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Promulgation of report Finabel Nr A25.R-T.37.R

“EUROPEAN UNION BATTLE GROUP MANUAL”
GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONAL PREPARATION AND TACTICAL
USE
DEFINITION OF GENERIC MISSIONS WHICH CAN BE ENTRUSTED
TO THE EU BG
→ *What to do with an EU BG?*
CONCEIVABLE EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE(S) FOR AN EU BG AT
TACTICAL LEVEL
→ *How to conduct an EU BG deployment?*

DATE OF PROMULGATION : APRIL 2008



“European Union Battle Group Manual”
Guidance for operational preparation and tactical use

Part 1

Definition of generic missions which can be entrusted to the EU BG
→ *What to do with an EU BG?*

Conceivable employment doctrine(s) for an EU BG at tactical level
→ *How to conduct an EU BG deployment?*

Table of contents

1. GENERIC MISSIONS AND TASKS FOR AN EU BATTLEGROUP	1
11. INTRODUCTIVE REMARKS	1
111. BACKGROUND	1
112. AIM.....	1
113. METHODOLOGY	1
12. THE CONCEPT	1
121. MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS.....	2
122. ROLE OF THE FRAMEWORK STATE.....	2
123. EU BATTLEGROUP AND NRF.....	2
124. OUTLINE FORCE COMPOSITION	2
125. SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES.....	3
1251. COMBAT TROOPS.....	4
1252. COMBAT SUPPORT	4
1253. ISTAR	4
1254. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT.....	4
1255. COMMAND AND CONTROL	4
1256. AIR AND AVIATION	4
1257. STRATEGIC TRANSPORT	4
1258. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH	5
13. ACTIVITIES	5
131. CONFLICT PREVENTION.....	6
1311. MISSIONS	6
1312. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	6
1313. SECURITY SITUATION	6
1314. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING CONFLICT PREVENTION	7
132. SEPARATION OF PARTIES BY FORCE.....	7
1321. MISSIONS	7
1322. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	7
1323. SECURITY SITUATION	8
1324. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING SEPERATION BY FORCE	8
133. STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY ADVICE.....	8
1331. MISSIONS	8
1332. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	9
1333. SECURITY SITUATION	9
1334. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY ADVICE	9
134. EVACUATION	9
1341. MISSIONS	10
1342. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	10
1343. SECURITY SITUATION	10
1344. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING EVACUATION.....	10
135. ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS.....	11
1351. MISSIONS	11
13511. Possible missions in Humanitarian Operations :	11
1352. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	11
1353. SECURITY SITUATION	11
1354. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS	12

14.	CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	12
141.	EMPLOYMENT.....	12
1411.	IN THEATRE EMPLOYABILITY	12
1412.	AUTONOMOUS ACTIVITIES.....	12
1413.	EARLY ENTRY FORCE.....	12
14131.	STRATEGIC DEPLOYABILITY.....	13
14132.	CREDIBLE COMBAT POWER.....	13
14133.	STAND-ALONE ISTAR.....	13
14134.	SUSTAINABILITY.....	13
14135.	COMPLEX TERRAIN.....	13
14136.	SELF-PROTECTION CAPABILITY	13
1414.	A BRIDGING FORCE.....	13
142.	DEPLOYING AN EU BATTLEGROUP.....	13
1421.	AT DISTANCE.....	13
1422.	STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT	14
143.	STANDARDS AND TRAINING.....	14
1431.	NATIONAL TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES	14
1432.	NATIONAL TRAINING STANDARDS AND METHODS	14
1433.	BEST PRACTICE.....	14
1434.	DRAWBACKS.....	14
144.	INTEROPERABILITY	15
1441.	COMMAND AND CONTROL	15
1442.	CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE.....	15
1443.	LOGISTICS.....	15
1444.	TRAINING.....	15
1445.	LEGAL / ROEs	15
1446.	WORKING WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES	15
15.	SUMMARY.....	16

ANNEX A : GROUPS OF TASKS RELEVANT TO ALL ACTIVITIES.....	17
ANNEX B : PROJECT	18
ANNEX C : COMMAND.....	19
ANNEX D : INFORM.....	21
ANNEX E : PROTECT.....	22
ANNEX F : SUSTAIN.....	23

2. CONCEIVABLE EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE(S) FOR AN EU BATTLE GROUP (EU BG) AT TACTICAL LEVEL.....	27
21. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.....	27
22. EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG.....	27
221. COMPLEX SCENARIOS	27
222. CORE ACTIVITIES OF THE LAND COMPONENT	28
223. EXPECTED STRATEGIC END-STATE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE EU BG	28
224. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG	28
225. PRINCIPLES TO THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG.....	29
23. CHARACTERISTICS.....	29
232. MULTINATIONALITY	30
2321. LEVEL OF MULTINATIONALITY OF UNITS.....	30
2322. NUMBER OF STATES FOR AN EU BG.....	31
2323. PROS AND CONS OF NATIONAL / MULTINATIONAL C2	31
2324. GUIDELINES FOR THE COMPOSITION OF OHQ/FHQ.....	31
233. FLEXIBILITY	32
234. ROBUSTNESS AND SELF RELIANCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT.....	32
235. ABILITY TO OPERATE IN COMPLEX TERRAIN.....	32

24.	ANALYSIS OF MISSIONS BY COMBAT FUNCTION	32
241.	COMMAND	33
242.	INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE	33
243.	FIREPOWER / INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES	33
244.	MANOEUVRE	35
245.	PROTECTION.....	35
246.	CSS	36
247.	OTHER CAPABILITIES	36
25.	INTEROPERABILITY	36
251.	INTEGRATION OF AIR UNITS, MARITIME UNITS OR CIVIL ORGANISATIONS IN THE BG 37	
252.	POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE TRAINING STANDARDS	37
26.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	38
ANNEX : ABBREVIATIONS		41

1. GENERIC MISSIONS AND TASKS FOR AN EU BATTLEGROUP

11. INTRODUCTIVE REMARKS

111. BACKGROUND

The EU Battlegroup concept was conceived as a means of encouraging continued improvements in deployable and employable European capabilities, thus widening the scope for burden sharing between European partners. This kind of high readiness capability meets EU requirement for forces which are able to respond very rapidly to an emerging crisis under a UN mandate, and thereby demonstrates European willingness to fill a crucial global capability gap.

These Battlegroups are held predominantly, but not exclusively, to be used in response to a request from the UN (under a UN mandate) to undertake rapid intervention. This might include acting to prevent atrocities in a hostile environment or helping with the provision of urgent humanitarian aid. This Activity¹ is particularly applicable in failing or failed states. Recent examples in Africa (such as the UK's operational experience in Sierra Leone and the French in Côte d'Ivoire) have not only illustrated the need for such a capability, but demonstrated how a relatively small number of forces can have a significant effect in a short period of time, provided they can be deployed rapidly with the appropriate integrated support; often as an Early Entry force (EEF).

112. AIM

The aim of this paper is to outline those Activities, Missions and Tasks that an EU Battlegroup may have to undertake during its tenure as one of the two committed EU Battlegroups.

113. METHODOLOGY

The paper will describe the overall Concept, Composition, Activities, Missions and Challenges for the EU Battlegroup before stating the Tasks they must be able to undertake to accomplish such missions. Those Tasks are divided between Operate, Prepare, Project, Command, Inform, Protect and Sustain. Operate Tasks are found within the main body of the text while the others are in Annexes A to F. This study was conducted by a Land environmental working group and for completeness a similar study should be conducted by those responsible for the other environments.

12. THE CONCEPT

The Battlegroup initiative will realise the ambitions set in the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal for the EU. The Battlegroup initiative concentrates on small, high readiness forces, which are rapidly deployable, mobile and self-sustainable. Battlegroups will undertake Activities in support of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which are based on the European Security Strategy. Due to the nature of the Battlegroups these Activities will be of limited duration and combat intensity.

The key elements of the initiative are:

- Stand-alone Battlegroup-sized forces (around 1,500 strong, including Combat Support and Combat Service Support) and an associated Force and Operational HQs that will have to operate within a coalition context.
- The force should be on mission within 10 days of an EU decision to launch an operation.
- Sustainable for 30 days (but extendable up to 120 days).
- Deployable over 6000km from Brussels (this is the planning target but not a limitation).
- Two concurrent operations; the deployment phases for each may have to be conducted separately and successively (it is unreasonable to expect the EU to conduct the deployment phase for two Battlegroups simultaneously over extended distances).
- Battlegroups are based on the principle of multinationality, which means that interoperability is key.

Rapid response forces need not necessarily be large but they do need to be militarily effective, credible, coherent and capable of stand-alone operations. EU Battlegroups are composed of the generally accepted minimum force elements necessary to meet such requirements.

¹ Activity is used in the document to align with current NATO terminology.

121. MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS

The Military Capability Commitments Conference on 22 November 2004 drew commitments from many EU Member States, and a number of supporting niche capabilities, to be available by 2007. Full Operational Capability was reached in 2007, with the Union able to undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations.

122. ROLE OF THE FRAMEWORK STATE

The Framework State is responsible for ensuring that the EU Battlegroup is ready to undertake its commitment. When the Battlegroup is constituted from a number of states this aspect of force generation and preparation cannot be underestimated. Of particular significance are the roles of both the Force Headquarters (FHQ) and the Operational Headquarters (OHQ)² which must be involved with the Battlegroup's preparation throughout. The availability of strategic transport (from EU resources) for the deployment of the entire Battlegroup is also a Framework state's responsibility.

123. EU BATTLEGROUP AND NRF

The activities for which the NRF and EU Battlegroups are designed are complementary, rather than being duplicative. The NRF is designed to participate in the full range of Alliance operations, up to and including high intensity war-fighting. This may include a show of force, stand-alone use for crisis response, or initial forcible entry for a larger operation. On the other hand, EU Battlegroups should be capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale.

124. OUTLINE FORCE COMPOSITION

The following definitions are applicable:

Battlegroup Package : A Battlegroup package consists of a FHQ, a Battlegroup and associated pre-identified operational and strategic enablers.


Battlegroup : The Battlegroup itself consists of a combined arms battalion sized force reinforced with CS and CSS elements.

An EU Battlegroup package is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations.

And includes (for example):


FHQ, including dedicated Staff- and CIS-Support and Augmentee Staff
Battlegroup (approx. 1500 troops)

² The OHQ may not be from the Framework state.



* = depending on the characteristics of the operation

Associated pre-identified operational and strategic enablers



* = depending on the characteristics of the operation

Chain of Command.

OHQ (Operational Headquarters, military strategic level). The OHQ is responsible for the military strategic planning and the conduct of the operation.

FHQ (Force Headquarters, operational level). The FHQ is deployed in the area of operations, it is responsible for command and planning.

