatened, the deployment of armed forces outside a state's national territory must be subject to international agreement. Deployment outside national borders is subject to certain restrictions.
0226. **Restrictions.** The first is the principle of sovereignty. This lays down that, in relation to actions within its own country, the authority of a state is not dependent on any other higher authority. No state may intervene in the internal affairs of any other state (the principle of non-intervention). In addition, the United Nations Charter prohibits the use or the threat of force in international relations (prohibition of force). This provision is intended to prevent states from deploying their armed forces (with or without the use of force), on the territory of or against another state, either at their own initiative or on the basis of their national legislation.
0227. **Foundations.** The right of a state to deploy its armed forces outside its national borders is enshrined in international law. International law consists of written and unwritten laws governing relations between states. The primary foundation is a resolution (Chapter VII) of the Security Council of the United Nations, setting out the tasks and powers of a military unit (the mandate). Even when no such resolution exists, international law offers two foundations for military operations. Firstly, the right to (collective) self-defence as set out in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Secondly, a state may deploy into the national territory of another state only at the request of that state.

⁸ In this section on the legal framework state has to be read also as EU state.

0228. Tasks and powers. Where a UN Security Council resolution exists, the tasks and powers will be included in the mandate. For self-defence the task is restricted to resisting or preventing an armed attack and the authority to use force is set out in the humanitarian law of war. When deploying at the request of a state, the operations depend on the arrangements made. However, even in such a case operations are subject to the agreed principles, such as proportionality and subsidiarity.
- Subsidiarity means selecting the means that will cause the least collateral damage ;
 - Proportionality means that the degree of force used in response to an aggressive act must be proportional to the level of force used in the original act. In other words, only force that is strictly necessary in order to achieve the intended aim may be used, and the amount of collateral damage must be strictly limited.
0229. The law is not static, but changes in line with international developments, including political developments. For example, the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and its associated conditions and legal rules were expanded in the wake of the NATO deployment in the Kosovo crisis. For each operation the exact task and the corresponding authorisation to use force will be determined on the basis of the legal foundation. Thus the responsibilities and powers of military personnel may vary from one operation to another.
0230. **Law and jurisdiction.** In principle the law and jurisdiction are governed by the Humanitarian Law of War. The Humanitarian Law of War has restrictions and powers. The powers relate to the right of combatants to take part in an armed conflict and the way in which this combat may be conducted. The restrictions relate primarily to the rules governing the means and methods used in war fighting. One of the aims of these restrictions is to protect non-combatants - people, who are not, or are no longer, taking part in the armed conflict. This includes the civilian population, the wounded, the sick and prisoners (including prisoners of war).
0231. **The Humanitarian Law of War** is one of the starting points when evaluating a possible operation and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and similar operational instructions that will apply. If a mandate allows a greater use of force than is generally acceptable under the Humanitarian Law of War, these exceptions are subject to legal scrutiny.
0232. **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** The ROE are typically a list of rules that set out the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives. They inform commanders of the constraints and freedoms under which they have to operate within the theatre of operations, and they are designed to ensure that any application of force is appropriately controlled. ROE are a political authorisation to use force. This authorisation is always granted at political level. The ROE grant powers and set boundaries for the use of force when executing the tasks which fall within the mandate, the mission and the commander’s intention.

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality apply in all cases. Thus the ROE do not contain an obligation to use force; rather they create the framework in which force can be used if there is a need to do so. Commanders can always restrict the ROE for their subordinate commanders. However, they may never expand them.

0233. No force without justification. In all cases where military personnel may use force there must be a legal justification. The force that can be used is always subject to restrictions. It may be used within the boundaries of the mission and instructions, including, for example, the ROE. Military personnel must be aware that the use of force without justification is prohibited.

SECTION 4 : THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

0234. Although deployment near the home (EU) country remains a possibility, operations can be at a considerable distance. This aspect of military operations is often referred to as their expeditionary nature. The distance alone has a major impact on the planning and execution of land operations. In the first place transporting the troops and establishing them on site is very demanding. In NATO these processes are known as Strategic Deployment, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (SD&RSOMI). Naturally the same applies at the end of an operation. Units to be deployed must be able to concentrate on the specific preparation required for the military activities in the area of operations. They must therefore be able to count on an organisation which can be responsible for the transport and the reception on site.

0235. The transport, integration and deployment of military units are more than just a logistic process. Experience shows that good preparation is essential for a successful start to an operation taking place far from the home country. This success also depends on the well-coordinated actions of a large number of specialist units. Firstly there is a need for units that can ensure an acceptable level of security. Only then do the units that can carry out the necessary infrastructure tasks and the logistic units enter into the picture. The standard of infrastructure in areas of operation is frequently far lower than in the country of origin.

Not only is the availability and state of roads and buildings important for the reception and the deployment of the units, the capacity to provide telecommunications, water and food supply, refuse disposal and electricity supply is equally important. Good intelligence preparation ahead of a new operation is essential, with detailed reconnaissance – fact-finding – playing an important role.

0236. For units operating at a great distance, maintenance makes great demands on logistic capacities (organisation, assets and stocks). Modern units with modern equipment require high quality, and often extensive, logistic support. Since deploying units almost always have to work within pre-determined manning constraints (personnel ceiling), the planning staff constituting the units are faced with a dilemma. If there are insufficient fighting elements to execute the mission it is likely to fail, but without sufficient logistic capacity it may not be possible to carry out the mission satisfactorily.

This dilemma can result in the armed forces having to consider the active involvement of civilian logistic companies. However, dependence on these companies will also oblige the armed forces to devote adequate attention to protecting these partners.

0237. Differences in the terrain and climate in these far-off areas of operation can have an important impact on planning. Both personnel and equipment are subject to their influence, particularly if “ exposed ” to them for long periods. The need to invest in the protection and welfare of personnel is greater than ever before. The human factor is the crucial key to the military power of a unit. This very need for care and protection affects the level of engineer and logistic support. As well as, and perhaps more importantly than, a high overall level of care and protection, each individual serviceman must be prepared to cope with exceptional climatic and geographic conditions. Appropriate physical, but also mental training and preparation is thus indispensable. When procuring new equipment, the possibility that it may be used under extreme conditions must be considered from the outset. In some cases it will even be necessary to procure specific additional material for the conduct of the operation. Equipment procured in the past, when the requirements were based on average conditions, will often need to be re-examined and may in some cases need extensive maintenance action.
0238. Local weather and terrain conditions may restrict operations for units. On some occasions (often for a limited period of time and in a specific place) units will be unable to carry out certain activities at all. In certain parts of the terrain it may be impossible to use vehicles and the only realistic option will be to deploy on foot. This must be taken into account when constituting the unit. It will often be impossible to deploy heavy units and heavy equipment.
0239. There is no doubt that weather and terrain factors will influence the way in which a unit deploys. In particular the tactical mobility of the unit is likely to be restricted, for example by a limited number of crossing points over water. It may therefore be necessary to deploy construction machines prior to the deployment of heavy vehicles. Sometimes certain areas will even be inaccessible to troops on foot. In those situations the only solution is to use helicopters or other means of air transport.
0240. Opponents operate across all environments and will choose to adapt their tactics to exploit the specific weather and terrain characteristics of the area in which they are operating. Often, they will be more familiar with the local conditions than the unit being deployed. Especially irregular activists (i.e. insurgents and terrorists) are operating in their own environment and may be able to rely on support from the local population. They are also accustomed to the specific nature of the weather and the terrain. This is why insurgent groups seek out places where they can increase their chances of success – particularly when confronted by a technologically superior force. In these circumstances they prefer to operate in situations which are difficult for their opponent. They often opt for limited actions in urban, complex or mountainous areas, in order to exploit their relative advantage and neutralise the technological lead of well-equipped military units. This enables them to achieve considerable success with limited means.

SECTION 5: THE POPULATION

0241. Civil society plays an important role in all military deployments, be it from the perspective of the national population, or the indigenous population. It is inconceivable that any part of the population would not be affected by these operations, both in the country supplying the troops and in the country where the military operations are taking place. A significant element of Campaign Authority is derived from gaining consent of the population, both at home and abroad. Once that consent has been gained, then the next vital step is to manage the expectation levels of all sectors of society so that a sense of realism is retained. In all cases it is the population that provides the manpower to establish the armed forces and in so doing determines to a great extent the physical and mental component of military power.
0242. **National population.** Prior to an operation, public opinion at home regarding the deployment of troops is influenced by political leaders. The way in which the media portray the conflict or crisis, together with the political reactions, plays a major role. The friends and family of service personnel on operations form a specific group. Service associations, the parties which make up the political opposition and all manner of action groups will also attempt to exert their influence during this phase. Support within society has a significant influence on the ‘end state’ formulated by the politicians as the goal to be achieved by the force.
0243. Media reporting, as well as successes and reversals during the operation, significantly affect public opinion at home. An opponent will often try to undermine support for the operation within the government and society (our own “centre of gravity”), or they will attempt to manipulate people’s perceptions of legitimacy. Casualty figures, legitimacy, the financial burden and the necessity and duration of participation in an operation all affect public opinion and consequently the level of support.
0244. In the case of a deployment on national territory people will have a favourable attitude to the military since they are providing civil assistance and thus serving the common interest. This may become less positive if the operation involves imposing orders and prohibitions and limiting freedom of movement. The perception of the military when operating in the home country is – just as in the expeditionary environment – influenced by the manner in which the soldiers conduct themselves, for example, their professionalism; their desire to help others and the respect shown for the population.
0245. **Indigenous population in the area of operations** (excluding operations on national territory). The local population⁹, in the theatre of operations, has an even more dominating effect on the deployment. Not only does the presence of locals form a physical factor of influence, they are often the source of manpower for the opponent and significantly affect the support for all parties.

⁹ An important part of the local population is made up by local, regional and state authorities. Their role is described in chapter 4 : cooperation.

0246. In combat actions between a coalition and the regular forces of an opponent, the large scale of operations may lead to collateral damage and unintended casualties among the civilian population. As previously discussed, the purpose of the Rules of Engagement is to minimise these instances, notwithstanding the fundamental right to self-protection. The presence of the civilian population also plays a role in this type of combat action, leading inevitably to constraints on the conduct of military operations. In order to comply with the fundamental principle of legitimacy, a coalition must do its utmost to avoid unintended effects under these circumstances. The relative importance of the indigenous population increases as the level and intensity of military operations decreases. Thus in a counter-insurgency situation, the perceptions and needs of the local population have to be actively managed, and the unintended consequences of military activity may have an effect out of all proportion to their scale. Under these circumstances the aim of the coalition must always be to restore security and bolster the civilian administration so that reconstruction and development activities may take hold. The temporary absence of a civilian administration can open the door to other actors wishing to exploit this power vacuum.
0247. Once security in the area of operations can be more or less guaranteed, and conflict no longer dominates, attention can shift to the causes of the conflict. Public opinion is crucial in this respect. The support of the local population for our presence is a precondition for success. The same is also true for a power opponent wanting to take advantage of these circumstances. Irregular opponents traditionally draw their support from the local population, and this support may either be freely given or as a result of coercion.
0248. At this stage the population will be likely to take the side of the party they believe will be best able to satisfy their immediate and longer term needs. The opponent is of course aware of this and will try to influence the population. In many cases this will involve forceful means, including terror. For the population this makes choosing difficult, and sometimes even extremely dangerous. Under these circumstances they will often wait to see how the situation progresses and will therefore appear uncommitted to the coalition.
0249. For a unit to have a chance of succeeding with the local population, the population will have to see its aim as a desirable (“ noble ”) and legitimate political objective. Without this a military operation is not possible and there will be continued resistance to the presence of the military unit. It is therefore essential to treat the population and the local authority with respect and reserve. The population will only support the unit once it can ensure permanent security and a significant improvement in their living conditions. In this phase of the deployment the military unit must support the reinstatement of the local agencies responsible for public order and safety. It must also be prepared to tackle the basic restoration of the utilities and infrastructure. It may also be called upon temporarily to undertake administrative tasks. There is often no clear indication of when a crisis is over. For this reason the term end state is used, rather than end date. The local population will only support the military unit unconditionally when active involvement is guaranteed for a lengthy period. This requires the unit to demonstrate resilience and perseverance.

0250. In order to win the support of the local population, they must share in the success of the local authority. Wherever possible, stabilising activities must have a local “ face ”. This generates attachment, job opportunities and security and thus helps to detach the population from the opponent. Care must be taken to avoid this ‘face’ being simply a “ face ”. The local contribution must be serious and, if possible, substantial.
0251. A population is not a homogenous entity. It is a collection of groups each with their own interests, family relationships, tribal structures and suchlike. To alter the perception of a population a number of opinion formers must be identified. In a rural environment these are usually the tribal leaders, local teachers, religious leaders and doctors. These people are normally seen by the local population as being “ above suspicion ”.
0252. It is important to build up a good overview of the key leaders in the target locality. In order to be able to separate the opponent from the rest of the population the unit must be aware of who carries influence with the locals, who is really in charge and of the various processes involved.

SECTION 6 : THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT

0253. In future conflicts military units may encounter a wide range of adversaries, varying in quality, quantity, the level of control (possibly by a local authority) and intentions. Adversaries may use regular or irregular activities¹⁰, posing regular and irregular threats upon the whole international community. States, nations, transnational actors, and non state entities will continue to challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Threats may be caused by nation states, organizations, people, groups, individuals, conditions, or natural phenomena able to damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. Preparing for and managing these threats requires employing all instruments of national (and international) power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Threats may be described through a range of four major categories or challenges : traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. While helpful in describing the threats units of Finabel countries are likely to face these categories do not define the nature of the adversary. In fact, adversaries may use any and all of these challenges in combination to achieve the desired effect against any country in particular or any coalition in general.

¹⁰ NATO and ABCA use the following draft definition for describing an irregular activity : “ **Behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent change through the illegal use, or threat, of violence, conducted by politically, ideologically or criminally motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority.** ”

- **Traditional threats** emerge from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in understood forms of military competition and conflict. Many nations around the globe maintain powerful conventional forces and not all are friendly to alliances such as NATO or EU. Some of these, powerful, hostile powers possess weapons of mass destruction. Although these powers may not actively seek armed confrontation and will avoid a confrontation with Western military strength, their activities can provoke regional conflicts that threaten the interests of the Alliance and/or the European Union (and thus the Finabel member states). Deterrence therefore remains an important aim of a coalition. Should deterrence fail, and there is some evidence that deterrence is less able to accomplish this goal, Western countries, their alliances and coalitions must maintain capabilities to act against any combination of enemy conventional and unconventional forces ;
- **Irregular threats** are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric, and often illegal¹¹, methods and (not exclusively irregular) means to counter traditional military advantages. A weaker opponent often uses irregular warfare to exhaust collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular warfare includes such means as terrorism, insurgency, criminality and guerrilla warfare. Besides that irregular activists will use (often and sometimes even as the chief means) regular economic, political, civil and cultural initiatives with the purpose to establish their influence over the local population and international (opposing) countries ;
- **Catastrophic threats** involve the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons (by irregular activists), also called weapons of mass destruction and effects. Possession of these weapons gives an enemy the power to inflict sudden and catastrophic effects. The proliferation of related technology has made this threat more likely than in the past. This threat may even occur at low levels by the use of dirty bombs, inflicting damage and casualties in larger parts of the operating environment ;
- **Disruptive threats** involve an enemy using new technologies that reduce Western (including Finabel) advantages in key operational domains. Disruptive threats involve developing and using breakthrough technologies to negate current advantages in key operational domains. These threats also encompass the actual will to use these technologies against coalition forces, whenever necessary and appropriate ;

¹¹ Methods can be considered to be illegal quite quickly because the illegality is established from the level of the state.

