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(signed) Colonel NOËL J.
Head of Finabel
Permanent Secretariat

Promulgation of report Finabel Nr C.35.R

**COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) IN THE FIELD OF
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS : ANALYSIS OF
MULTINATIONAL COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY WITH
RESPECT TO NATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.**

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1. <u>References</u> : Working Group CHARLIE Meeting - Minutes FIN/SEC/27.101C dated 16 November 2005	2. <u>Other references</u> : - AJP 4 (B) - AJP 4.6 (A) - NATO Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations (MC 0526). - EU Battlegroups Concept (10501/04 dated 14 Jun 04. - EU Battlegroups Logistic Concept dated 13 Jun 05. - FINABEL C.33.R
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11. <u>Summary</u> : - There is a trend towards MN operations which, from a logistics perspective, can help to optimise the use of limited national resources and maximise the logistic capability available to the force as a whole. Reliance on add-hoc solutions is unlikely to deliver the effectiveness and efficiency sought and this suggests a need to develop suitable cooperative systems; specifically Logistic C2. Nations bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring appropriate provision of logistic support to their forces but duplication of logistic functions should however be avoided and economies of scale realised at every opportunity. Fundamentally, in a MN operational context, logistic cooperation is dependant upon having appropriate and effective logistic C2 in place.	

- Coalitions must operate under the principle of 'unity of effort' as a minimum and aspire to 'unity of command'.
- Key logistic C2 principles and considerations include: responsibility, which falls jointly to contributing nations and the Joint Force Commander; provision of support (maintaining cross-use and cross-service goods and services at the theatre level); authority; and the importance of early planning.
- Potential Logistic Support options range from totally integrated MN logistic forces to purely national support. Four models are available for executing cooperative logistics within a coalition framework: National Responsibility; Logistic Lead Nation; Logistic Role Specialisation; and MN Integrated Logistic Support.
- In command terms, coalition commanders should have the same measure of control over logistics in the AO as over **combat forces**, normally OPCON, but where national imperatives or legal restrictions prevent force capabilities being placed OPCON to the force commander then LOGCON is the minimum C2 authority.
- Logistic C2 solutions will be operation specific but as a general principle Logistic C2 elements fall into one of two categories: those charged with strategic and operational planning & policy; and those responsible for the execution of force logistic planning and policy direction. The relationship between these elements will be key and the exact structure will be dependant upon the type of operation to be supported, the scale of effort and the relative complexity of logistic and operational activity.

1. GENERAL

1.1. Issue.

Command and Control (C2) in the field of multinational logistics: an analysis of multinational commander's authority with respect to national and multinational logistic functions and responsibilities.

1.2. Background

1.2.1. For the future, military operations are likely to be conducted in the face of increasingly complex interconnected threats and challenges. Complexity includes the potential need to conduct cross-spectrum operations simultaneously across the Area of Operations (AO) – that is whilst some force elements are engaged in **warfighting**, other may be involved in stability operations and/or humanitarian relief. Whilst the risk of large scale conflict against conventional adversaries has reduced, it has been replaced by increasing turbulence worldwide with persistent low-intensity threats. The trend is towards coalition intervention operations conducted within an increasingly Joint, Interagency and Multinational (JIM) framework and prosecuted by forces which are agile and **expeditionary** in nature. **Importantly, future coalition operations are highly unlikely to be conducted as single component activities.**

1.2.2. The primary reason why nations enter into a coalition is for mutual advantage and shared interest in pursuit of common political objectives and military unity of purpose. From a logistics perspective, coalition cooperation on operations can help to optimise the use of limited national resources and maximise the logistic capability available to the force as a whole.

1.2.3. Every coalition is different and the logistic demands will differ according to the specific requirements of each operation and the composition of nations involved. Continued reliance on ad hoc multinational C2 solutions is, however, unlikely to deliver the efficiency and effectiveness sought by nations. This suggests a need to examine future multinational logistic solutions and begin the process of designing and developing suitable cooperative and integrated logistic systems; specifically Logistic C2 - including organisational structures, responsibilities, interfaces and procedures - in order to promote successful coalition operations.

1.3. Aim

The aim of this paper is to define, within the framework of a Finabel-led multinational operation, possible organisational solutions for providing logistic support to a multinational force deployed on contingency operations, with particular focus on :

1.3.1. The authority assigned to Commanders in the logistic sector ;

- 1.3.2. The organisation of the Logistic C2 Cells and their links and relations with national and multinational logistic units.
- 1.3.3. The link between the Logistic C2 Cells and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs).