Battlegroup HQ (National/multinational command unit). The Battlegroup HQ is responsible for the training of its constituent elements and the preparation for certification according to EU agreed standards and procedures.

125. SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

There is no limit to the size of the overall force package but it is likely to range between 1,500 and 2,500 personnel. Every state has gaps in their military capability and might struggle to produce all the resources that are required to undertake the EU Battlegroup tasks; this will be exaggerated whilst they are involved in other Activities. There is a possibility that a state might either take a risk with this capability gap or fill it by 'double hatting' already committed forces. The Framework State is responsible for ensuring that all required capabilities are available from the time its EU Battlegroup is declared operational; often through assistance from other member states. Due to ongoing operations and the "single set of forces" a stronger link between the crisis response of NATO and EU should be taken into consideration.

1251. COMBAT TROOPS

The heart of any EU Battlegroup will be the combat element which is most likely to be based on an Infantry Battalion (or equivalent) with a minimum of three companies, a support weapons company and integrated logistics and C2 capabilities. It should have the ability to manoeuvre tactically in the area of operations; some form of protected mobility may be required.

1252. COMBAT SUPPORT

Combat Support troops will be required in their primary roles when an EU Battlegroup is involved in combat operations. At other times they offer other skill sets that they can undertake alongside their primary tasks ranging from basic combat skills to specialist engineering support for Humanitarian and Rescue Tasks³.

1253. ISTAR

ISTAR assets will allow the limited size of the EU Battlegroup to achieve its effects most efficiently and should be a core component of all EU Battlegroups. Techniques such as reachback will enhance any ISTAR capability but will rely on robust secure communications.

1254. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

No EU Battlegroup will be able to undertake any Activity without robust Combat Service Support. However, the logistic tail of any force will place its own burden on the operation and so should be kept to a realistic minimum. Even though the provision of combat supplies will be paramount to the success of the mission, medical support is more likely to be a force driver in tasking the Battlegroup.

1255. COMMAND AND CONTROL

The FHQ will control the operations in theatre when an EU Battlegroup operates autonomously; this will require staff capable of undertaking the full range of command functions (including CIMIC, Information Ops, an air co-ordination etc). It is most likely that the FHQ will have to operate closely with non-military organisations from within and outside the UN. The OHQ must have sufficiently robust CIS to communicate with the FHQ. At times a forward tactical HQ might be deployed to the military area of operations if the main FHQ needs to be positioned close to the political and economic centre of gravity of the Host Nation.

1256. AIR AND AVIATION

As an EU Battlegroup is limited in size and firepower it may rely heavily on offensive air and aviation to increase its potency. Air and aviation are both logistically difficult to support but this burden can be eased if they are based on either a secure and well resourced airfield or on a seabased platform. The balance between the two will vary according to the type of mission and the force deployed. Once deployed it is most likely that a Battlegroup will require battlefield helicopter support for movement, resupply and medevac.

1257. STRATEGIC TRANSPORT

The Framework State is responsible for organising the strategic transport with co-operation from the contributing states. The amount of air transport required to deploy and sustain a military force of over 1,500 personnel cannot be over estimated. Without sufficient air transport the employability of an EU Battlegroup within the given timelines will be limited. Co-ordination pan-EU air transport can be improved through early liaison with the EU Airlift Transport Centre which will manage all EU air strategic deployments. In reality it is likely that the air lift will have to be supplemented by sea, rail or road which, again, is the responsibility of the Framework State with help from the Sea Transport Coordination Centre.


³ See Study T35R

1258. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Most EU States support the concept of the Comprehensive Approach to operations. This is only possible if the military are trained and equipped to work with Other Governmental Departments, International Organisations, NGOs and other civilian agencies and that those agencies are prepared to deploy and work alongside their military counterparts.

13. ACTIVITIES

‘An Activity can be defined as a system or composition of tactical Tasks that can be assigned to a unit or formation in order to guarantee that the necessary effect, in relation to the specific Activity, can be obtained or achieved⁴’. An EU Battlegroup is likely to be deployed on one of the specific Activities shown below. However, the Battlegroup should be prepared to undertake Tasks which are associated with other Activities as the situation develops.



Tasks that are normally carried out by Host Nation security forces may have to be undertaken by an EU Battlegroup if the Host Nation's forces are incapable of carrying those tasks. This should be done in support of Host Nation authority and handed back to the Host Nation as soon as possible.

⁴ Proposed NATO definition.

131. CONFLICT PREVENTION

Conflict Prevention. A peace support [activity] employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and – when necessary – military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

In Conflict Prevention an EU Battlegroup may be employed to take the timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of conflict. This is most likely to be as a show of the UN and EU's intention to engage in the area rather than as a force capable of tackling the root cause of the tension. If the violence in the area of operations is wide spread it is unlikely that a force of this size will have a significant effect; therefore the rapid deployment to the region before violence is established is likely to have the greatest chance of achieving the desired effects.

1311. MISSIONS

Possible missions in Conflict Prevention :

- Early deployment of forces to prevent the build up of armed factions.
- Key Point Defence.
- Disarmament.
- Monitoring and Intelligence gathering.
- Show of Force.
- Support to elections.
- Support to local authorities.
- Training assistance (civilian / military).

1312. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Many of the following might be considerations:

- Host Nation requests support of EU or at least approves of the deployment of EU military forces.
- Mandate is issued by UN.
- Government control is limited or just about to break down.
- Distribution of power in theater is unclear.
- Domestic or international tensions (border disputes).
- Regional tensions between non-state actors.
- Tensions between state and non-state actors.
- Ethnic tensions or fighting for resources or territorial claims.

1313. SECURITY SITUATION

The following security situation might exist:

- Local unrests/riots/attacks likely to lead to regional conflict in which armed force is openly employed.
- An Insurgency is in its infancy but gaining support.
- Country of deployment is limited in its ability to ensure law and order.

1314. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING CONFLICT PREVENTION
Conduct negotiation and mediation.
Understand legal authority under which military forces are operating.
Conduct Disarmament Demobilisation and Re-integration of former military.
Plan operations to enforce rule of law in conjunction with the Host Nation.
Secure, protect and administer an APOD/SPOD.
Establish border security.
Construct and maintain Vehicle Check Points.
Conduct patrolling.
Support Public Order.
Conduct Cordon and Search.
Exercise powers of search and arrest as necessary.
Conduct prisoner and detainee handling.
Provide route protection.
Separate hostile/belligerent forces.
Enforce out of bounds areas.
Enforce curfews.
Conduct Information Operations.
Interact with the media.

132. SEPARATION OF PARTIES BY FORCE

Operations carried out to enforce and maintain or rebuild peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities.

In the early stages of a localised conflict an EU Battlegroup could interpose itself between two or more adversaries who are engaged in a limited encounter. This would have to be quickly supported by diplomatic and economic activities. Again, the limited size of the Battlegroups will only make it viable when the warring parties are not well armed or not in such numbers that the Battlegroups could soon become overrun.

1321. MISSIONS

Possible missions in Separation of Parties by Force :

- Forced separation of hostile formations.
- Surveillance and security tasks.
- Establishment of limited protected zones.
- Key Point defence.
- Securing LOCs.
- Crowd and riot control.

1322. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Many of the following might be considerations:

- Host Nation requests support of EU or at least approves of the deployment of EU military forces.
- Mandate is issued by UN.
- Government control is limited or just about to break down.
- Tensions between state and non-state actors.
- Ethnic tensions or fight for resources or territorial claims.

1323. SECURITY SITUATION

The following security situation might exist:

- Local unrests/riots/attacks are leading to local conflict in which armed force is limited.
- Country of deployment is limited in its ability to ensure law and order.

1324. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING SEPERATION BY FORCE

Understand legal authority under which military forces are operating.

Conduct negotiation and mediation.

Separate hostile/belligerent forces.

Delineate cease-fire lines, zones of separation and control zones. (FHQ level).

Establish and supervise protected/safe areas.

Able to conduct observation and monitoring.

Observe and monitor zone of separation, control zones and assembly areas.

Provide protection to individuals, commanders and installations.

Exercise powers of search and arrest.

Plan operations to enforce rule of law.

Conduct patrolling.

Conduct Public Order.

Conduct Cordon and Search.

Provide route protection.

Enforce out of bounds areas.

Enforce curfews.

Assist civil organisations with the movement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.

Plan and transfer responsibility for security and control to other appropriate HN or other organisations.

133. STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY ADVICE

Establish a secure environment and a degree of law and order. Tasks are likely to be conducted in a coordinated effort with Other Governmental Departments and other civil actors.

A force the size of an EU Battlegroup is unlikely to be able to undertake a vast range of stability tasks without significant support from other agencies. However, it has the capability to secure key installation, secure points of entry as well as contribute humanitarian aid. It will be of vital importance that the Battlegroups can co-ordinate their activity with and offer military advice to civilian agencies operating in the same area.

1331. MISSIONS

Possible missions in Stability, Reconstruction and Military Advice :

- Security of Key Points and Infrastructure.
- Secure APODs/SPODs for other agencies.
- Convoy escorts.
- Initial reconstruction of some essential services.
- Distribution of Humanitarian aid.
- Limited disarmament of military or civilians.

1332. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Many of the following might be considerations :

- Operations with the consent or support of the Host Nation (permissive environment).
- Mandate is issued by UN.
- Government control is limited but holding.
- Regional tensions between non-state actors.
- Tensions between state and non-state actors.
- Ethnic tensions or fight for resources or territorial claims.

1333. SECURITY SITUATION

The following security situation might exist :

- State authorities are not able to fully ensure security, they may have lost control over law and order in parts of the country.
- Violence amongst some elements of the population.

1334. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY ADVICE

Understand legal authority under which military force are operating.

Understand existing Host Nation criminal laws and powers.

Plan operations to enforce rule of law.

Conduct patrolling.

Plan & initiate Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of belligerents

Able to conduct Public Order.

Conduct Cordon and Search.

Provide key installation protection.

Provide route protection.

Separate hostile/belligerent forces.

Enforce out of bounds areas.

Enforce curfews.

Protect individuals, commanders and installations.

Exercise powers of search and arrest.

Conduct prisoner and detainee handling.

Establish and run temporary detention facilities.

Assist civil organisations with movement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.

Plan and transfer responsibility for security and control to other appropriate HN or other organisations.

134. EVACUATION

An Evacuation is designed to rescue and evacuate non-combatants who are under threat of violence in a foreign country to a place of safety. Frequently Evacuations are conducted in rapidly deteriorating conditions, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. They may be in circumstances where the Host Nation government or other authorities, overwhelmed by disaster or defeat, have ceased to function effectively, or have been overthrown without replacement.

An EU Battlegroup has the capacity to undertake Evacuation in both permissive and non-permissive environments. However, the ground troops would need considerable support from both air/aviation and naval forces to provide mobility for the military force as well as transport for the evacuation of civilians.