- By combining traditional, disruptive, catastrophic, and irregular capabilities, adversaries will seek to create advantageous conditions by quickly changing the nature of the conflict and moving to employ capabilities for which the Western world is least prepared. Adversaries will seek to interdict Western forces attempting to enter any area of crisis. If coalition forces successfully gain entry, the enemy (in case of an insurgency) will seek engagement in complex terrain and urban environments as a way of offsetting western advantages. Methods used by adversaries include dispersing their forces into small mobile combat teams—combined only when required to strike a common objective—and becoming invisible by blending in with the local population.
- The above described categories of possible threats do not cover all threats that may occur. Threats that occur from an internal conflict in a region will cause the deployment of coalition forces performing activities in the framework of peace support (peace keeping, peace enforcing, peace making). This type of threats will possibly be a combination of traditional and irregular threats. Reference can be made to the conflict on the Balkans. Threats will also frequently occur in the form of environmental disasters that will require support by military units performing support to humanitarian assistance.

0254. Threats can be expected to use the environment and rapidly adapt. Extremist organizations will seek to take on state-like qualities using the media and technology and their position within a state's political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage. Their operations will become more sophisticated, combining conventional, unconventional, irregular, and criminal tactics. They may focus on creating conditions of instability, seek to alienate legitimate forces from the population, or employ global networks to expand local operations. The threat will employ advanced information operations and will not be bound by limits on the use of violence.

0255. Conflicts are much more likely to be fought “ among the people ” instead of “ around the people. ” This fundamentally alters the manner in which military units can apply force to achieve success in a conflict. Enemies will increasingly seek populations within which to hide as protection against the proven attack and detection means of coalition forces, in preparation for attacks against communities, as refuge from strikes against their bases, and to draw resources. War remains a battle of wills—a contest for dominance over people. The essential struggle of the future conflict will take place in areas in which people are concentrated.

SECTION 7 : TENDENCIES IN RELATION TO THE OPPONENT

0256. Although it is hardly possible to give a clear description of possible opponents or adversaries a number of tendencies can be discerned in relation to the opponent. These trends act as a reference when analysing the opponent and provide insight into predicting how the opponent may behave.

- a. **Temporary coalitions.** The opponent could make use of temporary coalitions and could adapt them to suit his own purposes. The opponent may be a state or a non-state actor. He is more likely to appear in the form of groups (armed or unarmed), militias, temporary coalitions, private enterprises, criminal factions, or organised civil resistance, which may or may not be tolerated by the dominant form of government present. Temporary coalitions are formed quickly and may change rapidly during the course of an operation. In certain cases regular units may take part in such coalitions in some way ;
- b. **Ignoring international legislation.** Opponents may increasingly ignore or be in conflict with national and international legislation. If the opportunity arises the opponent will attack people and objects protected by legislation and protocols. The aim is to bring about change in the internal situation of a country by the use, or the threat of the use of force ;
- c. **Conflict avoidance.** Where possible the opponent will seek to adapt his tactics so that he can neutralise the coalition's technical advantage. The advantages of the use of precision weapons, launched from the ground or the air, or of the capability of ISTAR resources are thus negated. To this end regular units or weapon systems can be positioned across urban areas or in the vicinity of vital or sensitive infrastructure. The opponent is increasingly deployed among the population. Whereas in the past fighting took place at strategic points (harbours, mountain passes, high plains, river crossings), the current tendency is to fight in urban areas ;
- d. **The media.** The possibilities offered by modern communications technology present the opponent with the means for worldwide communication and networking. The availability of satellite telephones, mobile telephones and internet make it possible to disseminate news throughout the world easily and very quickly. The opponent does not constantly have to justify himself to the media, but can exploit opportunities for his own ends. He is not bound by the requirement to adhere to the truth. The strategic impact of events such as excessive collateral damage, casualties among the population or other bad news may result directly in restrictions on the coalition's freedom of action, whereas this may not be the case when the opponent is responsible. In some cases this may have repercussions with regard to the permitted use of force or may even lead to a ban on operating in certain areas.
- e. **Dispersal.** More and more often the opponent disperses his military units across the area of operations, thereby increasing his chances of survival against Western military forces. In addition he has the means to communicate effectively, allowing him to concentrate his effects in specific places at specific times ;

- f. **Lack of safe areas.** The opponent does his utmost to ensure that there are no areas in which coalition troops feel safe. Throughout the theatre of operations, but also on national territory, he will constantly attempt to create threats and cause damage. Thus there is no longer a safe rear area or a safe base which can be used to make preparations undisturbed. This means that all troops must have basic military skills and must be equipped to resist any form of threat. Moreover, attention must be paid to force protection at all levels and throughout the whole area of operations ;
- g. **Increased lethality.** The lethality of the opponent's (military) power is increasing. This is partly due to a decrease in the control measures that states take when monitoring those technologies and scientific knowledge that is also suitable for military applications. In some cases, where he considers it appropriate, the opponent can make use of high technology and weapon systems with a high degree of lethality – weapons of mass destruction or effect. The opponent has a thorough understanding of the vulnerability of Western society to the threat or the use of these weapons ;
- h. **Financial strength.** It is becoming increasingly rare for the opponent to be hampered by limited financial resources. As a result of financial globalisation, income from criminality, increasing wealth in other parts of the world and the discovery of valuable minerals in traditional conflict areas, possible sources of funding have increased ;
- i. **Unpredictability.** The threat posed by insurgents and ideologically motivated factions is hard to predict and thus difficult to eliminate. It is important to introduce units to this unpredictability during training. A key factor in the fight against the opponent is information on the attitude of the various societies, regions, tribes or population groups to the different groups of insurgents. It is important to determine whether there are any links with the regime, what their position is with regard to the other factors of power and also from which population groups they recruit their members.

SECTION 8: ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS

0257. The current operational environment¹² is **unpredictable and dynamic**. Land forces no longer focus on a single specific threat. They must be able to respond to a wide range of situations involving rapidly changing and diverse threats. It is not possible to predict the nature and the intensity of a conflict in advance. Land forces must be capable of rapid deployment across the whole conflict spectrum¹³. There are no longer any manageable “ divisions ” between the different levels of force. Thus land forces must be prepared to carry out simultaneous operations from a broad scale of deployment options, under very diverse circumstances and anywhere in the world.

¹² The operating environment that an EU battlegroup is likely to be deployed in.

¹³ See Chapter 2 and Chapter 6.

0258. Many military actions started by the international community arise out of crisis situations within states or regions. The primary aim of military deployments is to bring about security, stability and order in a crisis area, after which HN civilian authorities can continue their work. However, military involvement is not limited to neutralising an opponent or simply ensuring security. Work must be done, often immediately, to establish, or re-establish, a satisfactory administrative and economic situation in the country. It is worth remembering that there can be no development without security and no security without development.

Tackling such operations requires intensive cooperation between military and civilian organisations, including aid organisations¹⁴, from the outset. It is essential to have a clear plan for the use and deployment of lethal and non-lethal assets. Land forces may also be called upon to contribute to disaster relief operations.

The distribution of food aid following a natural disaster; the provision of logistic support to the authorities in a stricken area; or help with the evacuation of threatened civilians from flooded areas, are all examples of possible humanitarian missions. The deployment of military emergency aid units is necessary when governmental and non-governmental aid organisations are unable to cope with the scale of an emergency situation. Intervention is only ever by the request of the host nation authorities and is normally subject to a Memorandum of Understanding.

0259. **The central role of the human factor.** The armed forces have many tasks and operate in many areas. They may be deployed in all phases of a crisis and in all types of crisis. They are particularly likely to be deployed in situations where there is a long-term or not well defined threat or where the security situation does not yet allow reconstruction and development to take place. In many cases units have to conduct offensive and defensive actions in quick succession – or even concurrently– and thus contribute to stabilisation.

0260. The military contribution to solve conflicts and crises is usually on land. Conflicts and crises are usually also decided on land, by people. To a great extent the military on the ground determine the success, partly indirectly, but mainly through physical confrontations and actions. This makes great demands on personnel. They must be capable of entering into decisive physical combat with the opponent and of gaining and retaining the trust of the population under all circumstances.

0261. **Friction** is an integral part of land operations. The abundance of actors, the unexpected interplay between them and the speed at which events take place all require personnel to be quick thinking, carefully attuned to the situation, resilient and flexible.

0262. Sometimes, the extremes of climate and terrain place great demands on the level of training and robustness of the individual soldier. The equipment used by a unit on deployment must also be able to withstand these conditions.

¹⁴ Such as international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) etc.

0263. During the execution of a mission the world is more or less constantly watching and listening through the eyes and ears of the media. On the one hand the population at home is able to follow the situation and progress of their soldiers, but on the other hand the soldiers are constantly being judged. Those opponents whose interests are best served by the crisis continuing often do not feel the need to uphold internationally recognised laws and codes of conduct.
0264. **Operations are often expeditionary operations.** In order to carry out the main tasks of the armed forces, land troops need to be able to deploy quickly anywhere in the world. This may need to be at the beginning of a crisis, in a hostile and violent environment. Expeditionary operations take place both within and outside the NATO area. For all operations forces are required to move and deploy. Lines of communication must also be established and maintained. In addition, expeditionary operations require certain activities to be carried out in the theatre of operations in advance of the deployment. For example, the protection of the Task Force (or EU battle group) being deployed must be ensured, and the first unit to enter the theatre of operations will need to occupy the initial positions or perform the initial entry tasks with very limited means and support.
0265. **Operations are complex.** Partly as a result of increasing technological development, military operations take place in five dimensions: on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in the realm of information (cyberspace). To operate effectively thus requires joint planning and joint execution. However, operations are almost always decided in the land dimension. Land operations are more complex than those at sea or in the air. Not only because the environment is more complex, but also because of the direct interaction with civilian actors, such as the local population, refugees, international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the civilian administration. In addition there are many people, units and platforms present in the area of responsibility. These units and people are constantly exposed to threats from the opponent.
- Individuals and units carry out military activities across the area. However, in the harsh reality of fatigue, stress and life-threatening situations, even the simplest tasks are often difficult to accomplish. Chance occurrences also play a role in this respect. There is constant friction, and uncertainty and chaos are the norm for land operations. This complexity is also felt in other areas. For example, joint planning for military operations takes place in a multinational context and in cooperation with non-military organisations.
- In addition to the complex environment mentioned earlier, this complexity is also due to the fact that at all times large number of actors (with often unpredictable and sometimes contradictory interests) is operating within the area of operations. With this in mind it is necessary to include specialists in the unit, such as political advisers, cultural advisers and operational analysts.
- In many cases the opponent cannot be easily identified. There may also be a number of opponents (grouped together) with diverse objectives. The opponent may employ irregular (combat) techniques and will attempt to hide among the civilian population, thereby making the situation even more complex.

0266. **Operations are operations.** All operations can fundamentally be approached in the same way. During every operation the participating forces must be able to carry out a wide range of military activities, ranging from offensive and defensive activities and tasks to stability activities and tasks. This means that commanders and units must have the flexibility required to switch quickly from one type of activity to another. These may be physically quite close to each other. Commanders and units must also be able to carry out various activities **simultaneously** at different locations within the area of operations. Chapter 6 gives more information about the range of military activities.
0267. This way of operating places great demands on the soldier (mental and physical) and on all levels of command. The intensity of operations can change at a moment's notice and may vary according to the level of deployment. A unit on operations must be able to switch rapidly from a relatively calm situation, where the emphasis is on stability activities, to one requiring combat action and thus the use of lethal force (and vice versa).
0268. **Continued ability to deploy on regular (major combat / high intensity) operations.**
- It is unlikely that military units (e.g. EU battle groups) will be called upon to deploy at short notice against an organised military force deploying on a large scale (often referred to as regular forces). Instead the opponent will often consist of a combination of regular forces and insurgents operating irregularly, that may or may not share the same objectives. Although deploying against irregular insurgents carrying out small-scale actions is the most likely, combat against regular units – limited in time and space – must not be excluded. An important lesson learned from expeditionary operations is that military units must also be able to operate at the higher end of the force spectrum under rapidly changing circumstances. Units should endeavour to apply the degree of force required to gain control of the situation as quickly as possible and to maintain this control. Initially this requires escalation dominance ;
 - A continued capacity for regular deployment means that the military power for regular deployment must be maintained. In other words the three components of military power (see Chapter 3) must be maintained. In concrete terms this means that the “ know-how ” (the conceptual component of military power) needed to conduct a large-scale regular conflict must be maintained because of the length of time needed to build up such a capability. It must therefore continue to be included in doctrine. Land forces should also ensure that the physical component (personnel and materiel) is capable of conducting a regular deployment. This affects the material constitution of the land forces. Finally, the mental component must also be maintained, necessitating its inclusion in the instruction and training programme.

0269. Levels of integrated deployment

- As a result of the threat and the need to be able to ensure escalation dominance under all circumstances, there is a visible shift from the level of integrated deployment to the lowest tactical levels. Integrated deployment is not limited to the sole use of ground-based assets. The capacities of other dimensions (such as naval fire support and close air support) can also be integrated into this concept. On the one hand this has become possible thanks to new technologies. On the other hand it has become necessary in order to maintain the desired operational tempo¹⁵ and ensure escalation dominance.
It places strict demands on the unit to maintain the required cohesion during deployment. In some cases circumstances require the deployment to use units with the size of reinforced platoons.
- The importance of specialist units is increasing. Their technological and specialist qualities mean that only these units are able to create certain effects. We see a growing tendency to add so-called enablers down to the lowest level of tactical units (platoons). Placing elements such as Tactical PsyOp Teams (TPTs) and CIMIC, intelligence and fire support elements under the direct command of the tactical commander makes it easier to generate the desired effect. While the use of overwhelming firepower has become less important (because this usually causes unwanted side-effects), the use of precision weapons (current fire support elements) at the right place and the right time has increased.

0270. Network Enabled Capable (NEC)

- To achieve the desired effect from all available and suitable means (land, sea, and air) requires effective and efficient coordination. One solution is to link all the assets together in a network. However, this does depend on there being interoperability between the weapons, sensors and information and communication systems. This can reduce the duration of the decision-making cycle, which is a key condition for a manoeuvre based approach. Systems no longer operate on a stand-alone basis, but as part of an integrated network of sensor, decision-making and weapon systems. These are also known as Network Centric Operations (NCO). Capacities which can contribute to this are referred to as being Network Enabled Capable (NEC) ;
- The NEC concept focuses on improving the provision of operational information. Improving the way information is handled leads to information superiority, which in turn leads to decision and effects superiority. Improving the interoperability between sensors and shooters (weapon systems) from different countries and multinational forces acts as a force multiplier for operational effectiveness. A relatively modest investment in interoperability improves the effectiveness of the military power.