1341. MISSIONS

Possible missions in Evacuation:

- Security of Key Individuals.
- Security of groups of non-military.
- Point defense/ facility protection.
- Security of key routes.
- Armed redeployment of personnel, e.g. evacuation of an observer mission (UN, EU, OSCE or other), NGO or IO and/or material.
- Evacuation of EU nationals or citizens of other states.
- Crowd and riot control.

1342. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Many of the following might be considerations:

- Operations with or without the consent or support of the country of deployment.
- Evacuation is conducted to a friendly country (safe haven).
- Evacuation conducted to friendly shipping.
- Statewide unrest may exist.

1343. SECURITY SITUATION

The following security situation might exist :

- State authorities are not able to fully ensure security, they may have lost control over law and order in parts of the country.
- Law and order are fading.
- Violent mood among some elements of the population.

1344. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING EVACUATION
Gather all available information on Entitled Personnel (EP) and the situation.
Establish Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) in theatre of anticipated NEO.
Establish initial CIS framework.
Establish FOB (APOD, SPOD), evacuation points and reception centre.
Secure vital points and key terrain.
Secure routes required for evacuation.
Support to evacuation centre.
Evacuation of EPs.

135. ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Situations which create or exacerbate existing humanitarian emergencies may, if not addressed rapidly and effectively at an early stage, lead to regional instability. When appropriate, and at the request of the EU the Armed Forces contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, normally as part of a coordinated international effort.

Acting as a force for good an EU Battlegroup can provide security as well as participating in the delivery of humanitarian aid and specialist engineering support. This is likely to be as part of a co-ordinated operation to assist in areas of humanitarian crisis or natural disaster. As with Stability tasks, it is key that the Battlegroups can co-ordinate their activity with civilian agencies operating in the same environment.

1351. MISSIONS

13511. Possible missions in Humanitarian Operations :

- Preliminary operations to secure/monitor seaports and/or airports as a prerequisite for the delivery of relief supplies.
- Protection of transport and distribution of relief supplies, refugee movements and refugee camps.
- Protection of other important objects/facilities as e.g. food stores, water points etc.
- Crowd and riot control.

1352. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- Operations with the consent and support of country of deployment (permissive environment).
- Very limited support by the host country.
- IOs, GOs, NGOs are likely to be in the country of deployment.

1353. SECURITY SITUATION

- Government control is fading.
- Danger of looting.
- Potentially a violent mood among the population.
- Internal security can no longer be ensured completely.
- Threats posed by plagues/epidemics and other natural hazards.

1354. TASKS THAT AN EU BATTLEGROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT WHEN UNDERTAKING ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
Ensure role of Military contribution is clearly articulated.
Establish if military is leading or supporting role.
Plan and execute directed operations to relieve human suffering.
Conduct initial restoration of essential services.
Assess the extent of the disaster and offer limited technical advice.
Maintain security of assigned assisting forces.
Respect the independence of aid agencies and other supporting NGOs.
Share humanitarian information with other aid agencies and NGOs.
Provide command and control assistance for the distribution and delivery of humanitarian aid.
Identify and reduce future humanitarian vulnerabilities.
Comply with UN or stated mandate to provide humanitarian relief.
Build disaster response upon local capacities and capabilities, where possible.
Build humanitarian response upon local capacities and capabilities, where possible.
Conduct media operations.
Facilitate the rapid access of NGOs/IOs to disaster victims/areas.
Facilitate the timely flow of relief goods to disaster victims/areas.

14. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

141. EMPLOYMENT

1411. IN THEATRE EMPLOYABILITY

The distinctive characteristic of the EU Battlegroup is that it will be both rapidly *deployable*, and rapidly *employable* and, consequently, time to conduct deployment and in-theatre preparation, force integration and acclimatisation all remain limited. The rapid configuration and integration of different structures and systems is likely to be a considerable challenge. It should be noted that an underpinning assumption is that there will be both an APOD and some HNS available to the force in theatre. There may, however, be a requirement to protect the APOD once established. In certain circumstances (ie an EO) there may be a requirement to 'fight off the ramp'. Traditional Maritime and Air strengths of re-assigning very high readiness force elements offer significant potential in driving down deployment time.

The employment of the Battlegroups on these operations will most likely be in one of three methods :

1412. AUTONOMOUS ACTIVITIES

An EU Battlegroup must have the ability to operate autonomously when the security situation allows. Even though it will be capable of undertaking combat operations its size will limit its effectiveness in non-permissive environments. However, when the situation is largely benign a Battlegroup should have the capability to operate for at least 30 days without having to rely on external support (up to 120 days with access to reliable logistic support).

1413. EARLY ENTRY FORCE

Finabel definition: An Early Entry Force (EEF) is a Force capable of responding quickly to an emerging crisis and is designed and equipped to prevent the development of the crisis or if that fails contain the crisis and create the conditions for the deployment of follow-on or re-enforcement forces.

The main capabilities for an EU Battlegroup acting as an EEF are :

14131. STRATEGIC DEPLOYABILITY

An EU Battlegroup should be able to initiate movement to the theatre of operation within 5 days from the approval of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and start conducting the mission within 10 days from the decision by the EU Council to launch the operation, in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) up to 6000 km from Brussels. Air Transport will often be the only means of rapid deployment.

14132. CREDIBLE COMBAT POWER

An EU Battlegroup must have sufficient combat power to achieve the mission it has been given; without this it quickly runs the risk of losing credibility which will lead to mission failure. Often air and aviation will give light forces the firepower they inherently lack.

14133. STAND-ALONE ISTAR

For an EU Battlegroup an organic ISTAR capability is indispensable. This will include integral assets such as HUMINT, Ground Reconnaissance and UAVs but will also benefit on reachback for much of the intelligence processing.

14134. SUSTAINABILITY

All elements of the EU Battlegroup must have the ability to be self-sustaining on early entry operations for periods of at least 72 hours. The EU Battlegroup must be able to sustain itself for a minimum of 30 days.

14135. COMPLEX TERRAIN

There is high probability that an EU Battlegroup will deploy to theatres that include widely urbanised areas or rough terrain (e.g. mountain, desert). The requirement will be then for a high level of unit training to conduct operation in complex environments.

14136. SELF-PROTECTION CAPABILITY

An EU Battlegroup must possess a robust self-protection capability from the effects of direct fire, indirect fire and the hazards of the environment. While this requirement applies to every military unit, it becomes a priority for entry forces that will not be able to take advantage of a higher force protection network, already in place in mature theatres of operations.

1414. A BRIDGING FORCE

In some circumstances an EU Battlegroup may, by exception, be used to reinforce troops already on the ground on an EU/UN Mission. But the temptation to use an EU Battlegroup to fill gaps on an enduring operation must be resisted. This should only be for a limited period and for specific tasks that would give the UN time to prepare and deploy other forces that would take over these tasks on an enduring basis. Bridging Activities are most likely when an existing operation is expanding (eg Operation *Artemis* in DRC).

142. DEPLOYING AN EU BATTLEGROUP

There are a number of challenges facing the EU in its ability to meet the criteria it has placed on its Battlegroup concept. Even though some are political in nature this Chapter concentrates on the practical aspects of preparing for and executing EU Battlegroup operations.

1421. AT DISTANCE

To deploy an EU Battlegroup over 6,000km within 10 days might require the lead elements of the force to be deployed by air. Freetown in Sierra Leone is 5500kms from Rotterdam by sea and a single fast (15 knots) container ship would require a minimum of 10 days to move between the two ports. This does not take into account loading and unloading as well as congestion caused by other ships on the same operation. Obviously an operation inland would then require the movement of the force from the port of disembarkation to the area of operation.

1422. STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT

An EU Battlegroup will deploy using all available strategic means, likely to be principally Air Transport assets to move its personnel, materiel and stocks. It is highly desirable that deployable platforms be 'air-transportable'. The ability to deploy a force strategically directly from Europe to an in-theatre APOD will be governed by operational priorities and could also utilise Commercial Spot Charters (CSC). Determining the desired order of arrival, informed by existing readiness states, will be critical to ensuring successful and rapid action. This must prompt further analysis on how the Air Transport fleet might become more effective and the air/sea mix of strategic lift for the build up of follow-on forces. Analysis conducted by the UK so far strongly indicates that current levels of Air Transport must be supplemented by parallel sea-deployment to meet policy targets. Sealift readiness profiles, pre-deployment warning time, an early Decision to Prepare will all be critical in the efficient use of shipping, as vessels could be loaded and sailed from the Home Base while the political process is in train.

143. STANDARDS AND TRAINING

In order for the EU to have confidence in the ability of the Battlegroups there must be clear set of standards against which they can be assessed. These will vary across many dimensions but, collectively, will indicate whether a particular Battlegroup can successfully undertake the tasks expect of it. Self certification which is the current system has certain advantages :

1431. NATIONAL TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

Even though all contributing states will understand EU and NATO doctrine they will all interpret it in slightly differing ways. It is unreasonable to expect that they should have to adapt these to a centralised European system for the duration of their tenure as an EU Battlegroup.

1432. NATIONAL TRAINING STANDARDS AND METHODS

All states will make contributions to the EU from existing forces. They will, therefore, approach their time as an EU Battlegroup from a different background and have different training standards. These will be adapted to the tasks of an EU Battlegroup but flexibility needs to be retained as to how the various states adapt their forces – one size will not fit all.

1433. BEST PRACTICE

Centralised systems rarely allow for development of best practice.

If all the contributing states are able to undertake their own certification of their Battlegroups there will soon be a number of differing experiences as to how this was done; lessons will have been identified and be shared.

1434. DRAWBACKS

Even though a self certification process is currently used it has some major drawbacks :

Differing Standards. Whilst some states may have high standards in some areas other may have vastly different standards in others. This, again, may only become apparent when a Battlegroup is committed.

Interoperability in Multinational Battlegroups. Unless the multinational battlegroups have sufficient time to train together there is a risk that interoperability issues become their greatest weakness when committed to an operation. There are no EU exercises yet to test these issues but it is up to the State who is deemed the 'point of contact' to address these challenges. Interoperability issues across Finabel States are improving but more needs to be done to address the areas of weakness; this is an area that needs a Finabel study in the immediate future⁵.

⁵ A future study for Finabel Groups Mike and Romeo.

144. INTEROPERABILITY

There is a strong possibility that an EU Battlegroup could be employed as an early entry force or alongside already deployed forces. Procedures and equipment need to be in place that will allow the Battlegroup to operate with these other forces.

1441. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Standardised command and control procedures should be strived for but challenges in this area can be reduced through the exchange of liaison officers. It is unlikely that all the tactical battlefield systems can be made interoperable with other states but there are a number of systems used at the formation level that might be.

1442. CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

There are many differing concepts and doctrine for similar Activities amongst EU members. For example: the definition of Stability and the Tasks therein differ widely. It will be the role the OHQ to ensure that these differences are not a hindrance to the tactical aspects of carrying out the operations. There would be a big advantage for all EU contributing states to follow EU and NATO Concepts and Doctrine such as NATO's AJP 3.2 and its supporting publications.

1443. LOGISTICS

Different equipment types bring their own interoperability issues; each EU Battlegroup needs to be independently supportable. If the Battlegroup is made up from more than a single state clear responsibilities must be in place to ensure that equipment can be robustly supported. Interoperability issues go beyond equipment but this is the area where the Battlegroup is most vulnerable to failure. Each state is responsible for the logistic support to its own troops which includes equipment support. But the aim must be to reduce the logistic footprint in the theatre by a streamlined multinational approach in order to decrease the expense of deployment/employment of logistic forces, to save personnel, to save costs and finally to streamline structures and procedures.

1444. TRAINING

In order to have a high chance of success EU Battlegroups made up from more than a single State must have completed combined arms training together. This will not only prove the competence of the troops to work together but also give the commander confidence in his forces. Who is responsible for conducting the training as well as paying for it must be clear well in advance of the Battlegroup coming together. Those states that have a lower level of interoperability with other EU states might find that they need to conduct more multinational training.

1445. LEGAL / ROEs

The legal aspects and Rules of Engagement issues should not be allowed to hinder the rapid deployment of an EU Battlegroup. Many of these issues should be discussed and understandings reached during the work-up training; if possible legal Memoranda of Understanding should be signed by all EU States in advance.

1446. WORKING WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES

There is a strong possibility that civilian agencies might be in the theatre of operations before the Battlegroup deploys; if not they are likely to be there soon after. These include Host Nation security forces, NGOs, IO and private security companies. The commander and his staff are responsible for ensuring that co-ordination with other agencies is carried at all levels.

15. SUMMARY

The Tasks have been divided into a framework of Operate, Prepare, Project, Command, Inform, Protect and Sustain. The paper lists those Tasks that an EUBG should be prepared to undertake. This gives the guidance required to the States providing the troops in order that they can train, equip and prepare the various force elements in a coherent fashion.

ANNEX A : GROUPS OF TASKS RELEVANT TO ALL ACTIVITIES

PREPARE

All Tasks necessary to define resources and deliver Military Capabilities, within graduated readiness Criteria, for operational employment. This is to be completed before the Battlegroup is Certified as being Fully Operationally Capable and enters the Standby period.

The Framework state, supported by other contributing states, should be able to:

TASKS
<p>Force Generation</p> <p>Force generate all elements of the Battlegroup before the training period begins. Force Generation is the process of providing suitably trained and equipped forces and their means of deployment, recovery and sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks, within required readiness and preparation time.</p>
<p>Certification</p> <p>Certify that the Battlegroup is capable of accomplishing all potential missions</p>
<p>Conduct Equipment Preparation</p> <p>Ensure that equipment is maintained in a serviceable and functional condition by the Battlegroup. Equipment will also need to be prepared and held for the deployment phase (move by Air/Land /Sea) and subsequent conduct of operations within the readiness.</p>
<p>Conduct Materiel Preparation</p> <p>Ensure that all Materiel Preparation includes all activities related to ensuring that the Battlegroup, sub-units or individual is correctly provisioned with an endorsed and serviceable scale of equipment and consumables appropriate to role and probable task.</p>
<p>Conduct Personnel Preparation</p> <p>Ensure that all personnel are ready to deploy. This will not only require them to be trained but also made medically and administratively prepared to deploy into regions which might have virulent diseases.</p>
<p>Train</p> <p>Ensure all personnel are trained individually and collectively in all the tasks they may be required to perform. However, multinational and national training should continue whilst the Battlegroup is committed. Organising the collective training is the task of the Framework State.</p>

ANNEX B : PROJECT

The deployment and recovery, in a timely manner, of a tailored force package, in order to achieve a stated objective.

The Battlegroup should be able to :

TASKS
Plan and execute theatre entry to form a bridgehead for subsequent operations or to allow follow on forces to be introduced into theatre.
Develop a movement plan at the operational level in conjunction with all transport agencies operating in theatre.
Control all aspects of Battlegroup movement.
Provide coordination and monitoring of movement and the control of movement facilities for the deployment sustainment and recovery of the Battlegroup.
Control transport agencies within a theatre, to enable maximum efficiency and economy in movement.
Provide effective liaison with other agencies providing and operating transport within theatre.
Provide effective liaison with other national forces providing and operating transport within theatre.
Provide effective liaison with Host Nation or other agencies providing and operating transport within theatre.
Battlegroup/formation must be able to plan and produce movement staff tables.
Conduct theatre transportation and movements.
Establish Ports of Disembarkation.
Establish and control Forward Mounting Bases.
Prepare a force for, and conduct intra-theatre and tactical movement.
Conduct reception, staging onward movement/integration.
Be equipped and capable of establishing and administrating a Point of entry and Forward Mounting Base.
Provide access to life support services.
Provide a sufficiently trained and equipped Theatre Activation Group.
Be capable of concurrently receiving, sustaining, mounting and recovering forces en route to and from a theatre of operations.
Able to orientate itself to an operational theatre ensuring tactical configuration and situational awareness.
Understand, or if necessary provide, a country study. Train soldiers in cultural awareness.

ANNEX C : COMMAND⁶

The Authority for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces.

The Battlegroup should be able to:

TASKS
Plan
Conduct an estimate. Basic Mission Analysis. Evaluation of factors and development of Courses of Action (COAs). COA development takes account of enemy COAs, mission analysis and the commander's direction. Wargaming is conducted (depending on available time) to validate a given COA. Commander's decision
Develop and review the plan. Main Effort is used to focus combat power and reinforce intent. Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Combat ID (CID) are integrated in the plan and understood at all levels.
Time appreciation One third/two thirds rule at every level in order that subordinates have time to conduct their own planning. Plans and orders are produced and delivered in a timely fashion (see above) and are clearly understood.
CS and CSS factors considered throughout.
Contingency planning will be conducted iteratively whilst current operations are being executed.
Control
Exercise the functions of the HQ required to support the commander.
Undertake the staff processes required to achieve those functions are articulated and understood.
Manage appropriate staff branches which should be manned correctly.
Have sufficient redundancy to allow for 24/7 operations.
Ensure Staff in all branches are fully trained
Have the procedures in place to fully integrate augmentees and liaison parties.
Ensure that SOPs & SOIs are current, articulate all the functions and processes of the HQ, and are distributed appropriately.
Liaise
Ensure the liaison appropriate to the level of command and the nature of the operation.
Ensure the Liaison Officer/detachment fully understands the commander's intent, concept of operations and plan.
Ensure suitable communications are available and effective.
Have the appropriate administrative procedures are in place to support the Liaison Officer and staff.
Air/Land Co-ordination
Ensure the SOIs of the aircraft being supported are available and understood as far as they affect the Land force element.
Personnel have received training appropriate to the level of support being provided.

⁶ To be studied further by Finabel Group R in 2008.

Civil and Military Integration
Make sure the Battlegroup can provide liaison in crisis, peace or war between military forces and the civilian authorities, organisations and populations in an area where a military force is deployed.
Comprehensive Approach
Command Support
Ensure robust CP functionality
Fill all staff posts.
Ensure effective communications is maintained.
Protect all command and control nodes.

ANNEX D : INFORM

The co-ordinated acquisition, processing and dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information and intelligence which supports the planning, and conduct of operations, targeting and the integration of effects and enables commanders to achieve their goal throughout the Spectrum of Conflict. An EU Battlegroup should be able to:

TASKS
Determine CCIRs
Receive Information Requirements and incorporated into the estimate.
Capture Information Requirements from threat and Mission analysis and prioritise.
Collection
Allocate a trained Collection Manager
Generate a collection plan.
Review and updated the collection plan regularly throughout planning and execution.
Ensure the collection plan results in tasking of appropriate organic and assigned forces
Track RFIs effectively.
Assign Assets
Assign elements integrated into the planning and execution process.
Produce an ISTAR plan which is updated regularly.
Support assigned forces appropriately.
Understand environmental aspects
Collect environmental or other information as appropriate from within its own resources.
Understand the impact of physical environment, meteorological, oceanographic, medical intelligence, industrial hazards, social, political and economic factors on the task.
Targeting
Feed intelligence into G3 Ops.
Make available the products of the targeting process to the commander and staff.
Disseminate intelligence in a timely manner.
Manage Information
Battlegroup must have an information manager.
Battlegroup has procedures for information management (IM).

ANNEX E : PROTECT

The capability to conserve the fighting potential of a deployed force by countering the wider threat to its elements from adversaries, natural hazards, and fratricide.

An EU Battlegroup should be able to:

TASK
Conduct an IPB process that identifies threats to force.
Articulate force protection measures and enforce them.
Ensure that force protection measures are adequately resourced.
Identify and disseminate areas of risk.
Maintain a risk register and take measures to mitigate risk where appropriate.
Have a system in place to monitor existing and identify new threats.
CBRN
Establish a system to monitor CBRN and Environmental Health threats and disseminate guidance on appropriate posture (dress states etc).
Ensure all personnel understand drills for employment of protection equipment.
Air Defence
Plan and coordinate integrated air defence Measures.
Control air defence assets.
Deploy air defence assets to provide necessary protection.
Ensure that actions on enemy air vehicles are understood at all levels.
Have procedures for warning and reporting that are known at all levels.
Ensure that post attack measures are known and executed correctly.
Counter UAV
Plan and coordinate integrated air defence Measures to counter UAVs.
Control air defence assets to counter UAVs.
Deploy air defence assets to counter UAVs.
C-IED
Have a clear understanding of C-IED measures available.
Ensure that the structures are in place to conduct C-IED plan.
Monitor and identify current and emerging threats.
Disseminate new C-IED procedures in a timely manner.
Conduct cordon and search.
Provide physical force protection Measures.
Maintain database on IEDs.

ANNEX F : SUSTAIN

The maintenance of the necessary level of combat power for the duration required for a force to achieve its objectives. It is a combination of logistics, administration, resources and organisation.