¹⁵ See Chapter 6, Section 4 for an explanation of this term.

CHAPTER 3: THE ABILITY TO OPERATE¹⁶

SECTION 1 : INTRODUCTION.

0301. General. Military power consists of three inter-related components: a mental, a conceptual and a physical component. A set of widely accepted fundamental principles, current doctrine and procedures determined by practice combine to form the conceptual component. The operational capacities of the armed forces make up the physical component. Effective leadership results in the essential motivation which is so important, especially inherent motivation. Together with a sound organisation of the deployment, it forms the most important pillar of the mental component.




Figure 3-1: Components of military power¹⁷

0302. When deploying on land the contribution made by the units must be tailored to the specific characteristics of land operations. Only then can a unit successfully be deployed in a military operation. Section 2 will therefore outline these characteristics. The following sections will then examine the individual components of military power. Section 6 sets out how the various components can be applied in combination.

¹⁶ This chapter discusses the application of military power in the physical and psychological domains of an operation. Military units are able to operate as initial entry units, but will always be part of a complex environment as part of a comprehensive approach.

¹⁷ Some countries may use the moral component.

SECTION 2 : CHARACTERISTICS OF LAND OPERATIONS

0303. **The human factor.** The human factor plays a more significant role in land operations than in operations in the air or at sea or in civilian life. It is only on land that the various actors, including the opponents, encounter each other physically and that every action by an individual has a direct or indirect effect on another individual. Man's innate adaptability makes the planning and conduct of land operations even more complex than it already is.
0304. **Uncertainty and chaos.** Although commanders will do their utmost to obtain and maintain the fullest possible picture of the circumstances, experience shows that it is not feasible to cover everything. The environment in which the unit is deployed is subject to constant change, whereby information can rapidly become out-of-date. At the same time the commander is expected to take decisions in good time. Making assumptions and taking risks in an environment where uncertainty and chaos are normal are often the only option.
0305. **Force and danger.** Military units are often deployed in conditions where force is used, leading to a real threat of danger. Soldiers are of course equipped and trained for such situations. The ever-present risks, notably the danger of losing one's life, have considerable influence on the deployment. In addition, the risk that the use of force may pose a danger to impartial and innocent third parties has major repercussions.
0306. **Friction.** In principle military actions are in themselves often quite straightforward. However, in practice, the effect of uncertainty, chaos, violence and danger makes even the simplest actions difficult to perform. Chance circumstances and factors of influence over which one has little or no control also play a major role. One is often confronted with a series of local difficulties and minor delays, whose cumulative effects cause structural friction, which can affect the whole course of the operation. Flexibility is therefore essential.
0307. **Unpredictability of other actors.** Land operations are no longer solely determined by hostile military units following a fixed doctrine. More and more, hostile factions, and sometimes also individuals, use new and unexpected tactics. All the other actors, both neutral and friendly, such as influential members of the population, governments and NGOs, are likely to have their own agendas, interests and objectives together with the methods to achieve them. It is therefore essential to have empathy for the attitude and conduct of all these actors.
0308. **Continuous long-term deployment.** More than in the past, military units are involved in crises for which there is no short-term solution. There is often no indication at all of when the situation might be resolved. For this reason we now refer to an end state, rather than an end date. Other actors expect, or even demand, that units guarantee their uninterrupted active involvement. Resilience and stamina are essential.

0309. **Lack of overview.** In land operations units are frequently required to operate in confusing circumstances, in which direct line of sight contact is not always possible. Such circumstances make it more difficult to establish and maintain a cohesive deployment at the lower levels.

SECTION 3 : MENTAL COMPONENT OF MILITARY POWER

0310. In addition to a conceptual and physical capability, military units must also have a well developed mental component. The mental component consists of effective leadership, the ability to ensure a sound organisation of the deployment and strong motivation. This section will examine motivation, looking particularly at the concept of mental preparation. Mental training is namely an essential aspect of the mental component of military power.

0311. Intelligence creates the perception that commanders and in fact, all military personnel, have on all aspects that occur within an operation. This perception influences the mental component of coalition troops and the opponent either in a positive or a negative way. Perception influences also those principles of joint and combined operations that have a mental basis, for example legitimacy. One can speak about legitimacy and perceived legitimacy.

0312. **Mental training.** Land operations take place in rapidly changing locations and under very diverse circumstances. However a military operation can only succeed if the personnel involved have an unconditional commitment to its success and are prepared to make sacrifices if needed. Mental preparation consists of three main elements, comprising a total of eleven mental qualities. Being part of a team and toughness form the basis of a soldier's combat readiness (see figure 3-2).



Figure 3-2; Main elements of mental preparation and training

- **Team membership.** In an operational environment an individual soldier must focus first and foremost on the objectives of the force. He must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the legislation, norms and values, conventions and customs, to function correctly within the organisation. He is expected to execute the tasks assigned to him under diverse circumstances and also in unexpected situations. He will frequently be required to do so without direct help or instructions from others, always remaining within the framework of his mission ;
- As a member of a unit a soldier must focus primarily on the colleagues with whom he is working, either permanently or temporarily. He must feel involved with the people who make up the unit and be prepared to put the interests of the unit ahead of his own. Where appropriate he must take account of the interests of the other members of the unit. In many cases the unit he is part of is characterised by a range of ages, dispositions, social and cultural backgrounds, levels of education and philosophies. He must be able to deal with this diversity. He is expected to approach and treat the people around him with mutual respect and trust. He is also expected to have a strong sense of ethical values, and to display this in his conduct and actions. Effective leadership and the sound organisation of the deployment create a situation in which the individual soldier feels privileged to be a part of the unit. This in turn should lead him to act and operate in a sincere and trustworthy manner ;
- Mental characteristics such as camaraderie, independence, pride and ethical awareness are essential if the soldier is to be a respected member of the team and to contribute to the performance of military tasks ;
- **Toughness.** In an operational environment a soldier mainly performs his allotted tasks as part of an organic unit. He will be confronted by tasks and situations which place extreme demands on him, both physically and mentally. It is inevitable that he will be subjected to some of the trials of the battlefield, such as conditions, including weather, that are liable to change very quickly, a lack of comfort and/or sleep, uncertainty, chaos, misery, human suffering and fear. Despite this hardship he must constantly find a way of continuing to function effectively and perform his tasks. This will involve him stretching his own limits of physical pain, tiredness and/or frustration. He must also be prepared to be able to continue to function at the required level for prolonged periods, in spite of any setbacks he may encounter. This requires not only the appropriate knowledge and skills, but also the right attitude to be able to keep going under sometimes extreme operational circumstances ;
- Resilience, stamina and the ability to cope with stress are mental characteristics which are critical to the soldier's level of toughness, and which enable him to continue to perform his tasks, even in extreme conditions ;
- **Combat readiness.** The soldier must commit himself fully in order to perform his task and achieve the desired aim. In doing so he must act in accordance with policy and with the written and unwritten rules that set the limits for his conduct and actions ;

- In some circumstances organic functioning or deployment and the use of organic assets and/or units may not be possible. The soldier is then obliged to respond positively and to use his own initiative to make a contribution to completing the task. The soldier must take risks (in some cases endangering his own life) to perform his task. All military personnel must be mentally and physically prepared to confront the enemy, with the aim of putting him out of action ;
- Mental characteristics such as the will to win, discipline, activity and courage determine whether, and to what extent, the soldier is prepared to commit himself fully, in other words, his readiness to take part in combat.

0313. **The role of the commander.** The commander plays a special role in the mental component. He is the personification of effective leadership. In addition he is responsible for the pre-deployment training. During the deployment it is the commander, in his role as a leader, who, by means of example, motivation and his ability to transmit the will to “ go for it ” to his men, ensures that the tasks are completed. During a deployment he is the face of the unit. His actions determine the image that all other actors have of the unit. He is responsible for the actions of all the individual soldiers under his command.

SECTION 4 : CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT OF MILITARY POWER

0314. Success in military operations stems from the correct interpretation and application of the fundamental principles of military operations. These basic principles are fundamental rules for the use of military forces - the physical component of military power. The basic principles must be used by the commander and staff when preparing an operational concept and establishing an operational plan as a means of determining whether these are feasible and complete. These basic principles are based on years of military experience. They contribute to the mental component of military power, particularly the sound organisation of the use of military assets.
0315. The basic principles of military deployment are fundamental rules for the use of military assets for strategic, operational and tactical deployment. They must always be considered in relation to each other. Adhering completely to one principle can sometimes make it impossible to comply fully with another. Thus the application of the basic principles involves finding a suitable balance in each specific situation. In doing so the commander must at all times take account of the senior commander's (or commanders') intent, the mission and the objective, the operations of other parties and the time and space factors. The following paragraphs outline the 12 basic principles.
0316. **Maintenance of morale.** Morale is an important factor for military power and thus for the success of an operation. The commander plays a key role in this respect. A successful operation can create self-respect, a feeling which in many situations is indispensable in maintaining morale under difficult circumstances. A long deployment, far from home and in an environment where politics play an important part can affect morale. The fact that the media are constantly watching may also have a negative effect on personnel.

0317. **Freedom of movement.** Freedom of movement is essential to be able to act flexibly and effectively, and to take the initiative when required. This refers not only to physical freedom of movement, which can be obtained through having control of areas and infrastructure. It also refers to the freedom to make one's own choices, independently of others that is the key to success during the execution phase. A military unit that is unable to move to or within an area of operations will fail in the performance of its tasks. It will be unable to make a contribution to achieving the objectives set out.
0318. **Concentration of force.** If a decision is sought, a point of main effort has to be established at the right time and in the right place. This is necessary in order to gain the dominance needed to achieve the objective. Concentration of force involves a deliberate decision to deploy scarce resources. Concentration also implies accepting relative weakness in another location or at a different time. The application of this basic principle requires flexibility of thinking (the conceptual component) and flexibility in terms of personnel and material (the physical component). Empathy and adaptability are essential characteristics. This places demands on the structure of the organisation and the style of command within the force.
0319. **Selection and maintenance of the aim.** Any military operation must be focused on an unambiguous, clearly defined and attainable objective. Where a unit has no clear objective, or loses sight of what is to be achieved, the operation is likely to fail. Higher levels can express the objective in guidelines or a directive defining the desired end state. At the tactical level, commanders derive their objective from the higher commander's intent. This intent is clearly set out in the orders they receive and plays a central role in the planning, preparation and execution of land operations, thereby allowing all levels involved in a military operation to operate effectively.
0320. **Unity of effort.** All the assets and all the efforts needed to achieve the aim must be coordinated. This enables the commander to deploy all available military capacity to achieve his objective, while at the same time reducing his vulnerability. Modern military operations place heavy demands on the combination of the functions of military operations, particularly because a growing number and variety of means from various units, both national and international, are working towards the same objective. Unity of effort is a prerequisite for success, especially since land forces now only deploy in coalitions with other services and other armed forces. Unity of effort can be achieved through a common doctrine, a single command and synchronising own and supporting assets. It also requires training, team spirit, good will, a common aim and a clear delineation of responsibilities. Common doctrine, harmonised procedures and an understanding of everyone's capabilities and limitations are also important factors. Finally, coordination with all the other actors (including non-military actors) involved in managing a crisis is essential.

0321. **Simplicity.** The speed at which events unfold, the complexity of military operations and the vast amount of information available nowadays mean that chaos, stress and friction are inescapable. Unambiguous, clear and proven procedures, together with simple plans and clear orders, increase the chances of success during the conduct of an operation.
0322. **Flexibility.** Although in principle the aim to be achieved by the commander remains unchanged, he must have the freedom and adaptability to adjust his plans. The actual situation on the field is often very different from what was expected. Situations can also change very rapidly, necessitating adaptation. It must be possible to exploit any unexpected opportunities that may arise. Flexibility requires the correct mental attitude together with an organisation where people are used to responding quickly to changing needs. A commander can use his own mental flexibility and the keenness of his formation or unit to make good use of the chaos that often occurs during an operation.
0323. **Initiative.** Commanders must constantly strive to obtain or retain freedom of action. The objective is to act earlier and faster instead of merely responding to the actions of other parties. Only by acting more rapidly than the other parties is it possible to acquire and maintain an advantage. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances patience will be required. This requires a style of leadership which values initiative and accepts that risks must be taken.
0324. **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy has a legal and a social component. The deployment of military power by a country whether within national borders or outside them, is always based on a legal foundation. During deployment the unit must comply with the rules of national and international law. In many cases an additional set of rules tailored to the operation will also apply to that specific deployment. These are known as the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Legal legitimacy is non-negotiable. At the start of an operation it also contributes to the credibility of a unit. Social legitimacy is more important for the successful continuation and completion of military operations. As a result of the manner of execution chosen by the commander it can influence the level of support among the local population, the population in the country of origin and public opinion. When selecting the means to be deployed in a particular action, the commander must endeavour to prevent unnecessary damage or collateral damage.
0325. **Security.** Military personnel are usually deployed in a high-risk environment. Without appropriate measures this can lead to unacceptable losses, which means that the objective defined can no longer be achieved and public support disappears. A degree of security is thus essential. Security is not an end in itself. The execution of the mission remains the most important thing. Security can be achieved through the physical protection of all own assets.
This goes beyond simply the assets used for the deployment. It also involves the assets used in command and control support. It is essential to protect own information crucial to the success of the operation from any actors with a hostile intent.

0326. **Surprise.** A surprise action can be decisive for an action or combat action. This is particularly true when the unit is physically in the minority. The aim of the surprise action is to knock the opponent off balance, thereby allowing own troops to retain the initiative.
0327. **Sustainability.** Once an operation has started the unit deployed must be capable of sustaining it until the desired result (success) is achieved. The other actors, and certainly the local population, will expect this once the decision has been taken to deploy. In order to ensure the sustainability of an operation all the required conditions must be met. These include a fully functioning logistic system, the availability and suitability of materiel and fully trained and manned units, as well as political will and involvement.

SECTION 5 : PHYSICAL COMPONENT OF MILITARY POWER

0328. **Operational assets.** The operational assets belonging to the armed forces form the physical component of military power. The operational assets (in other words, the units) are made up of personnel and equipment that can be deployed in an operation. Operational readiness is also an important element of the physical component. The level of training of the units is a key factor. For the physical component to be valued correctly, it is very important to have a clear level of ambition for the deployment of the land forces. Deployment options and the corresponding instruction and training programmes should be linked to this level of ambition.
0329. **Personnel.** The personnel deployed must be capable, using the equipment available, of carrying out all military activities anywhere in the world and in all conditions. Personnel are instructed and trained accordingly, with attention being paid to specific elements reflecting the actual operation. This means that during each phase of the instruction and training attention must be paid to motivation and mental strength, knowledge of the possible deployment options, knowledge of tactics and techniques (skills and drills), basic skills (including physical training and physical toughness) and specific operation-related skills.
0330. **Materiel.** The development, procurement and maintenance of equipment should take account of the general rule that units must be capable of carrying out all military activities anywhere in the world and under all conditions. Studies relating to new equipment must be suited to the level of ambition defined for the units of the Land Forces Command. A correct interpretation of the results of the studies allows the formulation of tactical and technical requirements. These requirements form the basis for new equipment.