An EU Battlegroup should be able to:

TASK
Transport and Movement
Consider Logistic planning factors (Demand, Distance, Destination and Duration) and impact on operations during estimate process.
Identify external lift capacity required.
Identify Main Supply Routes and capacities as appropriate.
Establish and protect APODs and/or SPODs as required.
Estimate APOD and SPOD capacities as applicable.
Provide relevant Force Protection for all resupply activities
Consider and integrate transport and movement operations into sustainment plans.
Material Support
Receipt, store and distribute Materiel as required.
Re-distribute materiel to meet operational needs commensurate with the Battlegroup role.
Ensure personnel involved in provision of Materiel support possess relevant competencies / qualifications.
Equipment Support
Allocate available spares assets in accordance with the G3 operational and training priorities.
Provide the scaling of spares and the forward repair pool of engines and major assemblies in support of the operational and training priorities.
Monitor, co-ordinate and report spares availability problems and cross servicing with the chain of command.
Manage the local purchase, direct supply or exchange.
Provide specialist advice to the Chain of Command on equipment support material matters.
Plan and co-ordinate the management of materiel in all phases of operations in order to maintain tempo and freedom of action.
Medical
Ensure that the Battlegroup has a dedicated medical officer to provide Primary Health Care in the field.
Deploy its medical facility ready to receive trauma casualties within 20 minutes from fully loaded vehicles.
Have sufficient trained personnel to provide basic treatment for casualties at the point of wounding.
Ensure that all soldiers carry a copy of a medical Battlefield Casualty Aide Memoire.
Have sufficient trained personnel to provide advanced treatment for casualties at the point of wounding.
Ensure a casualty must be seen by a doctor within 1 hour from the time of sustaining the injury.
Ensure that medical teams are able to conduct triage, the evaluation and classification of casualties for purpose of treatment and evacuation.
Ensure that primary surgery can be provided to casualties within 2 hours of injury.
Have sufficient and adapted medical evaluation methods.
Ensure robust supply medical necessities – especially blood and oxygen.

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3. Promulgation:	4. Revision:
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7. Title: GENERIC MISSIONS AND TASKS FOR AN EU BATTLEGROUP	
8. Lead nation: UK	9. Address: WARDEV LWC Warminster BA12 ODJ UK
10. Key words: Activities, Missions, Tasks, Employment, EU BG Concept, Multinationality, Interoperability	
11. Summary: The aim of this study is to inform those States providing elements of the EUBG what Activities, Missions and Tasks the BG might be required to undertake. This will allow them to prepare and train the EUBGs to meet these challenges. It will also ensure that all States have a common understanding of the meaning of these Activities in order that there is coherence across the member States when providing this capability. It also highlights some of the challenges that each State might encounter.	
12. Abstract : (same classification as the study)	
INTEREST / USEFULNESS OF THE STUDY Many of the Finabel States are likely to contribute to implementing the EUBG Concept. This study provides guidelines for the planners in force generation and preparation of the BG, as well as explaining which tasks the BG must be able to undertake at the tactical level.	
MAIN ASPECTS In May 2004, the European Headline Goal was updated by the Headline Goal 2010 stating that autonomous two EU BGs, which would be kept at a high alert state, were to be generated to react to crises through rapid deployment and, if necessary, intervention. Even though the main Activities that the BGs might be expected to undertake were explained the actual Tasks that made up these Activities were not detailed. This was considered to be a gap which Finabel could fill; the study attempts to articulate these Tasks.	

METHODOLOGY

The paper describes the overall Concept, Composition, Activities, Missions and Challenges for the EU Battlegroup before stating the Tasks they must be able to undertake to accomplish such missions. Those Tasks are divided between Operate, Prepare, Project, Command, Inform, Protect and Sustain.

KEY ELEMENTS

The key elements of the initiative are:

- Stand-alone Battlegroup-sized forces (around 1,500 strong, including Combat Support and Combat Service Support) and an associated Force and Operational HQs that will have to operate within a coalition context.
- The force should be on mission within 10 days of an EU decision to launch an operation.
- Sustainable for 30 days (but extendable up to 120 days).
- Deployable over 6000km from Brussels (this is the planning target but not a limitation).
- Two concurrent operations; the deployment phases for each may have to be conducted separately and successively (it is unreasonable to expect the EU to conduct the deployment phase for two Battlegroups simultaneously over extended distances).
- Battlegroups are based on the principle of multinationality, which means that interoperability is key.

ACTIVITIES

The 5 Activities that the BG should be able to undertake are :

- Conflict Prevention.
- Separation of Parties by Force.
- Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice.
- Evacuation.
- Assistance to Humanitarian Operations.

CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The paper considered the following Challenges and Recommendations:

In Theatre Employability

The rapid configuration and integration of different structures and systems is likely to be a considerable challenge.

The employment of the Battlegroups will most likely be in one of three methods:

1. Autonomous Activities

An EU Battlegroup must have the ability to operate autonomously when the security situation allows. Even though it will be capable of undertaking combat operations its size will limit its effectiveness in non-permissive environments.

2. Early Entry Force

The main challenges for an EU Battlegroup acting as an EEF are:

- Strategic Deployability
- Credible Combat Power
- Stand-Alone ISTAR
- Sustainability
- Complex Terrain
- Self-Protection

3. Bridging Force

In some circumstances an EU Battlegroup may, by exception, be used to reinforce troops already on the ground on an EU/UN Mission. But the temptation to use an EU Battlegroup to fill gaps on an enduring operation must be resisted.

DEPLOYING AN EU BATTLEGROUP

There are a number of challenges facing the EU in its ability to meet the criteria it has placed on its Battlegroup concept.

At Distance

To deploy an EU Battlegroup over 6,000km within 10 days might require the lead elements of the force to be deployed by air.

Strategic Deployment

Strategic Deployment challenges require further analysis on how the Air Transport fleet might become more effective and the air/sea mix of strategic lift for the build up of follow-on forces.

Standards And Training

In order for the EU to have confidence in the ability of the Battlegroups there must be clear set of standards against which they can be assessed.

Interoperability

There is a strong possibility that an EU Battlegroup could be employed as an early entry force or alongside already deployed forces. Procedures and equipment need to be in place that will allow the Battlegroup to operate with these other State's forces.

Key challenges are:

- Command And Control
- Concepts And Doctrine
- Logistics
- Training
- Legal / ROEs
- Working With Civilian Agencies

TASKS

The Tasks are divided into a framework of Operate, Prepare, Project, Command, Inform, Protect and Sustain. The paper lists those Tasks that an EUBG should be prepared to undertake. This gives the guidance required to the States providing the troops in order that they can train, equip and prepare the various force elements in a coherent fashion.

2. CONCEIVABLE EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE(S) FOR AN EU BATTLE GROUP (EU BG) AT TACTICAL LEVEL

21. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to contribute to specifying which could be the effects expected from an EU BG in a military land Activity, in which it could take part autonomously, in accordance with the agreed EU BG concept.

22. EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG

221. COMPLEX SCENARIOS

We can consider that EU BG will have to operate in complex scenarios. A scenario is considered complex when there is the possibility of the occurrence of simultaneous operations of different intensity and nature (conventional military operations, operations against asymmetric enemies and humanitarian operations, for example), and when different actors to those habitually involved in a conventional armed conflict intervene or are present (such as international organisations, NGO's, tribal militias, criminal organisations, etc.). Also, the local civilian population will probably have cultural values and standards of living quite different to those of the states that constitute the military force.

In general terms, the following characteristics can be determined about this kind of scenarios:

- There is the presence of other actors actively involved in the resolution of the conflict such as representatives of the UN or other civil administrative organisations, NGO's and armed personnel of security companies, etc., as well as personnel of the international mass media. These actors have different attitudes towards the force, that can range from total acceptance and cooperation to hostility. Also, these actors can have quite distinct objectives leading to rivalry amongst them.
- The majority of the force's objectives are to be found in built-up areas, where civilian populations are located.
- Operations will be executed normally by small units acting independently.
- The values, customs, cultural references and perceptions of the civilian population are very different to those of the Force. Also, the social structure may not be very evolved and other stronger forms of authority exist (tribal, ethnic, religious, etc.) parallel to the established civil administration.
- The opponent/threat is likely to be mixed with the civil population and therefore it is very difficult to identify and also very difficult to detect its activities and support.
- There is a need to co-ordinate the military operations with the action of a civilian administration (local or international).

The Force finds itself restrained by political control from home territory, resulting from the impact public opinion has over the outcome of operations.

222. CORE ACTIVITIES OF THE LAND COMPONENT

Offensive Attack Raid Exploitation Pursuit Feint Demonstration Ambush Breakout	Defensive Defence Delay	Stability Security and Control Support to Security Sector Reform Initial Restoration of Services Interim Governance Tasks
Enabling Reconnaissance Link-Up Retirement Security Relief of Encircled Force March Advance to Contact Relief of Troops in Combat Obstacle Breaching/Crossing Meeting Engagement Withdrawal		

223. EXPECTED STRATEGIC END-STATE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE EU BG

The EU, possibly together with the wider international community, will set the strategic end-state based on political requirements. This will be synthesised at the strategic/operational level to create a Crisis Management Concept (including all levers of national power) to address the crisis or conflict. The military planning will then result in Military Strategic Options which, after political decision, will result in direction to an OHQ to translate it into military strategic planning. This planning is linked to the civilian components, in order to achieve the end-state. At this stage it might decide on the military objectives to be achieved at the tactical level. These military objectives will be able to be achieved for the EU BG being the only force present at the Operations Theatre (stand-alone force) or the EU BG will have assigned partial objectives as an entry force the AOO enabling the rest of the force deployment (follow-on forces).

224. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG

EU BG is dependent on some constraints and limitations:

constraints:

- The core of the EU BG should be made up of about 1500 troops (including Combat Support and Combat Service Support). The FHQ and operational and strategic enablers are not included in these numbers.
- Notice to move (NTM) within 5 - 10 days; the force should have the capability to start implementation of the mission within 10 days of an EU decision to launch an operation.
- Sustainable for 30 days (but extendable up to 120 days).
- Deployable over 6000km from Brussels
- Support by air and naval forces if necessary
- The number of states involved in an EU BG: the concept allows for the establishment of national, bi-national or multinational BG

limitations:

- Technical, tactical, and CSS interoperability
 Constraints in combat power, operational and tactical mobility, AOO size and FP due to its "battalion" size
 a BG must consist of ground forces but does not have to be a joint unit.
- Limitations concerning the use of force e.g. ROE.

225. PRINCIPLES TO THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AN EU BG

Agility	Ability to react to different changes in the situation occurring at the same time (three block war) This involves being broad-minded and developing simple plans with alternative solutions. Maintaining an appropriate reserve is essential for tactical flexibility.
Credibility	Perception of all parties in the crises of the force as being able to deal with the mission. National popular support adds up to the strength and will achieve the mission. Activity of the BG must meet the expectations created by the decision to launch the operation and public information on intent and capabilities, both in the country of employment and throughout the rest of the world.
Legitimacy and Proportionality	The employment of force is based on international agreements, laws and ROE's. Military capabilities should be applied with appropriate precision (Minimum Force Required).
Initiative	Recognising and exploiting unexpected opportunities that arise during operations and contribute to achieving the commander's intent. This principle is emphasized by the fact that most of the actions are to be developed by small units.
Information superiority	Influence the opponent's situational awareness and decision making process and protect one's own.
Mobility	Give priority to mobile combat operations during the deployment into the country of employment and during tactical operations (combining movement and the use of weapons) This principle is emphasised by the fact that a big AOR for the EU BG will be usual.
Security and protection	Of deployed armed forces, international organisations and the country's civilian population
Concentration of Force	Deployment of assets as effectively as possible (concentration of effort, force ratio and echelonment).
Cooperation	Cooperation of EU BG with other armed forces and civil authorities. Basic cooperation aspects are willingness, a common purpose and a clear and previously agreed distribution of responsibilities, as well as understanding others' capacities and limitations.
Objective	An EU BG mission should be aimed at achieving clearly defined, decisive and attainable military objectives (it is important to avoid "mission creep").