0331. **Harmonisation.** The physical component is not isolated. In order for the commander to have the opportunity to deploy his units (the physical component), he and his staff make use of the functions of military operations. These functions are described in greater detail in chapter 5, section 4. They form an analytical tool which can be used to examine all aspects of operation logically and correctly. In this way the mission (whereby the effects to be achieved form an important element), sound deployment (based on excellent physical and mental preparation), the application of doctrine and the optimum use of the available units can be closely coordinated.

SECTION 6 : COHESIVE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER

0332. When developing a strategy to achieve the objectives formulated, states (or organisations, such as the EU) examine which assets should be deployed. They also consider how, where, why and by whom they should be used. Correspondingly, the armed forces have to consider which military assets are required. In this way it is possible to achieve the essential coordination with all relevant actors involved in the crisis. This approach can be referred to as a comprehensive approach. The armed forces will also have to consider how they can make a contribution. The planning and preparation of military actions by land forces of the EU should be based on the fundamental principles set out above. However, in order to apply these principles correctly it is first necessary to know what the strategic end-state is. Only then is unity of effort possible. This agreed end-state guides the development of the plan for the military unit and all plans derived from this must be in line with this intent. This intent gives each subordinate commander the correct direction to follow, so that when the situation changes he is able to establish an alternative plan that is still in line with the directives formulated at the highest level. It also gives the subordinate commander the freedom, when opportunities arise, to develop and execute plans independently. This approach – mission-oriented command and control - allows flexible deployment and makes it possible to seize, and maintain, the initiative, while at the same time maintaining the aim and the unity of effort.
0333. In attempting to achieve its objectives a unit focuses also, or even primarily, on the actors at the source of the conflict or whose purpose is served by the continuation of the crisis. Previously, a unit in an armed conflict (a particular form of crisis) focused on the opponent's physical component (capability). Over the course of time a different approach to armed conflict has developed. One reason for this is that this one-sided approach often leads to major, unacceptable losses on both sides. In addition it also requires a great deal of capacity and time.
0334. For some time the most common approach has been the manoeuvrist approach. It does not preclude the physical elimination of the opponent, however the main aim is to disrupt what is referred to as the cohesion of the opponent and thus to destroy his will to deploy and fight. This is done by deliberately attacking selective targets, in the hope of creating confusion on the opponent's side and making it impossible for him to conduct a coordinated and cohesive operation. An opponent who is constantly and persistently forced to adjust his plans will run short of time. But more important is the fact that he is continuously forced to respond and thus is unable to regain the initiative.

Little by little this will affect his morale. A third aim is to shape the perception of the opponent, or understanding as it is also referred to. If the opponent has an incomplete or incorrect image of reality his actions will not produce the effects he desires. Thus the focus is no longer solely on the physical component of military power. It now also includes the mental component. In NATO the focus on cohesion, will and understanding is key to the planning and execution of information operations. The manoeuvrist approach can be seen as the practical implementation of the fundamental principles of initiative, concentration of effort and maintenance of aim. However, this approach can only be expected to succeed if the fundamental principle of flexibility is also borne in mind. The availability of validated intelligence, adequate mobility and high-quality command and control play an important role. These are rightly considered to be essential operational capabilities.

0335. Military commanders gain experience of cooperation with all the other actors who have an ever-growing influence in an area of operations and thus on the operation. Commanders must also take all these actors into account when planning and executing actions and when choosing material. Although these other actors are not opponents, their conduct can obstruct the execution of a military operation. In order to influence their conduct in such a way as to avoid the military operation being disrupted, increasing weight is given to the mental component. It is hoped that in tackling their information it may be possible to have an indirect effect on their conduct.
0336. When planning and executing actions, attention is also paid to those groups who provide support for opponents. One could say that in making use of all the operational capabilities that are available to them, commanders are constantly implementing the fundamental principles. Thanks to a clear commander's intent, expressed at the most senior level, and sufficient freedom of movement (mission-oriented command and control), they are able to exploit every opportunity and respond quickly to each change in the situation. A versatile and flexible method of deployment (the manoeuvrist approach) allows units to achieve their objectives without immediately losing support.

CHAPTER 4: COOPERATION

SECTION 1 : INTRODUCTION

0401. Military force is only one of the instruments of power that states (EU) can use when involved in solving a conflict. Cooperation is therefore the key word for every military operation.

SECTION 2 : COOPERATION WITH OTHER MINISTRIES

0402. The deployment of military units is not a matter purely for the Ministry of Defence, irrespective of whether the operation is on national territory or abroad. In most cases, and often at an early stage, states will employ a mix of all instruments of national power in order to safeguard their interests. The use of instruments of power outside national territory to protect state interests is a common strategy.

With respect to the EU, the deployment of EU battlegroups is a matter for the Council of the EU.

0403. In many cases collective security interests are involved, but in some cases it is purely a question of national economic interests. Countries restrict themselves to the security regions in which they, on the basis of collective security, wish to exert influence. Military units are assigned a specific role not only in the prevention of emerging crises but also once crises have been resolved, for example deployment following an armed conflict such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. Other ministries also play an important role in conflict management and during the reconstruction and development phase.

0404. In addition to the Ministry of Defence the Ministries of the Interior, Public Health and Justice make significant contributions. The decision as to which ministry takes prime responsibility for an operation on national territory is a national matter and is not covered in this study.

0405. In the case of an emerging crisis countries (either alone or in cooperation with others) will endeavour to nip it in the bud by diplomatic and economic means. This may include early deployment of military units in or near the area in which the crisis is developing in order to exert influence or demonstrate intent. In this situation it is important that the units give off the right signals and send out the right message.

0406. **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.** Countries make use of their ambassadors and in some cases of special envoys to influence the conduct of the party causing the crisis. At the same time they also use their representatives in international organisations such as the United Nations to bring influence to bear. Countries will use their Foreign Ministry representatives at all levels to try and convince the other side by means of negotiation and threats of diplomatic actions. These actions include recalling ambassadors, stopping development aid and closing national borders. At this stage a military unit which is too prominent can lead to undesirable escalation.

For this reason the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will often be in charge of national actions aimed at preventing a crisis.

0407. **The Ministry of Economic Affairs.** States are dependent for their continued existence on a solid socio-economic structure. The income from trade and industry and a positive trade balance in particular are important prerequisites. Without income a state (or indeed any other organisation) will be unable to implement policy and/or achieve its objectives. Ministries of Economic Affairs have the best insight into the economic structure of other countries. In order to succeed in the world of international trade, it is important to have a clear image of the 'competitors'. A thorough analysis allows this ministry to plan and execute appropriate economic actions. Relations between the ministry and companies, active at international level play a crucial role.
0408. **The Ministry of Justice.** This ministry also plays a part in the development and implementation of a strategy. For example, acting on behalf of the state, this ministry decides whether to admit refugees from a particular area and to grant them temporary asylum. Accepting these refugees can of course have a de-escalating effect on the crisis, while at the same time relieving human suffering. However, it could also be seen by the other party as an aggressive act or at the very least as interference in domestic affairs.
0409. **Ministry of developing cooperation.** This ministry plays an important role in the support of the development of "third world" countries. Such a ministry not only gives financial support, but coordinates and delivers many forms of support, ranging from humanitarian aspects to rebuilding programs for infrastructure and coordinating and supporting IO's and NGO's.
0410. **Summary.** When acting to contain a crisis, the prime aim of all ministries or appropriate EU institutions is to end the crisis as soon as possible. To this end they develop their own specific plan, based on a common strategy and objective. An understanding of and empathy with these different plans, all of which are working towards the same desirable political end state, are essential for crisis management. For all the actors from the various ministries, therefore including military units, this attitude is the only one that can produce the required integrated policy. During a crisis all will need to consult in the search for a feasible solution. It is difficult to determine in advance who will take on which role and who will be in charge during which phase. In practice the Cabinet, acting as a crisis cabinet, is in charge. Cooperation between ministries often only takes place at the highest political level. Long-term structural cooperation often already exists at the subordinate levels (advisory boards and councils).
0411. **Once a crisis has ended** (be it an armed conflict or some other form of crisis). On the basis that there can be no security without development, and no development without security, it will be necessary to formulate a holistic plan for reconstruction and development. The structures needed for a country to function will usually have suffered some degree of damage. This relates not only to infrastructure but also to order, peace and security, public administration and socio-economic structures.

Reconstruction is a complex process requiring an integrated approach, which can be divided into roughly three dimensions: security and stability, governance and socio-economic development. The primary role of the military is always to establish security and stability. These are essential conditions for a sustainable reconstruction.

0412. Experience teaches us that reconstruction requires an overarching coordination mechanism to avoid problems such as overlap, waste, misuse and corruption. Successful reconstruction also requires early and long-term involvement. A regional approach is often the best. Establishing local structures at an early stage is essential in order to allow independent functioning in the future. Early involvement of the business community in economic recovery is the best guarantee for successful reconstruction.
0413. **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.** Acting on behalf of the government, this ministry bears responsibility for coordinating the various national reconstruction efforts at national and international level. Naturally, development cooperation plays a major part. Increasing weight is also being given to security and stability as preconditions for sustainable reconstruction, combating poverty effectively and establishing a democratic society.
0414. **The Ministry of Economic Affairs.** The main concern of this ministry is to stimulate cooperation with national companies and agencies in the area at an early stage. This does not only help the area, but also creates a foundation for establishing or expanding trade and investment relationships. The ministry's role is primarily coordination.
0415. **The Ministry of Justice.** This ministry can play an important part in establishing or reforming the police and judicial system, including the prison system. It is also the best placed to formulate a plan for the return of refugees who have been given temporary asylum in the country in question. These returning refugees often play an important part in the reconstruction of their own country.
0416. **Conclusion.** During the reconstruction phase these ministries will always work on the basis that the government in the region is ultimately responsible for reconstruction. The national contribution is intended to provide temporary support and not to take over responsibility.

SECTION 3 : COOPERATION WITH OTHER MILITARY PARTNERS

0417. Land forces (of the EU) work with two types of military partners, namely the other component commands (naval forces and air forces) and the armed forces of other countries. There is also a particular form of cooperation with the Special Forces component. Cooperation with the other operational commands is internationally referred to as joint operations. This cooperation can take place at all levels.

0418. **Cooperation with naval forces (the maritime component).** Naval forces have the means to deploy at sea and in coastal areas. This enables them to provide direct and indirect support to land operations. This support may be in the form of ship-based fire support, logistic and medical support and strategic transport. They also make an indispensable contribution to the protection of sea lines of communication. Marine battalions give naval forces units the capability of operating quickly and independently, for a short time at least, in coastal areas, thereby making an important contribution to operations. These operations are referred to internationally as power projection ashore. In the initial phase their specific knowledge and experience can contribute greatly to the deployment of ground troops. They can also be deployed as part of the Land Component.
0419. **Cooperation with air forces (the air component).** Air forces have the means to operate in the airspace, thus enabling them to make an indispensable contribution through air defence, (close) air support, aerial reconnaissance and air transport. Air transport is not limited to strategic mobility, i.e. transport to and from the area of operations. Tactical mobility, i.e. air transport within the area of operations, is perhaps more important. Particularly in those areas where transport and movement by road are subject to many restrictions, land forces are increasingly dependent on help from the air force. Ground troops also call on combat aircraft and combat helicopters to tackle hostile insurgents effectively, as well as to protect convoys. In some cases terrain conditions make it difficult for ground troops to attack these fighting factions. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters can also provide effective support to ground troops in urban and other cluttered areas. The integration of air forces and land forces increasingly takes place at lower levels.
0420. **Cooperation with Special Forces (SF)¹⁸.** Special Forces are combat units which have been specially trained and equipped. They form a flexible capacity which can be deployed rapidly to reinforce and complement conventional units. Special Forces can be deployed in all operations across the whole spectrum of conflict. They have relatively few logistic prerequisites and preparation requirements in order to be able to deploy at an early stage. However they do need to have strategic mobility. Special Forces should not be seen as a replacement for conventional units. They may be able to carry out independent operations in situations requiring a small, separate, highly trained unit. They offer the joint commander possible ways of exerting influence in the area of operations at an early stage. Special Forces operations are often supported by elements of the land and air forces (e.g. light infantry and attack helicopters).

¹⁸ NATO uses the term Special Operations Forces (SOF). In this text we use only Special Forces.

0421. Special Forces are deployed across the whole Joint Operations Area (JOA) of a Joint Force Commander (JFC). Initially they operate under a separate component¹⁹. Deployment under national command is also possible. Specific command and support relationships can be defined for each deployment.
0422. During their operations they gather a great deal of information which can be very valuable to conventional units. The command relationships and liaison elements chosen must ensure that this information is made available at the relevant tactical level as efficiently as possible. Naturally the operational security (OPSEC) of the deployment of these units must be safeguarded.
0423. The way in which Special Forces deploy, their specific OPSEC requirements and the often short warning time make efficient de-confliction measures essential in order to avoid fratricide.
0424. **Military units from other countries.** When operating outside national territory, military units (e.g. the EU battlegroup) will always have to cooperate with military units from other countries. This cooperation is referred to as combined, although the term multinational is becoming increasingly common. As well as the obvious cooperation with NATO partners there are an increasing number of temporary cooperation frameworks with other countries (referred to internationally as coalitions of the able and the willing). Cooperation does not always lead to an increase in military effectiveness and requires a great deal of effort and coordination from the units involved.
0425. Successful cooperation is based on a number of conditions. Besides an understanding of the means, possibilities and doctrine of the partner, mutual respect for ideas, culture, religion and customs contributes to success. Successful cooperation at the lower levels requires commanders to take account of the limitations of all foreign units involved when planning the missions. In some cases commanders will encounter political restrictions (referred to internationally as national caveats). These are operational limitations set by national governments on their contingents. In the search for successful cooperation it is useful to examine the power added value of units from other countries, rather than to focus on the restrictions. The value of coalitions is that they demonstrate international resolve to crisis management and resolution.

¹⁹ This will usually be a Special Operations Task Force, which may be combined and joint.