23. CHARACTERISTICS

231. STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL MOBILITY

Mobility describes the capability to move forces overland, by sea or by air. It comprises the strategic and operational deployability as well as tactical mobility of forces and assets in the area of operations. Strategic and operational deployability as well as tactical mobility of forces and assets in theatre are indispensable for achieving quick and direct effects during an operation and being able to conduct strategic and operational deployments in the context of force projection. Rapidly deployable and robust forces are required for this purpose.

- Strategic deployability is the prerequisite for fielding, augmenting and supplying forces in distant operational areas. The strategic deployability needed for this purpose requires adequate, timely and securely available air, sea and land transport capacities and procedures. A precondition is deployable forces, ready to deploy. Strategic deployment needs to be planned on a joint and multinational basis, using all modes of transport for expeditionary operations, including civilian resources.
- Operational deployability allows for a fast move across large distances and a shifting of focus as part of a land, air or sea operation. It includes movements in spite of poorly developed infrastructure and even under threat, if applicable.

Tactical mobility by own means is the prerequisite for an effective deployment of forces and constitutes the basis for the conduct of operations. It permits movement by own means within the area of operations even under geographically and climatically difficult circumstances, in an environment with a poor infrastructure, overcoming barriers and obstacles and even under opponent fire and with the required protection of own forces.

232. MULTINATIONALITY

Multinationality is a visible feature of international solidarity and an expression of the will to collaborate for the benefit of shared values. Multinational cooperation may take place in alliances. The broad spectrum of military capabilities required for this purpose can hardly be provided in the face of limited national resources. Complex military operations that have to be sustained for an extended period of time cannot be conducted by one state alone. Multinational cooperation allows a better and more effective use of existing resources. The fact that forces are multinational increases the political and military impact of their action and deprives a potential adversary of the possibility of putting single states under pressure or of isolating them. Multinational cooperation permits resorting to a larger capability profile and thus raises the options for action, increases sustainability and reduces risks. Additionally, it allows for decreasing redundancies by the distribution of tasks, by role specialization, the establishment of pools or the joint operation of facilities.

The disadvantages of multinationality become particularly clear whenever armed forces of an alliance or a coalition do have deficits in terms of interoperability that cannot be reduced. Therefore, interoperability capability is of utmost priority for the composition of multinational contingents.

The defined standards and procedures should be complementary to NATO (NRF) documents, nevertheless taking into account the characteristics of the EU. They must also enable the conduct of a hand-over to follow-on forces under the authority of other organisations, e.g. the UN. This should be expanded to include the obvious logistical problems associated with multinationality as well as issues of training and preparation.

2321. LEVEL OF MULTINATIONALITY OF UNITS

For the core Bn⁷ and all other units below company level multinationality would not be appropriate. For other elements (the FHQ; CS, CSS of the BG and the operational and strategic enablers) a specific level can not be defined as this depends on effectiveness and interoperability.

This statement is based in the fact that at the tactical level actions to be developed by the EU BG need close coordination among all their elements, as well as a common training to attain required efficiency and an excessive multinational organization below the level recommended may be harmful. We consider that the multinationality level could descend to lower echelons only when very specific capabilities are required and their tasks do not involve a high level of collective training (CBRN teams, bridge platoons, signal, MPs, PSYOPS, etc.).

⁷ The EU BG concept speaks about “Infantry Bn”, while in this study the term “core Bn” is used to reflect all options that can be used to form up this capability (mostly combat troops).

2322. NUMBER OF STATES FOR AN EU BG

Theoretically there is no limit on the number of different nationalities that can contribute to a single BG. In multinational operations every state provides forces and capabilities within the scope of its capacities. It must be reviewed whether a BG can be set up mainly consisting of national and/or bi-national elements. Emphasis should be on ensuring a well-balanced combination of multinationality, in the sense of burden-sharing, and military effectiveness, aimed at mission accomplishment. For this purpose, a 2+1 form could be considered, i.e. a bi-national BG and a partner having niche capability. For ease of training and force preparation, however, it is suggested to keep the number as small as possible. For the same reason the core Battalion, should primarily be national or should be at least composed of elements that have an existing relationship of affiliation or cooperation in order to minimize frictions in a situation of hardship.

2323. PROS AND CONS OF NATIONAL / MULTINATIONAL C2

In view of the close interaction between FHQ and the core of the EU BG the highest possible degree of interoperability is required. Therefore, the objective will be to have both elements provided by the same lead state. The lead state should provide for the necessary command and control systems. In this case, the interoperability of the command and control system would be guaranteed.

Multinationality may impact on effective communication and therefore on effective C2.

There are several layers in the chain of command from the FHQ down to the lowest level. When systems are not interoperable the responsibility to provide communication means is one level down. If several layers are provided by different states due to multinationality duplicity of terminals and other communications means would usually be the result, unless a lead state provides the command and control system to more levels down. The latter solution however would involve a previous training period.

Another important point is the fact that if states have contributed to EU BG with some elements, they would usually be required to provide liaison(s) to the FHQ and / or Bn CP. Establishing excessively multinational BGs would lead to oversized command posts and serious delays in the decision-cycle, effects that will obviously have to be avoided.

Considering the above the number of participating states should be limited. A binational BG or the 2 + 1 form mentioned in the previous paragraph provide the most reliable option for effective command and control if resourcing a BG from a single state is not feasible. In such a BG the lead state providing the FHQ should provide the command and control system to the core of the BG (the Infantry Bn) and the CS- and CSS-elements. In view of the close interaction between FHQ and the core Bn the aim should be to have this lead state also be the lead state for the core Bn.

2324. GUIDELINES FOR THE COMPOSITION OF OHQ/FHQ

It is assumed that the OHQ should provide the military-strategic command of the operation, and the FHQ should provide operational command. Clear command and control arrangements are needed to ensure the unified command. It is necessary to clearly establish the authority of the multinational commander over the forces assigned to him by clear command relationships. The establishment of an FHQ in addition to the OHQ ensures a stringent and effective command and control and is therefore an expedient measure. All troop contributing states should be adequately involved in the establishment of the FHQ (mainly) and the OHQ⁸.

In general terms, the OHQ should be to plan and execute the Campaign Plan to achieve the military strategic objectives, including strategic enablers. The FHQ should operate at the operational level organizing and synchronizing the EU BG operations including the operational enablers supporting them. However, the EU BG must observe the conduction of ongoing operations and their effects on the current operations.

The FHQ should adjust to a normal NATO HQ (J1, J2, J3.....) structure, and should have the capability to incorporate functions as: strategic communications, political and legal assessment, liaison capabilities with civil authorities, IO and NGO, INFO OPS, targeting, movement control, air and naval elements according to the enablers assigned, Intelligence feedback, etc.

⁸ The OHQ is manned from a system of augmentees from all MS

233. FLEXIBILITY

The complexity of conflict implies that military plans should be designed for simplicity, so that subordinates can act purposefully in confusing situations; and for flexibility, so that a plan can be adapted to meet changing conditions. Flexibility applies to both individuals and to a land force as a whole. Individual flexibility is largely mental, requiring an enquiring mind and the ability to consider alternatives. Physical flexibility is the ability of a force to move from one activity to another. It should be nurtured through grouping, training, good battle procedure and robust and well-practiced drills. It requires control systems that permit, for example, the swift massing and switching of indirect fire. It relies on fast and effective decision-making, and good staff work.

234. ROBUSTNESS AND SELF RELIANCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT

The EU BG needs personnel that shows initiative, is well trained, efficient, willing to give the best and convinced of their mission. Their qualification, motivation and job satisfaction are key factors for operational readiness. The stress caused by operations require from the soldiers a strong degree of ability to cope with physical and mental pressure. During operations in particular resolute manner assuredness and assertiveness are just as important as ethical responsibility, intercultural sensibility and language skills.

235. ABILITY TO OPERATE IN COMPLEX TERRAIN

Operations will be mostly conducted outside Europe. They can take place in surroundings characterized by unfamiliar environmental conditions, unfamiliar terrain and types of vegetation, climatic conditions, a volatile situation, destroyed infrastructure and often violent confrontation. We therefore need a preparation for the respective operational environments and an extensive support of deployed forces. In many countries the way of life and thinking and the patterns of behavior differ substantially from those of Western states. Ethnic compositions, strong social differences, religious and political convictions and legal interpretations dictate the range of prevailing norms, cultural values, customs and habits. They determine the political, economical, social and military order of the foreign social system. These often complex interrelations complicate relations of friendly forces with the population and the parties to the conflict. A violation of these norms and cultural values, for example, can be understood as an act of disparagement, disdain or discrimination. The suspicion that this act is intended to change the social order might even be regarded as a threat. Both can evoke disapproving or even hostile reactions. Knowing these foreign norms and respecting them - whenever possible and tenable – is therefore an important prerequisite for gaining acceptance and for a successful implementation of measures.

Lessons learned from recent conflicts also prove that operations are increasingly taking place in an urban environment, allowing technologically inferior opponent forces to find cover and be more effective, while operational forces are often subject to constraints out of consideration for the local population. Different types of conurbations must be taken into account. The different types of conurbations range from metropolises with a highly developed networked infrastructure to large, extremely complex ancient town centres or slum areas with a high population density and rudimentary infrastructure. Every conurbation has its specific characteristics which have a very strong impact on the size, composition and capability profile of the forces employed.

24. ANALYSIS OF MISSIONS BY COMBAT FUNCTION

All scenario's with the possible exception of the evacuation operation meet the current trend of dispersed operations (having to cover larger areas with fewer troops) in an ever changing environment (3-blocks war). In conjunction the military is challenged with having to perform 'non-military' stability activities in the initial stages of operations until handover to the appropriate department or agency. As a rapidly deployable force the EU BG will most likely encounter both of these challenges.

In dispersed operations by a BG-sized force the emphasis might be on activities at low level (company, platoon, section). Due to the (potentially) unstable environment these elements will require support to be attached or, as a minimum, pre-arranged: Engineer Search, EOD, fire support, medical etc. All, or at least a substantial number of these elements must also be highly mobile in order to be able to concentrate forces or project back-up forces in time and over longer distances if the situation so requires. Effects are ultimately achieved in the mind. The activities of the BG are perceived by the population and the media. To successfully contribute to the desired end state or situation the activities must meet the expectations of the actors involved. To keep or turn opinions in favour of the BG operation expectations and – where possible – perceptions need to be managed. This requires effective communication, backed up by credible actions.