SECTION 4 : COOPERATION WITH LOCAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

0426. In the case of an emerging crisis countries (either alone or in cooperation with others) will endeavour to find a solution by using diplomatic, civil, economic and military instruments of power²⁰. This may include early deployment of units in or near the area in which the crisis is developing. Deploying military assets is only one of the instruments of power and thus is not restricted to the Ministry of Defence alone.
0427. Cooperation with governments (inter agency in the strictest sense) is often initiated at the highest levels. Responsibility for coordination is frequently also at those levels. However, military personnel on deployment must be able to cooperate with the representatives of local, regional and sometimes national authorities. This is true of both operations on national territory and those abroad.
0428. **Local authorities and expeditionary deployment.** During crisis prevention, crisis management and reconstruction following a crisis the responsibility for planning and direction lies with the various authorities. An armed force (and thus also the military personnel) simply acts as an instrument of power employed by states²¹. This military instrument is increasingly deployed to support authorities in a crisis area. These are the authorities responsible for maintaining and, if necessary, restoring public order, forming a satisfactory administration and creating a socio-economic climate. In such cases military personnel must constantly be aware that their supporting role is only temporary and that the ultimate aim is to return to a situation in which their contribution is no longer required.
0429. If there is no satisfactory administrative system, or if the administration requests support, an operation may be possible. Good cooperation with all representatives from the outset is essential. Consultation and joint planning must start at an early stage. Exchanging liaison officers is one of the important instruments here. Using the plan which was formulated under the responsibility of the administration, the military unit determines its own activities. The unit can, and indeed must, fulfil an advisory role. Military organisations have a specific understanding of how to tackle situations and the organisational set-up required to do so. In the same way administrative organisations have their own corporate culture and specific style of management. Cooperation between military organisations and administrative authorities can only work if both parties show respect for each other and do not insist on having their own way. The population is entitled to the fastest possible return to a stable situation and sees its own administration as being primarily responsible.
0430. Cooperation with authorities is usually initiated at the higher levels, which is where the responsibility for coordination usually lies. However, military personnel on deployment must also be able to cooperate with the representatives of local, regional and sometimes national authorities.

²⁰ See Chapter 2, Section 6.

²¹ An EU BG acts as an instrument of power employed by the EU.

0431. When deployed in other parts of the world, countries involved in the deployment are often inclined to help the local societies by introducing their own forms of administration and their own norms. Although these initiatives are well meant, this approach virtually never succeeds. Agrarian societies have a different level of organisation from industrialised societies. In addition, societies in these regions have an administrative, social and often religious structure based on centuries of locally and regionally dominated experiences and developments. Western societies do not always have a good understanding of the background and often also the advantages of these structures. The locals, who are the central focus, are used to a particular form of government. In their eyes what needs to change is not the form of government, but rather the way in which those in authority fulfil their mandate. The population is often only seeking a return to peace and quiet and a solid, trustworthy administration. These are the essential conditions for establishing and maintaining an acceptable standard of living.
0432. Thus it is important for military commanders to be aware, from the outset, of the history and background of a crisis and the area of operations. Information about the local culture, religion and customs, and respect for these, are important for successful cooperation. In many cultures the status of governments and civil servants differs from that of the average Western society. In some cases restoring the faith of the population in its own authorities will turn out to be the ultimate aim. The same is true for restoring the self-respect of the civil servants. Military personnel must constantly take account of these feelings when working with these people.

SECTION 5 : COOPERATION WITH IOS AND NGOS

0433. A crisis often brings human suffering for sections of the population. Therefore, certainly in the beginning of a crisis, military units will almost always encounter not only authorities, but also a wide range of IOs and NGOs. Each of these organisations has its own reason for being there and its own aims which it wishes to achieve. Safeguarding own interests also always has a role to play here.
0434. Experience teaches us that as well making an important contribution to relieving human suffering, these organisations also play a role in the sustainable reconstruction of a region. In some cases one of the international organisations takes on the role of coordination. The most important aspect of this coordination is to ensure that help is provided wherever it is needed. Care must be taken to avoid each organisation having the same target group as this could lead to some groups being neglected. From the very start IOs and NGOs must constantly strive to achieve the ultimate objective – a country or region capable of functioning independently and sustainably. In the initial phase of a crisis, in which emergency aid is essential, military units can play an important role in synchronising activities and establishing unity of effort.

However, military units act only in the role of enabler. They must concentrate on their specific task, which is usually the establishment of a secure environment. Here again, establishing liaison channels can be a good way of ensuring productive cooperation. If as well as working with the authorities, military units also cooperate with IOs and NGOs this is classed as inter agency in its widest sense.

0435. Some IOs and a number of NGOs will refuse to work, or be seen to be working, alongside deployed military units, and this situation can make inter-agency coordination all the more difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, if waste and mismanagement is to be avoided, commanders must make strenuous efforts at achieving a high level of coordination. Whilst NGOs need a secure environment in which to conduct their work, they will often avoid overt contact with the military forces as they see this non-aligned and neutral stance as their best form of protection. There are examples in the past where this tactic has failed, and this has resulted either in the taking of hostages among the deployed NGO staff, or worse. Commanders must be sensitive to the desire of NGOs to distance themselves from their operations and to maintain their neutrality, but must be aware of which NGOs are operating in their area. Under no circumstances are they to prejudice the neutrality of the deployed NGOs.

SECTION 6 : THE MEDIA

0436. National and international media will always be interested in the operational deployment of national units. Thanks to modern means of communication, images and articles in the national or regional media may influence the public opinion including those in the service of the Ministry of Defence. In addition the media may exert direct and indirect influence on the operational planning process and command and control. Right from the start it will be necessary to consider the effects of operational decisions in the light of what the media can do with them.
0437. The representatives of the media have their own independent view of events. The image they project will not necessarily be the image hoped for by the defence organisation. This means that a view given by the defence organisation may appear in the news in a way which does not reflect what it would like to have seen. Military personnel must be aware that the media are independent and thus cannot be controlled. False or inaccurate, reporting may have politico-strategic implications, just as accurate reporting may.
0438. Indirectly the media are the eyes and ears of the home front and thus galvanise and influence the political climate and public support for the operation in the troop contributing countries. Traditionally the press strives to achieve independent reporting. Where conditions are unsafe journalists can be embedded in operational units for their own safety.
0439. The media must be regularly updated with the current situation. An open, truthful and professional attitude on the part of commanders, and all other Defence personnel, makes it possible to establish a pro-active and positive relationship with the media.

The guiding principle for communication with the media must be that the truth must not be distorted and that negative events must not be glossed over or ignored. It is essential that the perception of the national population - and the European population, when discussing the deployment of a EU battlegroup - is not at variance with reality.

SECTION 7 : THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION

0440. The previous Sections have outlined the cooperation required with the various other actors in any power area of operations. Clearly, this primarily involves cooperation between people. Without the correct mental attitude cooperation is doomed to failure. The introduction of the “ narrative ”/strategic communication.
0441. Prior to and also during this cooperation these people must be willing and able to communicate with each other, and to work together. Information is a key factor. Correct decision-making is based on access to accurate information. This applies to all actors. The quality of the decisions depends to a great extent on the quality of the information. Every actor in the area of operations has specific but at the same time also limited sources and thus often has access to only part of the information. All actors can improve the quality of their plans considerably by sharing the available information with each other. Obviously, this does not include own strategic information. The actions of many actors are still driven by the motto “ knowledge is power ”.
To achieve true success this attitude will have to change with the adoption of a new motto : “ sharing knowledge is strength ”. This is not only in the interests of the party with the least or worst information, but also of the party with the best information.
0442. Being able to share this information and to communicate with each other requires access to the necessary technology. Facilities allowing information to be shared and exchanged within networks are becoming more and more widely available. Internationally these technological resources are often referred to as network enabled capabilities (NEC). The arrival of the Internet and the availability of software allowing reports to be exchanged have made an important difference.
0443. The following step required to optimise cooperation is to adapt and open up mutual decision-making processes. Unlocking and linking together the various networks will also produce positive results. Only then will communication be possible at the required level and will thinking and working in networks become a reality. Obviously the safeguarding of essential own information in the context of Force Protection plays an important role. Classification of information is therefore essential. However, it is important to ensure that such protection does not prevent effective cooperation with important partners.

CHAPTER 5 : COHESION

SECTION : 1 INTRODUCTION

0501. A military operation is part of a much broader plan (usually referred to internationally as the campaign plan within a comprehensive approach). Following a thorough analysis of a crisis, states develop a strategy to achieve the agreed desirable strategic end state. This is often referred to as an information strategy as part of the overall campaign plan. The military plan must be in line with the plans of all other actors. It must therefore be an integral part of the greater plan. Section 2 will examine briefly this aspect of **cohesion with others**.
0502. A military operation consists essentially of a chain of coordinated military actions. It starts with preparation for the deployment. Every military operation ends with a winding down phase. This study focuses on the execution phase in which concepts such as the core functions and the operational framework play an important role. They are a means of helping the commander to translate the objectives to be achieved into achievable missions. This is referred to as **the cohesion within the military operation** and is covered in Section 3.
0503. A successful military operation depends to a great extent on the integrated deployment of all military functions (“ the combined weapons or joint effects ”). The military functions provide the commander and his staff with a conceptual tool for the planning and execution of actions. Section 4 is devoted entirely to the cohesive deployment of these military functions.

SECTION 2 : COHESION WITH OTHERS

0504. It is the role of governments to plan and implement a country’s response to a developing crisis, and to determine the desired end state. Within that planning process, military leaders have a significant advisory role. First and foremost military leaders have to examine how the available military capability of a country’s armed forces can contribute most effectively to the agreed political end state. During this process they must ensure that the military unit is not assigned any tasks which cannot be carried out by military personnel. It is also important that a military unit is not assigned any tasks which could be better carried out by others. The capabilities of a military unit must constantly be borne in mind during the planning process. Creating an understanding of the possibilities and also the restrictions of available military assets is one of the most important responsibilities of military leaders at the highest level. Last but not least, it is important to develop an overview at this level of the ambitions, possibilities and restrictions of all the other actors involved. Only then can the advisory role relating to the military participation in an operation be fulfilled satisfactorily.

0505. **Levels.** The deployment of land forces of Finabel countries under the command structure of NATO or within an EU operation may be considered to be the most likely option. Within NATO there are three levels. The Allied Command Operations (ACO) is the NATO strategic level.
The EU operations centre forms the EU strategic level. The Joint Force Commands (JFC) and, where appropriate, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) form the operational level, while the FHQ forms the EU operational level. The Component Commanders (CC) – in case of the EU, the EU battlegroup commander - are considered to be the highest tactical level.
0506. **Operational level.** This is the level at which the objectives defined by politicians are translated into a mission to be formulated for the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to be deployed. An answer must be found to the following three core questions. Which military conditions must be created in order to contribute to the political objectives (**Ends**)? Which activities are required (in time and space) to create these conditions (**Ways**)? Which military assets and other capabilities are required (**Means**)? It is particularly important to examine or estimate the prevailing risks and how these can be minimised and if possible eliminated. The subject of Force Protection (in the widest sense) often plays a dominant role. A Campaign Plan is formulated, setting out how the troops, in conjunction with the other actors, are to contribute to achieving the internationally defined grand strategic objectives. At this level it will also be necessary to define which component should be seen as the supported force and which component or components will act as supporting forces.
0507. **Tactical level.** The appointed Land Component Commander (LCC) starts his planning on the basis of the mission assigned by the commander of the CJTF. The first task is the sound military assessment of the situation at his level. This is followed by an analysis of the mission (orientation). The commander formulates his vision and guidelines which are then set out in the Commander's Planning Guidance. Various possible options for deployment are then formulated and evaluated (concept development). The commander takes a decision on the basis of which the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Statement of Requirement (SOR) are drafted and issued. Only then is a plan formulated (plan development), which is eventually transformed into an operation plan (OPLAN). An Operation Order (OPORDER) is then issued, thereby completing the decision-making process.
0508. **Technical level.** The technical level relates to the way in which small units, or sometimes even individual soldiers, systems or weapon systems, deploy and operate in order to achieve the tactical objective of a military activity in a particular disposition or order. The technical level relates to the actual implementation of combat and other techniques and tactics (skills and drills), often using a specific system, weapon system or other means of delivering effects.

It also covers the actual execution of other tasks to support combat, or other actions in the widest sense, such as repairing materiel, installing and setting up a radio station or acting as a member of a staff.

0509. **Additional remarks.** Experience shows that planning at the various levels does not take place consecutively, rather it takes place concurrently, and this is enabled by the timely issue of Warning Orders. Planning is a circular process which involves continuous analysis of the situation as it develops and an assessment of what is observed. The cyclic process can best be captured in the following stages : Analyse – Plan – Execute – Assess.
0510. Similar processes also take place in all situations where a deployment is not under the auspices of NATO. International political decision-making is followed by national decision-making. This involves consultation between government and parliament. Campaign planning then begins under the leadership and responsibility of the commander of the armed forces. On the basis of these results the designated unit then starts specific functional planning and preparation.
0511. It is essential for the commander of a deploying unit (EU battlegroup) to have an understanding of the strategic intent and the considerations which were behind the planning at higher levels. In addition to the international line of command the commander of a deployed unit also has his national line of command. States often have specific interests and have, and make use of, the right to impose certain caveats. The national commander of the armed forces and his representative in the area of operations (the contingent commander) will continue to implement this line of command even after the transfer of authority (TOA).
0512. Naturally, regular consultation with representatives of all the other actors involved is essential to ensure that cohesion is maintained. In addition to an extensive network of liaisons, and the exchange and sharing of information, the active personal participation of commanders at all levels determines the quality of the cohesion. Good personal relations will often have a very positive effect. A great deal is expected of the commanders of units on deployment.

SECTION 3 : COHESION WITHIN THE MILITARY OPERATION

0513. The phases of a military operation. Every military operation consists of a preparation phase, an execution phase and a completion phase. The preparation phase, of which the planning phase is an essential component, begins when the CDS receives a formal tasking for an operation. The execution phase begins when the operational responsibility for the military unit to be deployed is transferred to the national or multinational troop commander²² (TOA) and ends when this responsibility is handed back.

²² Or national/regional civilian authority.

The completion phase begins at that point and formally ends when the unit has returned and begins preparing (instruction and training) for a new mission. So in fact every soldier and every unit is constantly preparing for a military operation.

The preparation phase and the completion phase take place under national responsibility. This section examines **the cohesion of a military operation during the execution phase**.

0514. In almost all cases the task of the unit is to create and maintain a **secure environment**. A secure environment is necessary to allow the other actors to achieve their objectives. But first and foremost it is an essential condition to enable the local population and local authorities to return to a stable situation. The terms safety and security are used here in their widest sense. Creating and maintaining a safe and secure environment involves not only protection from opponents, but also against the influences of weather and terrain. In this way the unit often performs a key role in the early stage of a crisis when the situation can be very dangerous.
0515. In Chapter 4 it was already stated that when planning and executing a military operation land forces adopt the manoeuvrist approach. In order to practise this philosophy at tactical level it is important to understand four **core functions**: find, fix, strike and exploit.
0516. **Find**. It is crucial to the success of an operation to carry out a thorough investigation into the origin or cause of the crisis and all relevant actors. The investigation must examine their ambition, their motivation and the sources of help available to them. It should attempt to establish the network of the various relevant actors. It is also important to look at questions such as : which actor exerts what influence and on whom. Clearly a great deal of attention must be paid to the actor or situation responsible for the origin and/or the continuation of a crisis. A continuous and thorough listing of all factors of influence is the key to success. Only then is it possible to support those actors who are favourably disposed and to defeat the opponents, and their undesired effects.
0517. **Fix**. Once the full picture is available everything possible must be done to prevent the crisis situation worsening. By identifying the right effects it is possible to gain the “ time and space ” needed to end the undesired crisis situation. The actors in need of support must be put into a position which allows them to make their specific contribution to resolving the crisis. Thus these actors and the military unit become closely interlinked. The opponents must be denied their freedom of action. The use of military means allows them to be fixed at the right time and place, thereby preventing them from achieving their objectives.
0518. **Strike**. Eventually the origin of the crisis must be resolved. Clearly the success of this important phase depends to a great extent on the success of the two previous core functions: find and fix. When it comes to the strike, the long term situation should take precedence over short term success. The activities of the actors who are favourably disposed must be constantly supported. The influence of the opponents must be eliminated.

0519. **Exploit.** This core function is implicitly linked to the manoeuvrist approach, and is only feasible where there is mission command. In any operation unexpected opportunities arise, and commanders at all levels must be empowered to seize them. To this end it is crucial to disseminate a clear commander's intent, which fits with the end state defined by politicians. Every soldier is duty bound to exploit such opportunities. However, care must be taken to ensure that exploiting success will not have negative repercussions, in either the short or longer term, for the other actors involved or for 'neutrals'.
0520. **Operational framework.** Within the land forces an operational framework is used as a means of harmonising the various phases of a military operation and helps subordinates visualise their part in the plan. This framework shows the relationships in time, space, function, purpose and geography between the different military units involved in the execution of a plan.
0521. **Classification according to objective.** Within the framework a distinction is made according to three effects. Firstly, part of the operation is concerned with creating and maintaining the right conditions. The NATO term for this is shaping. Clearly there will also need to be actions aimed at supporting the operation. In NATO that element of the military operation is known as sustaining. The main part of the military operation is referred to in NATO as decisive. It is in this part of the operational framework that military commanders seek the decisive outcome.
0522. Classification according to time and space. At the operational levels the framework primarily distinguishes between three related elements: the deep operation, the close operation and the rear area operation.
0523. The aim of the deep operation is to create the conditions for the close operation by finding, fixing and, if possible, striking at the opponents. Increasingly the information and the information structure are the target. In this way an attempt is made to affect the opponents' decision-making by attacking the decision-making processes and supporting systems, while at the same time protecting own information, processes and systems.
0524. The aim of the close operation is to launch a direct attack on the opponent with the intention of destroying or neutralising his power. Rear operations are intended to ensure the force's freedom of action.
0525. As a continuation of this classification within the operational framework, the land forces distinguish between four sorts of military activity : offensive activities, defensive activities, stabilising activities and enabling activities. These are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

SECTION 4 : COHESIVE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MILITARY FUNCTIONS

0526. When planning an operation and during its execution, the commander, supported by his staff, examines all possible factors of influence. It will almost always be necessary to employ all the military functions to execute a military mission. Agreeing which means will be required is one of the aims of the decision-making process.
0527. The decision-making process analyses the mission, and the commander's guidelines and intent. The first task is to determine the effects required to achieve the objectives set, after which the actions needed to achieve these effects must be decided on. Only then does it make sense to start allotting the means required.
0528. When analysing military activity it is useful to have a list of functions which provides a complete description of everything that military organisations do prior to, during and after operations. The resulting list, or framework, is an analytical tool for commanders and staffs to use so as to ensure that they address all aspects of operations. This list identifies six military functions: command and control, information and intelligence, force protection, manoeuvre, fire power and combat service support.
0529. **Command and control.** Command is the authority vested in an individual, the commander, to lead the troops assigned to him, take decisions about their deployment and exercise command. Command and control thus consists of three elements: leadership, decision-making and command. The commander is supported by his staff, and it is they who are responsible for executing control of all assigned forces such that their activities conform to the overall plan.
0530. This gives commanders the responsibility for a coordinated, harmonised use of assets. To this end they have the authority to ensure obedience and that orders are followed. And they thus are accountable for all the actions of all military personnel.
0531. Commanders have staffs to support them. The main tasks of these staffs are to gather information, to process it and to disseminate it. This enables them to support commanders in preparing their decisions before and during the execution of military actions.
0532. **Information and intelligence.** In order to function properly a military unit is dependent on having the most complete, up-to-date and reliable information possible. Within a unit everyone acts as an intelligence gathering organ, often referred to as a sensor. In addition a unit usually has a specific organisational element whose sole task is to gather and process intelligence. In most cases this element also depends on other staffs or foreign intelligence organisations for its supply of information.

0533. By establishing a full and concrete intelligence requirement (core questions), linked to the tasks to be carried out as part of the operation, scarce intelligence resources can be focussed to deliver the best effect. Only in this way is it possible for intelligence officers to have the guidance and direction necessary to carry out their part of the operation. Interest is not restricted to information about the enemy, the weather and the terrain. Information about the historical, cultural, social and religious background to a crisis and the location, role and significance of all other actors is equally important.
0534. **Force protection.** One of the key functions of a military unit is to offer protection. Only if the capacities of the force are protected against external negative influences can they be fully deployed when the commander deems it necessary. Protection measures allow friendly forces to preserve their combat power despite the negative effects of enemy weapons and hostile environments. These measures do not in themselves contribute to the destruction of the enemy, but they allow friendly forces to preserve their combat power until the decisive moment. In this way, the commander is better able to retain the initiative, and when combat is initiated, he can do so using his full capability. In addition to the physical protection of personnel and materiel, the protection of own essential information and of the information infrastructure is extremely important. Experience also shows that a protection capability is also needed to maintain the logistic capacity. The physical protection of personnel and materiel is now commonly referred to as force protection. The protection of a military unit during an operation involves many dimensions. Firstly, the protection which must be afforded to each individual serviceman. Good instruction and training, immunisation, adequate personal clothing and equipment, and an excellent operational medical system are indispensable. Satisfactory information and an adequate level of facilities, given the circumstances, also make a significant contribution.
0535. The actors on whom the unit depends or who contribute to achieving the end state are also constantly under threat. Thus protecting IOs, NGOs, civilian contractors, journalists, local authorities and the local population is increasingly becoming the responsibility of the military unit. Without a good protection plan for all the actors involved in the military operation or action, a plan to carry out a tactical mission will have no chance of succeeding.
0536. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre is the means of concentrating force, or the threat of force, at decisive points to achieve surprise, shock and opportunities for exploitation. In the end it will only be possible to contain or resolve a crisis through the use of effects. Only land units can occupy territory or actually enter into contact with people. Resolving problems involves the ability to deploy weapon systems rapidly and without restriction where this is considered necessary or desirable. In other words, freedom of action in time and space.

The plan for the manoeuvre, often the focus of a military action, is in fact simply the plan setting out how the available (weapon) systems are to be deployed. It is essential that the plan be based on good intelligence. The deployment of ground troops in an area of operations, where they may be housed in compounds (which they leave for short periods for operations in the surrounding area) is a form of manoeuvre.

0537. **Fire power.** Fire power destroys, neutralises, suppresses and influences. It is essential in defeating an enemy's ability and will to fight, and has utility in both decisive and shaping operations. There is little point in deploying units if they do not have the ability to influence the conduct of others. Units must have sufficient capacity to achieve the desired effects. Destroying the opponents, or at least neutralising their negative influence, is frequently the effect desired. This no longer involves solely conventional weapons and fire support assets. Influencing opponents through their information and information infrastructure, their financial resources and their support is widespread.

The targeted use of assets to support those actors who are favourably disposed, and considered a support to the local population should also be seen as a form of fire power.

0538. There is a close relationship between manoeuvre and fire power. In planning and executing offensive and defensive actions this relationship is clear to most as the manoeuvre plan and the fire power plan are harmonised. When containing and, as far as possible, resolving a crisis in which many more actors are involved than simply the " classic enemy ", success depends primarily on good harmonisation. Deploying manpower and fire power (in its broadest sense) will only work if the other actors consider the deployment to be useful. This is particularly crucial for long term effects. The targeting process examines which targets should be attacked using which means. This process thus plays a key role in the planning and synchronising of military actions.

0539. **Combat service support.** On the basis of the correct intelligence a plan is established for the deployment of manpower and fire power. Adequate force protection will allow the commander to conserve all military power allocated to him. However, this deployment will fail if there is no corresponding plan for the logistic aspects. It is the logistic support which creates the conditions to begin, execute and complete military actions. In an expeditionary deployment the available logistic capacity may in some cases even restrict the power of units. Although the logistic plan is based on the deployment plan, the deployment plan must increasingly be adapted to suit the logistic possibilities and limitations. These restrictions are often financial.

0540. **Summary.** In any unit there are six military functions, each of which makes only a partial contribution to the result. There is no set order of priority. Each function is indispensable and thus important. Only by deploying these functions in a harmonised manner will success be achieved. For each operation or action the situation is analysed, leading to the constitution of a military unit comprising a mix of these functions. For this reason land forces have a wide range of units.

From an organisational point of view they are divided into combat units, combat support units, combat service support units and command and control support units. In the planning phase prior to a deployment, the composition of the unit is tailored to the military actions needed to meet the objectives set. These military actions are described in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6 : THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

SECTION 1 : INTRODUCTION.

0601. This chapter will examine in broad outline the range of military activities (as NATO refers to it) that may be carried out by units during a military operation. Section 2 will give a brief explanation of the principle of the military activities. Section 3 is entirely devoted to offensive activities, describing in turn activities such as the attack, the pursuit and the breakout.

Defence and delay, two traditional activities for military units, are covered in Section 4.

Section 5 will discuss the group of stabilising activities and will include an explanation of terms such as Security and Control and Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).

This chapter will then deal with a large number of enabling activities, which never stand alone and where the aim is to facilitate the offensive, defensive and stabilising activities. Section 6 will describe the enabling activities.

Finally, Section 7 will examine the question of information operations.

SECTION 2 : INTRODUCTION TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES


0602. The spectrum of conflict, as set out in Chapter 2, is a convenient way of describing the politico-strategic environment in which military operations take place. When military units are deployed there is rarely a clearly defined situation. During an operation there may be different levels of force being used in different parts of the operational area. As time progresses the level of force may also change within one part of the area of operations. The campaign themes of the spectrum of conflict must not be confused with the various tactical activities taking place at battalion, brigade or Task Force level. The campaign themes are too abstract to act as the basis for the formulation of tactical missions. At tactical level four main categories of military activities have been identified. Land tactical level activities may be classified as either: offensive, defensive, stability, or enabling activities. Every campaign and its operations are conducted through a balanced combination of these tactical activities. These activities are shown in the table below.

Offensive	Defensive	Stability
Attack Raid Exploitation Pursuit Feint Demonstration Reconnaissance in Force Ambush Breakout	Defence Delay	Security and Control Support to Security Sector Reform Initial Restoration of Services Interim Governance Tasks
Enabling		
Reconnaissance Security Advance to Contact Breaching/Crossing Meeting Engagement	Link-Up Relief of Encircled Force Relief of Troops in Combat Withdrawal	Retirement March Obstacle

Figure 6-1 : the range of military activities

0603. The resources and emphasis placed on each type of activity will depend upon a number of situational factors and will reflect the nature of the campaign. Parallel to and in close cooperation and coherence with these activities, influence activities (information operations) are being planned and executed.

Any military operation will at any given moment in time contain elements of offensive, defensive, stabilising and enabling activities. This range of activities, harmonised to form an operational concept, covers the conduct of the campaign at tactical level. Depending on the phase of the campaign, the main thrust will be with one of these types of activities. The figure below gives an example of an operation and illustrates the link between the various activities.



Example drawn from Southern Iraq 2003 - 2004

Figure 6-2: Example of links between military activities.

SECTION 3 : OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

0604. Offensive activities are defined as : activities in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack him. (AJP 3.2 Lexicon). Offensive activities will be the key to defeating an enemy. Even in the defence, a commander must take every opportunity to seize the initiative and carry the battle to the enemy through both offensive activities and an offensive spirit. It should be remembered the influence activities of information operations may be conducted in an offensive manner as well.
0605. The aim of offensive activities is to eliminate the factors that allow the crisis to persist. In many cases the first thought is to defeat the enemy. This does not always need to be through the use of lethal means. Disrupting mental cohesion, for example by neutralising information systems (including information infrastructure) or removing opponents' external support, should also be seen as an offensive activity. In many situations an offensive action has a limited objective. Examples include an offensive action to distract the opponent's attention, to capture an important area of terrain or to gather essential information.
0606. Retaining the initiative, surprise and the concentrated use of available assets are typical of offensive activities. It is essential to be conscious of own security. This depends primarily on the availability of and the correct use of reliable, detailed intelligence.
0607. The purpose of offensive activities is to defeat the enemy either by breaking his cohesion, by physical destruction or both. The real damage to the enemy's will is caused by destroying the coherence of his operations and fragmenting and isolating his forces. Offensive activities should attack both physical and moral cohesion. By so doing, the enemy's capability to resist is destroyed.
0608. Other subsidiary purposes of offensive activities are :
- The gaining of information through reconnaissance in force activities ;
 - Depriving the enemy of resources ;
 - Pre-empting the enemy in order to gain the initiative ;
 - Disrupting enemy defensive, offensive action and other activities such as C2 systems (through offensive information operations) ;
 - Dislocating enemy forces through decisive engagement or deception ;
 - Seizure of ground ;
 - Fixing the enemy as an economy of force activity; and
 - Influencing or changing perceptions of commanders and other, possibly neutral or hostile, target audiences. This may be done through physical or intellectual activities.

0609. **Types of offensive activities.**

- attack ;
- raid ;
- reconnaissance in force ;
- pursuit ;
- demonstration ;
- feint ;
- ambush ;
- breakout (of encircled forces).

The following paragraphs will examine these activities in more detail.

0610. **Attack.** To attack is to take offensive action against a specified objective. The primary purpose of an attack is to destroy the enemy's capability to resist and subsequently to destroy his will and cohesion. An attack may be a separate activity or may be carried out in conjunction with other types of activities. A commander undertaking an attack possesses the initiative, in that he decides the location, time, direction and weight of force to be concentrated. Once the attack is launched, flexibility and speed in the employment of forces are paramount. The attack must be executed vigorously, exploiting any favourable developments and reallocating resources to areas where there appears to be an opportunity for success. Momentum must be maintained in order to keep the enemy off balance and the attack should not be delayed in order to align units or adhere rigidly to a plan. Indeed, few attacks will develop as planned and commanders must actively seek to turn unexpected successes to their advantage and to cope rapidly to reverses. To be able to do this they must understand their superior's intent and desired end-state. A distinction is made between a deliberate attack, a hasty attack, a counter-attack and a spoiling attack.
0611. **Raid.** A raid is defined as : *an activity, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.* (AAP 6) The wider purpose of a raid is to disrupt the enemy usually through destruction or capture of a vital asset or capability. It is based on detailed intelligence, generally involves swift movement into hostile territory and ends with a planned withdrawal. Because raids will often be carried out over a short distance and time period, only a limited amount of supplies need to be carried and maintenance will be confined to minor crew repairs. Fire support systems are required to support the raiding force so as to reduce the enemy's ability to react. Armoured reconnaissance, airmobile, airborne and amphibious forces, dismounted infantry, particularly if supported by aviation fire support, are well suited to this type of attack. Nodal attacks in urban areas by heavy armoured forces may be considered a raid if withdrawal follows the activity.