The Commander of an EU BG should have a tactical reserve. This is an essential part of a tactical lay-out of forces. A reserve is able to intervene in support. The size of a reserve depends on the situation.

241. COMMAND

The command and control structure is a very important factor as most of the scenarios described include civil actors, air and maritime forces resulting in the need for liaison. Furthermore, special advisory bodies (political, cultural, legal, religious, etc.) will be required. For this reason, liaison teams for establishing contacts with civil actors, air and maritime should be part of the FHQ structure with the Command Post (CP). On the other hand the core Bn CP should merely comprise personnel required for the conduct of operations. As it is based on the CP of a battalion, it is designed to plan and conduct military operations at the tactical level, with small entities and being supported by reduced combat-support elements. This implies that this CP should not be oversized.

The possibility to conduct network enabled operations is also to be ensured. For command and control secure data links are of utmost significance. Next to that dispersed operations will increase the demand for (secure) long range communications and for means to communicate with air/maritime assets or special forces at a lower level (platoon).

242. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE


Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of operations. Intelligence is the product of the organized efforts of commanders, staffs and ISTAR collection assets to gather, analyse, and distribute information about the opponent and the operational environment. Information requirements are turned into intelligence through the ISTAR process and the use of ISTAR assets at each level of command. These information requirements are refined into a collection plan. This plan provides the basis for acquiring information, either through the coordinated use of ISTAR assets held at that level of command or from those held at other levels of command. The information received is then collated, evaluated, analysed, integrated and interpreted. The process should be timely and responsive to support decision-making, and flexible enough to support the requirements of the whole force.

Also information gathered by HUMINT is extremely important. All soldiers must be aware of the fact that they can always obtain information while conducting their respective tasks. EW assets have become increasingly important as a means for collecting information. In many potential EU BG scenarios the use of UAVs for intelligence collection purposes will be of great significance.

Finally, the counterintelligence cell becomes very important, since it is responsible for maintaining OPSEC and controlling local interpreters and civil personnel in their service.

243. FIREPOWER / INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Firepower represents more than lethal fires. It is the capability to reach out and affect the behaviour of the various elements and actors by influencing their understanding, will and capability. Therefore firepower ultimately aims at the psychological domain. The purpose of fires is not to simply destroy capabilities through attrition but to undermine will and shatter cohesion in order to affect behaviour. Next to lethal fires influence activities seek to directly shape the understanding, perceptions and ultimately will and behaviour of adversaries and other actors. This is simplistically represented in the figure below.



(1) Fires

Firepower destroys, neutralizes and suppresses. It is essential in defeating an opponent's ability and will to fight and has utility in both decisive and shaping operations. In its broadest sense firepower includes conventional maritime, air- and land-delivered munitions, as well as offensive EW assets. The application of firepower should be judged by the effect required on the opponent, be it neutralization, suppression or destruction. This prompts consideration of the volume, duration and lethality of fire, and the precision and range of the munitions. The appropriate mix of weapons systems can then be chosen to achieve the desired effect. A combination of systems should be used to deliver firepower, thus complicating the opponent's response. Airborne fire support must be available as field artillery may not always be available or within range. Because airborne fire support can not always be delivered immediately the infantry companies – preferably every platoon - should have integrated fire support assets (e.g. mortars) Related to close air support, it's important that the EU BG has to be provided with enough forward air controller (FAC) teams in order to have this capability at least at the Coy or Platoon level depending on the situation taking into account that sometimes these human resources could be critical.

(2) Influence Activities

To keep or turn opinions in favour of the BG operation expectations and – where possible – perceptions need to be managed. Influence activities have many shapes and forms as they need to be tailored to the target to be effective. But communication is crucial to all of them. Though our messages are sent in many ways, physical capabilities for effective communication are PSYOPS, CIMIC and Press & Information (PI).

Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of intelligence, resources such as linguistic support, graphics and print capability, broadcasting capability and other delivery mechanisms. Message presentation methods include print, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face contact, the Internet, faxes, pagers and mobile telephones. Beside the employment of own assets local media services may be contracted.

EU BG will require a CIMIC unit that might be composed of a coordination centre and different CIMIC teams. Depending on the scenarios and missions, this unit will require specialised personnel for different areas of reconstruction. The tasks of this CIMIC unit will include liaison between military and civil agencies (to include IO/NGO etc.), support of the civilian population and civil support of armed forces.

Although PI is primarily focused on the need to inform and educate audiences which results in maintaining EU public support and hence freedom of action, its impact is much wider. It is therefore essential that PI staff and INFO OPS staff work closely together to ensure that a coordinated message is delivered to the intended audiences.

244. MANOEUVRE

As it applies to firepower, manoeuvre must not only be considered in terms of physical activities with combat forces but also in terms of influence activities. As such manoeuvre is not only focused at the opponent but at various elements and actors.

When it comes to physical combat offensive activities may be directed against the front, flank or rear of the opponent and may be conducted from the land, air or sea. Any combination of these is possible. Normally the point of main effort is placed where the opponent is weakest or where the terrain offers possibilities of breaking deep into his defensive area. This is done through the manoeuvre of forces. Manoeuvre is defined as: employment of forces on the field through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the opponent in order to accomplish the mission (AAP 6). This firepower may be direct fire, indirect fire support or a combination of the two. It is the means of concentrating land forces at the decisive point to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt opponent cohesion through surprise, psychological momentum and dominance. Manoeuvre will be planned with fire support as an integral component at all tactical levels. Surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (STAR) sensors should be arrayed and tasked so as to allow maximum manoeuvre out of contact.

Depending on the environment and the scenario EU BG should have helicopters for facilitating manoeuvre. These helicopters will provide EU BG with tactical mobility, as well as with QRF reaction time, and can be employed for reconnaissance and transport tasks.

In addition, the employment of Special Forces (enablers) might be necessary. Also, these units could be employed for obtaining information and military assistance.

245. PROTECTION

Protection covers the conceptual, mental and physical component of fighting power. It aims at reducing the chance and the effect of all possible threats to force effectiveness. It is first of all a mindset and achieved in the plan through the coordination of the six other combat functions. It results in procedural, physical and non-physical measures. However, specific (physical) measures may be taken with the primary aim of protecting fighting power. The measures include: mobility and counter-mobility; survivability measures; counter battery and air defence; CBRN defence; and, tactical security.

- EU BG engineer units should be able to perform reconnaissance and route clearance tasks. They will need an EOD unit capable of neutralising any type of ammunition and IED. As far as counter-mobility is concerned they require assets for creating obstacles such as perimeter defences, checkpoints, roadblocks etc. Depending on the scenario there may also be a requirement for specific military capabilities such as demolitions.
- To increase survivability the EU BG should have the capability to create field fortifications and shelter. The most effective means to reduce the number of potential casualties in cases of attacks with mortars, rockets and other aerial delivered weapons is timely detection and warning. Such a capability requires radar or a weapon locating system linked – physically or procedurally – with an alarm system. These are usually part of integrated air defence or counter battery systems. Whether these systems have to be deployed in full depends on the scenario.
- The risk of the continued existence, and even proliferation, of CBRN weapons, particularly amongst unconventional adversaries, and the chances of encountering toxic industrial hazards in underdeveloped regions during operations, requires that the EU BG should have capabilities for detection, identification and warning, physical protection and medical countermeasures.
- Security comprises personnel security, physical security, operational security and information security. Especially security of the Lines of Communication and installations may absorb quite a lot of combat power. Therefore all soldiers of the BG are to be trained as riflemen and the operational and strategic enablers must have integrated support (including guard details) so they don't have to draw from the BGs scarce resources.

In scenarios with an asymmetrical threat, force protection becomes very important since the opponent will try to cause casualties among our forces in order to influence the public opinion.

246. CSS

The mission of logistics is to ensure materiel readiness. The most important task of logistics is the timely provision of capabilities and logistic assets and of the required type, quantity and quality of supplies, in accordance with the operational and tactical demands, at the place required by the user with as little effort as possible. Consequently, it contributes to the sustainability and mobility of the armed forces. This mission is valid for the entire task spectrum of an EU BG. Tasks are performed on a mission-oriented and resource-optimised basis as part of close interaction between Army, Navy and Air Force.

The assignment of means of transport will depend on the resources assigned in the area, although mission particularities must be considered such as humanitarian aid.

Finally, relating to medical assistance their efficiency will be measured by their capacity to stabilize casualties and develop rapid evacuation.

In the case of a multinational EU BG, the needed previous agreements should be encouraged to attain logistic principles of authority, clarity, economy, simplicity, continuity, opportunity and flexibility. Also, these agreements should establish the lead/specialised state at all suitable logistic functions. Besides, depending on the mission and the operational environment, potential HNS should be taken into account.

Logistics is complemented by Host Nation Support, if possible. During planning, the most appropriate stock level for every type of resource and for the different logistic units should be determined for the different phases of operation.

The combat service support of an EU BG should be rendered by the lead state responsible for the logistical infrastructure. Upon request by the lead state, the states participating in the BG provide personnel/materiel.

247. OTHER CAPABILITIES

It is not necessary that specific units in the EU BG should be dedicated to crowd control tasks, although at least some units of the EU BG should be highly trained for this commitment. For this aim, when necessary, units designated will reorganize ad hoc and will be provided with appropriate assets and material for the execution of this task.

Special support applying the reach-back principle can increase planning depth and production output.

25. INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability is the ability of systems, equipment or procedures to operate in synergy, also the ability to exchange information between information systems. Interoperability comprises equipment, systems, procedures as well as organisation. It is aimed at ensuring the joint accomplishment of the mission. Interoperability is achieved, among other things, by standardising structures, policy, procedures and materiel. The disadvantages of multinationality become particularly clear whenever armed forces of an alliance or a coalition do have deficits in terms of interoperability that cannot be reduced.

Therefore, interoperability capability is of utmost priority for the composition of multinational contingents. Especially in terms of technology interoperability is of paramount importance. As far as EU BGs are concerned, all doctrine and training should be NATO standardised to ensure the necessary cohesion. Other standardisation procedures for achieving best interoperability may be:

- The EUMS should provide assistive guidelines available to the states. These guidelines should include aspects about training.
- Enhancing the contacts with NATO.
- Refinement of doctrine studies by bilateral or trilateral working groups proposing solutions to other EU members.
- The valid standards for training and set up of an NRF should be synchronised with EU BG standards and be further developed.

Detailed military standards and criteria for BGs and associated capabilities need to be developed.

251. INTEGRATION OF AIR UNITS, MARITIME UNITS OR CIVIL ORGANISATIONS IN THE BG
 It is likely that maritime and air forces have to support ground forces for strategic and/or operational deployments. Therefore, at military-strategic and operational level, a joint approach seems appropriate and respective cells/liaison elements should be established in the FHQ. Obtaining Host Nation Support (HNS) is to be aimed at. Additionally, operations should constantly be supported by personnel from the civilian organisational areas and by civilian organisations. This may be achieved by the integration and/or exchange of liaison elements.