0612. **Reconnaissance in force** is defined as : *an offensive activity designed to discover and/or test the enemy's strength or to obtain other information.* (AAP 6) The purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to compel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action. The enemy's reaction may reveal weaknesses in his defensive system that can be attacked or strengths that should be avoided. Commanders may conduct reconnaissance in force as a means of keeping pressure on the defender by seizing key terrain and uncovering enemy weaknesses. They must also be prepared to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success.
0613. **Exploitation** is defined as: an offensive activity that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganise the enemy in depth. (AAP 6) As a tactical offensive activity, exploitation is characterized by a rapid advance against lessening resistance. The purpose is both physical and moral. The aim is to retain the initiative by preventing the enemy from reorganizing his defence or conducting an orderly withdrawal. Additionally, exploitation will create confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy command, reducing his capability to react and lowering his morale. This may be decisive in itself.
0614. **A pursuit** is defined as : *an offensive activity designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.* (AAP 6) It may commence when the enemy force is demoralized and its units are beginning to disintegrate under pressure. Alternatively, it may originate in an operation in which the enemy loses his ability to operate effectively and attempts to disengage. It will often follow an attack that causes the enemy to withdraw rapidly.
0615. **Feint and Demonstration.** These activities are forms of deception and thus elements of information operations in that they affect the understanding and perception of the enemy commander in order to cause him to act inappropriately to the real threat. Both may seek to fix a enemy force and may be supported by other deceptive activities such as false radio traffic :
- **Feint.** A feint is defined as follows : in military deception, an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or **time** of the actual main offensive action (Term proposal submitted to LOWG terminology panel for inclusion in AAP 6.) A feint seeks to distract the attention and action of an enemy force by seeking combat with it. Its intent is often to support the development of the main effort elsewhere on the battlefield, normally by fixing an element of the enemy and distracting the commander. Feints must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired enemy reaction. It is most effective when it supports the enemy's expectations, when it appears as a definite threat to the enemy, or when there are several feasible courses of action open to the attacker; and

- **Demonstration.** A demonstration is defined as : *an attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought made with the aim of deceiving the enemy.* (AAP 6) A demonstration seeks to distract the enemy's attention without seeking combat. It may be part of a broader deception plan. Demonstration forces use firepower, manoeuvre and electronic warfare to affect the understanding and perceptions of the enemy commander. It should also be aimed at a vital sector of the enemy's defences if he is to be successfully misled.

0616. An ambush is defined as : *a surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy* (Term proposal submitted to LOWG terminology panel for inclusion in AAP 6.) The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the enemy while denying him an opportunity to counter-attack, principally through surprise. It is often conducted in the same manner as a raid and often within territory controlled by the enemy. Normally the ambushing force lies in wait for the enemy force.
0617. Breakout (of encircled forces). In a breakout, an encircled force takes offensive action to link up with a main force. The breakout should attempt to surprise the enemy and is more likely to be successful if it is conducted at the earliest opportunity once the encirclement has been realised. The breakout operation may be supported by other forces attempting to fix the encircling enemy.
0618. Alternative forms of offensive action. The offensive activities described above are primarily aimed at the opponent, either directly or indirectly. Reducing freedom of movement (for example by instituting a curfew) or the ability to communicate are frequently applied offensive actions. Another indirect offensive action is to tackle the opponent's external support. Other good examples are combating criminal activities used by the opponent to finance his activities or denying access to the electromagnetic spectrum. Detecting insurgents in certain areas is an offensive action increasingly used by military units. A further useful offensive tactic is to provide support to actors whose aim is to reduce the power and influence of the opponent, either directly or indirectly. Offensive deployment is more than simply the planning and execution of specific military offensive activities.

SECTION 4 : DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

0619. Defensive activities are defined as : activities that resist enemy offensive activities²³. Usually, defensive activities are undertaken when the enemy has the initiative, to prevent him from seizing terrain, attacking friendly capabilities or breaking through into a defended area. They aim to break the enemy attack, destroy his forces and stop him from accomplishing his aim. In so doing they create the circumstances for offensive action.

²³ AJP 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations Lexicon.

This is fundamental to the defensive battle that must not drift into a situation in which the defending force merely reacts to enemy actions. Every opportunity should be taken to grasp the initiative and force the attacker to react to the defensive plan. Defensive activities include the delay, however the delay is considered separately in this chapter.

0620. Defensive activities are mainly intended to maintain own power. This consists of the combination of personnel and materiel means, essential information, infrastructure and terrain. Defensive activities are also intended to reduce the opponent's power. Finally, they can also be intended to gain time. In many cases the unit conducting the defensive activities has the advantage of being more familiar with the terrain and of having been able to prepare better. However, the unit acting defensively does not usually have the initiative, which is a relative disadvantage. Defensive activities can entice the opponent to deploy offensively, thereby putting himself in a relatively vulnerable position.
0621. The **purpose** of defensive activities is to resist and ideally defeat enemy offensive activities. Within that, the objectives of defensive activities may be :
- To wear down the adversary's offensive capability and to cause his attack to fail ;
 - To retain a previously determined area and prevent the adversary from breaking through ;
 - To gain time for other activities and operations ;
 - To allow the concentration of friendly forces elsewhere ;
 - To force the enemy to concentrate so that he is more vulnerable to friendly fire; and
 - To protect friendly capabilities or indigenous facilities or systems.
0622. Offensive action is fundamental to the defence. The defence should be creative, with every opportunity being taken to grasp the initiative and so disrupt the enemy's cohesion. For example, by holding terrain, or undermining the enemy's efforts and resources in one area, a commander may be able to establish the conditions for decisive action in another. The object will be to force the enemy into action that narrows his options, reduces his fighting power and exposes him to a decisive offensive action. An effective defence is therefore rarely passive, and it is desirable to incorporate aggressive offensive action to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt the enemy whenever possible. This may be done by fixing the adversary by deception and encouraging him to make inappropriate plans, luring him into situations where one can exploit surprise, denying him information, and striking at his cohesion. Deep operations may be conducted to fix the adversary by denying him freedom of action, and striking in order to dislocate his power for offensive manoeuvre, and disrupt his ability to pass orders.
0623. Defensive activities should not be merely reactive. They aim to create the right conditions in order to achieve the desired effects and objectives. A key aim will generally be to limit the enemy's freedom of action and to develop the conditions for future offensive operations.

0624. A defensive activity may be required to :

- Destroy the adversary's offensive capability and cause his attack to fail ;
- Fix the adversary in order to allow friendly forces to strike elsewhere ;
- Gain time in order to complete the preparation for other operations including a counter-offensive; and retain terrain and prevent the adversary from breaking through.

0625. An attacker normally determines the time and location of his attack and can mass his forces whenever he wishes. He will normally seek out centres of gravity, attempting to disrupt the tempo of current operations and the planning and preparation of future ones.

0626. Defensive activities will play a major role in many campaigns that do not involve a great deal of major combat. Initial footholds and firm bases during COIN or peace support, all have to be secured and, depending upon the adversary, vital points such as key civilian infrastructure may have to be secured. The principles of the defence will still apply.

0627. There are two types of defensive activity: defence and delay.

- **Defence:** The purpose of defence may be to defeat an adversary force or to hold ground. Generally, both will require a fixed element that denies the enemy freedom of manoeuvre, and a moving element to counter-attack the enemy. The balance between these two forces depends upon the mission and the relative capabilities of the attacker and defender; and
- **Delay.** Delaying activities are those in which a force being pressed by an adversary trades time for space, reducing its opponent's momentum and inflicting damage without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay may be conducted to slow an enemy's advance, reduce his fighting power, gather information about enemy intentions, or protect friendly deployments. Delaying operations also allow the commander to shape the battlefield, and to create the conditions for a counter-attack. A delay activity is usually close associated with a corresponding defensive position that is being prepared while the delay is being fought. The delay is best fought with well-protected, mobile forces that can engage the enemy at range from mutually supporting battle positions and then withdraw quickly before becoming decisively engaged.

0628. **Alternative forms of defensive action.** The defensive activities described above are primarily aimed at the opponent, either directly or indirectly. Providing protection and safeguarding the freedom of movement and action of all actors who make a positive contribution to reaching the desired end state should also be seen as a form of defensive activity. Defensive deployment is more than simply the planning and execution of specific military defensive activities.

0629. Defensive activities are intended to prevent something or to hold on to something. By definition they are thus rarely decisive for an operation. Offensive activities do have that power.

SECTION 5 : STABILITY ACTIVITIES

0630. Military stability activities can be described as: tactical military activities that seek to stabilise the situation by setting the conditions that allow for reconstruction and development. These activities will normally be carried out in close cooperation with other actors, because they are not exclusively military activities. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities with the purpose to maintain, restore or create a situation in which the responsible administrative bodies can function correctly. Stability activities should establish and maintain the conditions for normal civic activity and responsible government. It provides the security and control over areas in order to allow this development and the freedom of manoeuvre for other elements of the inter-agency framework to bring lasting security, particularly for local governments and populations. The security and control provide freedom of manoeuvre for a local populace so that normal civil activities such as local markets may take place.
0631. Many of the described tactical stability tasks, especially those belonging to the categories *support to initial restoration of services and support to initial governance* are tasks of another origin. Many of these tasks have a pure civilian or legal basis or deal with financial and infrastructural issues. Military units will, however, be often the first (and the only) to meet challenges with respect to these “ non military ” issues. This means that the process of solving problems in those areas has to be started by military commanders, their staffs and their units. This initiative will also contribute to the improvement of the security situation in the area and will enhance the feeling and the attitude of the local populace towards the NATO force.
0632. The **purpose** of stability activities is to create and sustain security and control, restore services (or support civilian agencies in doing so), and support civilian agencies to develop more effective and accountable organisations and mechanisms of government. Stability activities involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive activities, or as the primary focus of an operation. Stability activities provide an environment in which the other instruments of Alliance strategy and non-NATO actors can operate, in cooperation with an indigenous lawful authority or government.

0633. Stability activities consist of the following tactical activities :

- **Security and Control.** The provision of general security and control allows the civilian populace and other elements of the inter-agency framework the freedom and safety to conduct normal civic activities and to build institutions that support a lasting stability. Security and control should be the first consideration following the completion of major offensive engagements, particularly in the populated areas ;
- **Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).** A key aspect to the long term stability and development of a nation may be the reformation of the various elements of a nation's security sector. The military will have a key role in reforming/developing the nation's military capabilities. SSR may be preceded by a demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process. This involves the standing down of select former combat forces and their reintegration to civil society or a newly structured military force. All of SSR will require an inter-agency approach with other government and international agencies dealing with judiciary and police forces. Military forces will have a key role in supporting and securing the process.
The key to the reform of the security sector of a country is that it must conform to the cultural expectations of the indigenous population as well as being acceptable to the international community. The skill for those involved in SSR will be to establish this balance.
- **Support to Initial Restoration of Services.** Ideally the reconstruction of essential services will fall to agencies other than the military. In the early stages of a campaign, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves and other agencies become capable of such operations. Additionally though, the military may wish to pursue some of these tasks, particularly on the tactical levels, in order to engender ongoing support from local populaces, that is, create effects on the moral plane.
Specialist military units involved in this type of stabilisation activity should have access to sufficient funding as well as other resources in order to implement repairs to infrastructure. They should take care to manage the expectations of the local population so that a failure to restore, say, the power, cannot be blamed on them.
- **Support to Initial Governance Tasks.** The provision of governance to a nation in which an Alliance campaign is being conducted will ideally be done by agencies that specialise in such duties. In the early stages of a campaign, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves. This may see the military reconstructing schools and helping to establish local markets, for example. Such activities will not only assist an indigenous population to return to a normal state of affairs, but it will help to engender support from local populaces, that is, create effects on the moral plane in pursuit of the operational objectives.

SECTION 6 : ENABLING ACTIVITIES

0634. Enabling activities link and support the transition between different types of tactical activities, for example, between deliberate attacks or when transitioning from one defensive position to another. They may be conducted to make or break contact with the enemy or may be conducted out of contact. An enabling activity is never carried out in its own right. Its execution must lead to the active prosecution of another type of tactical activity. The successful and rapid execution of these activities relies on such factors as devolution of decision, collocation of headquarters, liaison and a simple plan.

0635. The effective execution of enabling activities will help ensure the following :

- The ability to make a transition between phases and activities without a loss in tempo ;
- The forces taking over the battle having the most up-to-date information ;
- Fluid movement ;
- Fire control so as to use all weapons to further the aim and to avoid fratricide; and
- Quick regrouping.

0636. Enabling activities consist of the following activities :

- Reconnaissance ;
- Security ;
- Advance to contact ;
- Meeting engagement ;
- Link-up ;
- Withdrawal ;
- Retirement ;
- Relief of troops in combat and encircled forces; and
- Obstacle breaching.

0637. **Reconnaissance**

- Reconnaissance activities are those activities undertaken to obtain information about the enemy, other adversary, terrain and environmental conditions or indigenous population of a particular area. Area, point and route reconnaissance are common tasks. Gaining information and providing it to the relevant staff elements is a general task for all formations ;
- Tasking of reconnaissance forces must be done with care. They normally execute their missions while planning is ongoing for the forthcoming mission and are then re-tasked to support follow-on missions with little or no opportunity for recovery ;

- The employment of reconnaissance forces must be closely tied to the intelligence cycle and integrated into the overall ISTAR plan. Key is the rapid dissemination of information gained, particularly to those units in contact or power contact ;
- Any combat or combat support troops may be employed in reconnaissance tasks, and many combat and combat support units have integral specific reconnaissance capabilities and dedicated troops. In general, the following forces will be dedicated to reconnaissance activities :
 - * Armoured reconnaissance units ;
 - * Reconnaissance troops and platoons in regiments and battalions ;
 - * Engineer reconnaissance sections or detachments; and
 - * Special Forces.

0638. **Security**

- Security activities provide early and accurate warning of adversary dispositions and activities. Depending upon their mission and structure, they may provide an element of protection for a main body force or gain time for the preparation of other deliberate activities. Security activities are normally conducted as part of a larger enabling activity or in support of another type of tactical activity such as the defence. Security activities consist of screen, guard and cover.
- There are many aspects to security. It is primarily aimed at safeguarding own power and freedom of action. The all-round protection of a compound, the protective force and flank protection are familiar concepts. Increasingly it is becoming necessary to deploy manpower and fire power to protect all movements in an operational area. In addition consideration must be given to protecting own information infrastructure and information. The security of all the actors who play any form of role in meeting the political and military aims must also be borne in mind.

0639. **Advance to contact**

- The advance to contact seeks to gain or re-establish contact with an enemy under the most favourable conditions. To achieve this, forces may be employed in both supporting security and reconnaissance missions. It differs from a meeting engagement in that contact is not made unexpectedly. The advance to contact is normally executed in preparation for a subsequent offensive activity and therefore ends when the main force is positioned for the subsequent activity and in accordance with the commander's plan. Subsequent activities will be determined by the mission assigned to the main force. This may also be determined from the posture of the main body when contact is made with the adversary ;
- By advancing to contact, the force seizes and maintains the initiative. The activity may involve destroying or forcing the withdrawal of minor enemy elements and seizing ground of tactical importance.

0640. Meeting engagement

- The meeting engagement is a combat action that may occur when both sides seek to fulfil their mission by offensive action. It will often occur during an advance to contact and can easily lead to a hasty attack. In offensive, defensive or delaying activities it will often mark a moment of transition in that the outcome may well decide the nature of subsequent activities. This is the reason a meeting engagement is described as a transitional phase. Even when the main part of a force is attacking, defending or delaying, individual elements may find themselves in situations that have the characteristics of a meeting engagement. The meeting engagement normally occurs at brigade level and below.
- The meeting engagement differs from the advance to contact in that it occurs unexpectedly whereas in the advance to contact the commander is deliberately seeking to establish contact with the enemy ;
- A meeting engagement may occur in various circumstances :
 - * When a force which is moving makes contact with an adversary about whom the friendly force has little or no information. It more occurs if reconnaissance has been ineffective ;
 - * When both sides become aware of the other and decide to attack without delay in an attempt to obtain positional advantage, gain ground of tactical importance, maintain momentum or assert dominance over the adversary; and
 - * When one force deploys hastily for defence while the other attempts to prevent it from doing so.
- The important characteristics of meeting engagements are a shortage of information about the enemy and a limited amount of time available for the commander to develop the situation. Plans must be drawn up and executed as quickly as possible. Success will depend primarily on the ability of the commander to anticipate a Meeting Engagement and to bring to bear, fully and quickly, the combat power at his disposal. Thus, at all levels, bold, vigorous action by subordinate commanders is often the key to success. Prompt action to gain control of the situation quickly will reduce the enemy's chances of carrying out his plans and may help to preserve freedom of action. Well rehearsed drills will be of immense importance.

0641. **Link-up**

- Link-up is conducted to join two friendly forces in enemy controlled territory. It may therefore be necessary to destroy the enemy between these forces before a link-up is established. It is followed by another activity such as a forward passage of lines, a withdrawal or a relief ;
- The mission to carry out a link-up operation will always be given in the context of a subsequent mission for the forces involved. It will normally state the location or the route where the link-up will take place. Frequently, a time will be stipulated for the link-up ;
- In a link-up, both forces may be moving towards one another, or one may be stationary or encircled. They may have the same or differing missions. A link-up activity could occur under the following **circumstances**:
 - * A link-up between two forces engaged in converging attacks may take place when each force captures adjacent objectives, thus completing an encirclement ;
 - * A link-up with encircled or cut-off forces may take place on the perimeter of the defensive position established by that force. When the link-up is combined with a break-out action, it may take place at another designated objective. The encircled force should try to break out, or at least mount some form of diversionary action in order to ease the task of the relieving force by diverting adversary attention; and
 - * A link-up activity with an air delivered or infiltrated force may take place on the perimeter of its defensive position. In this case, the link-up is normally followed by a passage of lines or by a relief of the forces involved.

0642. A **withdrawal** occurs when a force disengages from an enemy force in accordance with the will of its commander. It seeks to disengage its combat forces from the enemy although contact may be maintained through other means such as indirect fire, reconnaissance or surveillance. The withdrawal will be followed by another specific activity such as the defence in a new location.

0643. The order to withdraw will not normally be given by the commander without the agreement or direction of his superior commander. A withdrawal may be undertaken for the following reasons :

- If the object of the activity cannot be achieved and the force is threatened by defeat;
- The objective is achieved and there is no further requirement to maintain contact ;
- To avoid battle in unfavourable tactical, CBRN or environmental conditions ;
- To draw the adversary into an unfavourable posture, for example, to extend his lines of communication ;
- To conform to the movements of adjacent friendly forces ;

- To avoid fighting in sensitive areas, be they near powerfully toxic industrial sites or culturally sensitive sites ;
- To allow for the use of the force or parts of the force elsewhere; and
- For combat service support reasons; i.e., the force can no longer be sustained.

0644. A **retirement** is different from a withdrawal. It is a movement away from the adversary by a force out of contact with the adversary. It is completed generally in the same manor as a withdrawal; however, since the force is out of contact, it is unlikely that there will be a requirement for a robust covering force.

0645. **Relief**

- When combat activities are taken over by one force from another, this is referred to as the conduct of relief activities. Relief activities are undertaken when forces :

- * Are unable to continue with their mission ;
- * Are required for activities in another area ;
- * Have accomplished their mission ;
- * Are due for rotation to avoid exhaustion; and
- * Are not suitable to accomplish the new task.

- The types of relief are as follows :

- * **Relief in Place.** A relief in which all or part of a force (outgoing force) is replaced in a sector by an incoming unit. In certain circumstances the force being relieved may be encircled by adversary forces and unable to breakout ;
- * **Forward Passage of Lines.** A relief in which a force advances or attacks through another which is in contact with the enemy; and
- * **Rearward Passages of Lines.** A relief in which a force effecting a movement to the rear (outgoing force) passes through the sector of a unit occupying a defensive position. Normally, a delay force would be expected to conduct a rearward passage of lines ;
- * **Relief of encircled forces.** The purpose is to break through adversary positions to reach an encircled force, thus restoring its freedom of action. In such a situation, it is unlikely that the encircled force will have the combat power necessary to break out of the encirclement, even with support from another force.
The break through will result from a deliberate attack, followed by a link up activity with the in-place, encircled force, and then the relief.

0646. **Crossing And Breaching Of Obstacles**

- General. An obstacle is a natural or man-made restriction to movement which will normally require special equipment or munitions to overcome it. A coordinated series of obstacles is known as a barrier ;

- Forces require an ability to cross obstacles in order to continue movement in support of operations. Although crossings normally occur during offensive operations, they may also be necessary during defensive or delaying operations. They can occur throughout the combat zone and along lines of communication further to the rear. Often they involve a passage of lines.

0647. Types of Obstacles and Their Characteristics

- Inland Areas of Water or Waterways

- * Areas of water are normally obstacles after the destruction of fixed bridges ;
- * Detours are not normally possible ;
- * The need for crossing operations can normally be foreseen, from existing geographical data and confirmed by ISTAR assets ;
- * Assault boats and some other types of vehicles may cross without engineer assistance; and
- * Crossing difficulty will depend on climatic and terrain conditions.

- Minefields

- * Normally cause attrition ;
- * Are covered by observation and fire ;
- * Detours/bypassing may be possible ;
- * The need for a breach may not be anticipated; and
- * Normally engineer assistance is required for a breach.

- Other Obstacles

- * Rough, soft or marshy ground, terrain covered by deep snow ;
- * Craters and ditches ;
- * Vertical steps and slopes ;
- * Contaminated areas ;
- * Abatis, extended wire entanglements, debris, including collateral damage from the effects of weapons ;
- * Existing and reinforcing obstacles including craters, mines, landfalls and avalanches. Bypass will almost always be difficult or impossible; and
- * Artificially induced flooding and inundation.

SECTION 7 : INFORMATION OPERATIONS (INFO OPS)

0648. **Introduction.** Information operations are crucial to achieving the objectives. They are not a separate form of operation, but rather an integral part of all activities planned and executed within the operational framework.
0649. **Definition.** The definition of Info Ops and information activities is as follows :
- Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other coalition approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.
 - Information activities are actions designed to affect information and or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protective measures.
0650. These activities are directed at political and military objectives and are carried out using both military and non-military means. For this reason these activities are initially developed, planned and executed at strategic and operational level. The tactical level is frequently tasked with executing elements of these activities.
0651. Prior to an operation being conducted by a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) an information strategy is developed within the appropriate coalition the Finabel Land Forces are operating. A plan of action is then established on the basis of this politico-strategic guideline. Using up-to-date and accurate intelligence, activities are planned which are intended to bring about the desired effect (including the behaviour changes deemed necessary) and thus to contribute to achieving the end state. Important elements of this process include selecting, and where necessary prioritising, the appropriate target groups, developing activities specific to these groups, allocating the assets required and measuring the results.
0652. Info Ops comprises three inter-related activity areas :
- Information activities that focus on changing, influencing, or reinforcing perceptions and attitudes of adversaries and other coalition approved parties ;
 - Information activities that focus on preserving and protecting Alliance freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment by defending the data and information that supports Alliance decision-makers and decision-making processes ;

- Information activities that focus on countering command functions and capabilities, by affecting the data and information that support adversaries and other coalition approved parties, and are used in command and control, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, and weapon systems.

0653. **Key Tools and Techniques.** Info Ops is an integrating function focused on the information environment rather than a capability in its own right. The 3 inter-related activity areas can make use of all or any capability or activity that can exert influence, affect understanding or have a counter-command effect; the extent is only limited by imagination, availability, policy, doctrine and legal constraints.

However, there are several capabilities, tools and techniques that form the basis of most Info Ops activity. Information Objectives can be achieved by the planned coordination and synchronisation of military capabilities, tools and techniques affecting information or information systems (such as direct and indirect communication, and by using the electromagnetic spectrum or computer networks). The use of force (such as coercion and destruction) may also combine with those means, e.g., by delivery of specifically targeted fires, which can create considerable effects in the information environment. Clearly, many of these tools and techniques have a much wider application than Info Ops (and when not used to support Info Ops the potential unintended information effects of such activity must be considered), but can be drawn upon by Info Ops. The following paragraphs provide examples of capabilities, tools and techniques used in support of Information Objectives.

- Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).
PSYOPS are directed at specially selected and approved target groups. The intention is to influence the attitude, behaviour and perception of these target groups by disseminating specially selected information ;
- Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP).
The visible presence of troops can exert influence on the attitude and behaviour of opponents, the local population and other important actors in the area of operations. The character of the troops is crucial. Credibility rests on the willingness and ability to intervene if necessary. The commander plays an important role in this respect. He represents the troops. His attitude, behaviour and use of language have a major influence on credibility and thus on the chances of success ;
- Operational Security (OPSEC).
In order to achieve success, the information critical to the operation²⁴ must be listed and protected in order to prevent it being passed on to third parties ;
- Information Security (InfoSec).
Information security related to the administrative, technical and procedural security measures. The intention is to protect the secrecy, integrity and availability of own information ;

²⁴ Referred to internationally as the *Essential Elements of Friendly Information* (EEFI).

- Deception is intended to mislead the opponent and thus to jeopardise his decision-making, will, perception and military power. Deception can consist of disseminating incorrect information, or of keeping back part of the information. It will only work if supported by the other military activities and the effects of the other key functions of Info Ops ;
- Electronic Warfare (EW).
EW is intended to weaken the opponent's command and control capacity through the deliberate and determined disruption, temporarily and locally, of his communication systems. Unobtrusive monitoring of communications, thereby allowing essential information about the opponent to be exploited, is also part of EW ;
- Computer Network Operations (CNO).
CNO involve protecting own networks and software, while at the same time disrupting and influencing those used by the other actors. The intended effect is to weaken or otherwise affect the opponent's situational awareness and command and control. Unnoticed infiltration into the networks of the other actors makes it possible to obtain, and even alter, essential information ;
- Physical Destruction.
The small-scale deployment of military force is used to physically destroy the opponent's information systems and structures.
- Key leader engagement
As part of the Info Ops contribution to an operation it is vital that all key actors and their inter-relationships are identified. Having detailed knowledge of key leaders' personalities, leadership styles, ambitions, motivations, objectives (short and long term), current stances, dependencies, psychological profiles and personal histories will be essential to provide the context to plan appropriate information activities. A vital component in all plans will be to recognise the complex, adaptive relationships and dependencies that exist between actors.

0654. **Civil-Military Cooperation.** Although Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a capability that can be used to achieve Information Objectives, it is unique in that it seeks to create a meaningful relationship between the military, civilian agencies and the local population. Indeed, CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. CIMIC facilitates cooperation and coordinates activities between a military force and all parts of the civilian environment within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) by :

- Liaison and coordination with civil actors, e.g. International Organisations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) ;
- Considering political, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations;

- Building an effective relationship between the military and civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and populations within the JOA.

0655. In addition to the tasks of liaison, reconnaissance, provision of an advisory service and coordinating the management of infrastructure projects, direct relief operations can also be undertaken. The CIMIC staff needs to establish relationships with a variety of civilian authorities and agencies and thereby establish a valuable source of information to assist in the planning of information activities. However, due care must be taken to avoid CIMIC activities being perceived as intelligence gathering by partner agencies such as IOs or NGOs. This can be achieved by CIMIC coordinating with other capabilities that consider civil audiences and information systems to create and sustain the conditions needed to support the achievement of Alliance objectives. Depending on the situation and mission requirements, CIMIC activities, within the scope of CIMIC tasks, may directly contribute to influencing key decision-makers.
0656. **Public Affairs.** The aim of PA is to protect the credibility of NATO or any other coalition and promote widespread understanding, thereby gaining support for military operations while not compromising EEFI. Military PA is the function responsible for promoting the coalitions military aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the coalition. This includes planning and conducting media relations, internal communications and community relations. An important facet of any military operation is to communicate the principal themes and messages while providing a clear and complete understanding of the operation, while maintaining OPSEC. Although PA is primarily focused on the need to inform and educate audiences, which results in maintaining the public support and hence freedom of action, its impact is much wider. It is therefore essential that PA staff and Info Ops staff work closely together to ensure that a coordinated message is delivered to the intended audiences. Particular attention must be paid to local and regional media within the JOA and to other media sources that are influential within the JOA as media reports will have an influence on all parties and must be taken into account. While PA and Info Ops have different audiences and delivery channels, coordination of the message and delivery timing is necessary and appropriate. Effective PA provides a commander freedom of action and supports Info Ops in countering adversary propaganda with the truth about operational activities, while protecting OPSEC. The credibility of PA spokespersons as sources of timely and truthful information must not be jeopardised. Under no circumstances is it permissible to lie to the media. To avoid giving the false impression that the media are being manipulated in any way, a clear distinction must be maintained between Info Ops and PA.

0657. PA and Info Ops are separate, but related functions. They directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions. However, the efforts of PA and Info Ops differ with respect to audience, scope and intent. Therefore, coordination between PA and Info Ops must be assured at all times and at all levels to ensure consistency in the message released by the military to outside audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the campaign. Beyond coordination of efforts and messages, PA will have no role in performing the Info Ops function.
0658. **Planning and execution of Information operations.** Information operations (and the associated military activities) produce effects which influence the will, understanding and capabilities of all actors involved. The planning and execution of these activities and actions must be closely coordinated with all other military activities. Good planning ensures that during the execution all activities work together to ensure a better result. Establishing and maintaining an up-to-date overview of the situation and making this available to all levels is absolutely crucial to success. The selection and coordination of targets for information operations must be complementary to and harmonised with all other planning, targeting and evaluation.
0659. All activities, including the military activities related to information operations, are planned, integrated and coordinated under the leadership of the G3/S3 staff sections. The military activities related to information operations should be seen as an aspect of the military function fire power.