Maritime and Air will provide the Land Component with the biggest force multiplier. The use of air delivered weapon systems, use of maritime logistics all mean that they are an essential part of our inventory at the tactical level. At the least we need adequate liaison structures. At best we need in the FHQ an Air Support Operations Cell (ASOC) e.g. to control the ASM of the Air, Maritime Air Operations Teams (MAOT) to control the movement of maritime support helicopters, specialised planners for air and maritime (amphibious) forces.

252. POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE TRAINING STANDARDS

Manpower, equipment and organization are converted into deployable capability by training. Initial training forms a baseline capability and generates common understanding. Collective training forms trained individuals into cohesive formations and units, and greater individual experience. As combat is complex, so are the skills required to conduct it. Such skills fade over time, both for individuals and units. Training should therefore be individual and collective, progressive and conducted in an appropriate frequency.

EU BG forces should be composed, trained and prepared under national responsibility. Requirements concerning capability profile and level of training should correspond as much as possible to NRF requirements and could be prepared and issued by the EUMS. Certification will remain a national responsibility of the respective troop contributing states. The certification standards should be recommended by the EUMS and developed in cooperation with the member states. EUMS could monitor the certification and provide guidance to national units in command and control and training matters. The only way to achieve common standards of training are to have them clearly defined (a common training syllabus) and assessed (through some sort of certification).

For example training could be delivered in different forms with a variety of methodologies and be divided in the following categories:

- CPX OHQ-FHQ
- CPX FHQ –BG- “ENABLERS”
- DEPEX FHQ-BG
- LIVEX FHQ-BG-“ENABLERS”
- Seminars and lectures.
- Coaching.
- Project Groups.
- Simulation training.
- Workshops.
- Internet-based Distance Learning (IDL)
- “On the job” training

Training should be aimed at accomplishing the different missions assigned to the EUBG. One of the missions selected for training exercises should be a demanding one, since if an EU BG is trained for the most demanding mission, it will be able to adapt to less demanding ones.

26. RECOMMENDATIONS

To summarize this study, we consider giving the following recommendations:

- As determined by the EU Battle Group Concept with a strong focus on the core Bn, EU BGs must be capable of covering the entire range of tasks they can be assigned. It will not be possible to specialise a BG to fulfil only specific tasks. For this reason, the most realistic and pragmatic solution is constitute EU BG with medium capabilities allowing it to face any scenarios included in Headline Goal 2010 and European Security Strategy. This involves that they have to be designed considering a medium effort for the most demanding scenario, with adequate flexibility to assign or reduce assets suitable for the mission to accomplish.
 - Due to the size of an EU BG, the mission given must be aimed at achieving a clearly defined, decisive and attainable military objective. We have to be aware of the fact that an EU BG deployed as a stand-alone force in a scenario where the violence is wide spread has not the capabilities to achieve the effects desired.
 - In general terms, multinationality level should be fixed at Battalion level for the core Bn and at Coy level for CS/CSS. Multinationality at lower levels should only be considered when very specific capabilities are required and their tasks do not involve a high level of collective training.
 - It is necessary to clearly establish the responsibilities among the different levels of Command (OHQ, FHQ and HQ BG) in order to avoid interferences among them.
 - Related to the capabilities of the EU BG, we remark the following points:
 - * It is important not to oversize the CP of the EU BG and it is desirable that EU BG and FHQ are provided by the same lead state.
 - * EU BG needs high tactical mobility in order to facilitate the manoeuvre. Helicopters are desirable, especially for short reaction times in an extended AOR.
 - * Related to intelligence, all soldiers must be aware of the fact that they can always obtain information while conducting their respective tasks. Besides, it is necessary that in certain scenarios, specific assets such as UAVs and EW are available.
 - * Special support applying the reach-back principle increases intelligence and PSYOPS capabilities.
 - * Fire support should have the capability of employing smart and high-precision ammunitions with the aim of reducing collateral damage.
 - * In scenarios with an asymmetrical threat, force protection is a key capability. For this reason, C-IED assets and protection against RAM (rockets, artillery and mortars) are essential.
 - * EU BG Engineer units should have capacity to support mobility on LOC. Thus, they will develop reconnaissance and route clearance tasks, identifying alternative transit routes and clearing them.
 - * EU BG will require a CIMIC unit capable of carrying out “quick impact projects”.
 - * EU BG has to be able to deal with crowd control tasks.
 - * The EU BG force package must be capable of planning and delivering Influence Activities in support of campaign mission objectives.
 - Training becomes a key element to achieve the cohesion desired among the different units of the EU BG and to work properly between the different levels of command. Related to this aspect, we consider the following points:
 - * Doctrine and training should follow NATO standards and EUMS could make guidelines available to the states.
 - * The training should include CPX and LIVEX.
 - * Training should foster initiative of commands at the lowest levels.
 - * Training should increase the individual flexibility and the flexibility of the land force as a whole.
- Training must include instructions on the ROEs and on the cultural awareness aspects. EU BG has to be familiar with the complex interrelations of the society located in the area of operations as well as the international laws.

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3. Promulgation:	4. Revision:
4. Number of pages: 13(with annexes)	5. Classification Unclass
6. Title: Conceivable employment doctrine(s) for an EU Battle Group (EU BG) at tactical level	
7. Lead nation: GERMANY	8. Address: German Army Training, Doctrine and Army Development Command Brühlerstraße 300 50968 KÖLN GERMANY
9. Key words: Missions, Tasks, Employment, EU BG , Characteristics, Combat functions, EU BG Concept, Multinationality, Interoperability	
10. Summary: Finabel studies cover a large spectrum of land operations issues. A common understanding of some principles can be useful to Finabel member states and to the works of EUMS planners. The aim of this study is to inform the EUMS planners, at strategic level, about the real capabilities, courses of action, and limitations of the EU BG at land level. It could also give useful information to the Finabel and EU national planners, who are in charge of setting up, training and certifying the EU BG made available within the framework of military missions of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).	
12. Abstract : (same classification as the study) a. Interest / usefulness of the study All Finabel states are likely to contribute with military forces to implement the EU BG Concept. This study could provide some guidelines for the planners in the force generation and preparation process, as well as possible employment of the EU BG at land and tactical level. b. Main aspects In May 2004, the European Headline Goal was updated by the Headline Goal 2010 and small, autonomous EU Battle Groups (EU BG) with a high alert state were established to react to crises and conflicts at an early stage. The contents of this study deals with the following aspects: missions and tasks, employment, characteristics, combat functions and interoperability.	

c. Main conclusions

EU BGs must be capable of covering the entire range of tasks that can be assigned and therefore their specialisation to fulfil only specific tasks is not desirable. For this reason, the most realistic and pragmatic solution is to constitute EU BGs with medium capabilities allowing them to face any scenarios included in Headline Goal 2010. This involves that they have to be designed considering a medium effort for the most demanding scenario, with adequate flexibility to assign or reduce assets suitable for the mission to be accomplished.

d. Main recommendations

In the conclusion, the study lists the main recommendations which are related to the level of multinationality, the capabilities required by the EU BG and training, among others.

The following recommendations are given:

- Due to the size of an EU BG, the mission given must be aimed at achieving a clearly defined, decisive and attainable military objective. We have to be aware of the fact that an EU BG deployed as a stand-alone force in a scenario where the violence is wide spread has not the capabilities to achieve the effects desired.
- In general terms, multinationality level should be fixed at Battalion level for the core Bn and at Coy level for CS/CSS. Multinationality at lower levels should only be considered when very specific capabilities are required and their tasks do not involve a high level of collective training.
- It is necessary to clearly establish the responsibilities among the different levels of Command (OHQ, FHQ and HQ BG) in order to avoid interferences among them.
- Related to the capabilities of the EU BG, we remark the following points:
 - * It is important not to oversize the CP of the EU BG and it is desirable that EU BG and FHQ are provided by the same lead state.
 - * EU BG needs high tactical mobility in order to facilitate the manoeuvre. Helicopters are desirable, especially for short reaction times in an extended AOR.
 - * Related to intelligence, all soldiers must be aware of the fact that they can always obtain information while conducting their respective tasks. Besides, it is necessary that in certain scenarios, specific assets such as UAVs and EW are available.
 - * Special support applying the reach-back principle increases intelligence and PSYOPS capabilities.
 - * Fire support should have the capability of employing smart and high-precision ammunitions with the aim of reducing collateral damage.
 - * In scenarios with an asymmetrical threat, force protection is a key capability. For this reason, C-IED assets and protection against RAM (rockets, artillery and mortars) are essential.
 - * EU BG Engineer units should have capacity to support mobility on LOC. Thus, they will develop reconnaissance and route clearance tasks, identifying alternative transit routes and clearing them.
 - * EU BG will require a CIMIC unit capable of carrying out "quick impact projects".
 - * EU BG has to be able to deal with crowd control tasks.
 - * The EU BG force package must be capable of planning and delivering Influence Activities in support of campaign mission objectives.
- Training becomes a key element to achieve the cohesion desired among the different units of the EU BG and to work properly between the different levels of command.

ANNEX : ABBREVIATIONS

A	
AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AOO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
ASM	Airspace Management
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
B	
BG	Battle Group
Bn	Battailon
C	
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCIR	Commander's critical information requirements
CID	Combat Identity
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
COA	Course of Action
CP	Conflict Prevention Command Post
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CS	Combat Support
CSC	Commercial sport charter
CSS	Combat Service Support
C ²	Command and Control
D	
DEPEX	Deployment Exercise
E	
EEF	Early Entry Force
e.g.	for example (exempli gratia)
EP	Entitled Personnel
EO	Evacuation Operation
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP	Entitled Personnel
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
etc	et cetera
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Military Staff
EW	Electronic Warfare
F	
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FP	Force Planning

H	
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HNS	Host Nation Support
HLG	Headline Goal
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I	
IDL	Internet-based Distance Learning
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IM	Information Management
INFO OPS	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation
IPB	Information Preparation of the Battlefield
ISTAR	Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
J	
J1 - J9	Staff Department 1 – 9
JOA	Joint Operations Area
L	
LIVEX	Live Exercise
LOC	Line of Communication
M	
MAOT	Maritime Air Operations Team
MHE	Material Handling Equipment
MILO	Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MS	Member States
N	
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
NTM	Notice to Move
O	
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPSEC	Operations Security
OTF HQ	Operation Task Force Headquarter
P	
PI	Press and Information
PSYOPS	Psychological Operation(s)
Q	
QRF	Quick Reaction Force

R

RAM Rockets, Artillery, Mortars
ROE Rules of Engagement

S

SOI Standard Operating Instruction
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SOPF Separation of Parties by Force
SPOD Seaport of Debarkation
SR Stabilisation, Reconstruction
STAR Surveillance, Target acquisition and Reconnaissance

U

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN United States