1.4. Linkages

- 1.4.1. In establishing logistic operating principles and developing logistic C2 policy and concepts for use on Finabel coalition operations, due account should be taken of approaches, concepts, procedures, doctrine and standardisation agreements developed for use elsewhere. In particular those developed under the aegis of NATO and the EU should be exploited - specifically work currently in hand to develop the Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations, and also the development of the European Union Battlegroups (EUBGs) Concept and associated EUBGs Logistic Concept.
- 1.4.2. It is emphasised that the ongoing development of both the Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations and the EUBGs Logistic Concept are especially relevant to this Study; in terms of 'scale', the EUBGs Logistic Concept is perhaps especially relevant to likely FINABEL-led coalition operations. Both concepts continue to evolve; experience and understanding gained in their development should inform the development of Logistic Concepts to support Finabel-led operational deployments.
- 1.4.3. This is not to suggest that NATO and/or EU based solutions would be appropriate for application within a Finabel-led coalition framework for every eventuality; merely that where relevant, applicable and acceptable (to FINABEL nations), previously agreed NATO and/or EU approaches and procedures should be exploited and/or used as the basis for further development within the FINABEL context.
- 1.4.4. Finally, this Study should be considered in conjunction with Finabel Working Group CHARLIE studies C.33.R and the developing C.36.R.

1.5. Scope

The size of any future Finabel-led operation will be determined by the nature of the task to be undertaken, the environment in which the operation is to be undertaken, and the willingness of nations to participate in the operation and contribute force elements. Contingencies range from small scale (at Battle Group +), through medium scale (brigade level operations) to large scale operations (divisional level +). Accepting that scales of effort may vary and will be operation specific, in examining Logistic C2 this paper seeks to consider broad Logistic C2 principles which are applicable to all operational activity and which may then be scalable to the demands of specific operations.

For example, the need to undertake the discrete functions of logistic ‘planning’ and logistic ‘execution’ is the same for all operations, but specific organisational solutions will be scaled according to the needs of the particular operation.

2. THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENT

2.1. The Support Framework.

2.1.1. In the layout of the battle-space, there must be a clear understanding among nations that national logistic organisations exist in a multinational framework in support of combined operations. Flexibility within the support framework is required as there are no standing multinational forces, units or headquarters¹ within the FINABEL construct, and logistic support will be based first and foremost on national provisions and may include degrees of multinational support as agreed by those nations where it makes sense and is feasible to do so.

2.1.2. Key elements operating within the logistic support framework may include some or all of the following :

- The Civil Economy and Infrastructure:

- * Contractors ;
- * Host Nation Support ;
- * In-Country Resources ;
- * Local Labour.

- Military Forces

* National Elements ;

- National Command Elements ;
- National Support Elements (NSE) ;
- Formations and Units.

* Combined or Multinational Elements

- Coalition HQ ;
- Rear Support Command (RSC) ;
- Theatre Support Command (TSC) ;
- Land Component Command ;
- Units and Operational/Tactical Formations (eg Brigades, Divisions).

¹ The issue of a permanent logistic headquarters has been discussed by FINABEL Working Group CHARLIE and the clear consensus is that there is no requirement for a standing headquarters and that national capability provided by TCNs should be used as the core capability of any MN logistic structure.

* Bases and infrastructure

- Other Government Departments (OGDs), Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (eg aid agencies etc) and International Organisations (IOs).

2.1.3. Although nations would bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the appropriate provision of logistic support for their forces allocated to coalition operations conducted within a FINABEL framework, duplication of logistic functions should however be avoided wherever possible and economies of scale realised at every opportunity. Cooperative arrangements and mutual assistance among nations in the provision and use of logistic resources should ease the operational and financial burden on individual nations. Fundamentally, in a multinational operational context, logistic cooperation is dependant upon having appropriate and effective logistic C2 arrangements in place.

2.2. Log C2 Benefits

2.2.1. Within the broad goal of improved cooperation and coherent logistic C2 across all national force elements, a coalition can potentially gain significant benefits within the theatre of operations at the operational level; these benefits include :

- Reduced logistic footprint – without loss in effectiveness for either individual nations or the force as a whole ;
- Reduced costs to all contributors ;
- Optimisation/best use of resources - national, host nation and local ;
- De-confliction in time and space ;
- Improved flexibility ;
- Coherent deployment, reception, staging and onward movement of force elements, and ;
- Better plans and reduced time constraints.

2.3. Unity of Effort

2.3.1. To provide the necessary logistic support to a broad range of Military Tasks across the spectrum of conflict in the current and future operating space, support elements must be usable, available and: as cohesive, flexible and agile as the force itself. To achieve this versatility and agility, coalitions must operate under the principle (as a minimum) of ‘unity of effort.’ All nations must work together to identify requirements, prioritise them, and share capacity to provide the most effective and efficient support possible. This requires coordination not only between contributing nations, but also with the Host Nation (HN) and civilian agencies in the Area of Operations (AO). Executing coalition logistics should be a collective responsibility of the coalition force as a whole.

- 2.3.2. Beyond ‘unity of effort’, coalition logistics should also aspire (as far as possible and appropriate to the operational situation and national considerations) to ‘unity of command’ by reducing national or component support stovepipes and increasing multinational Joint logistics cooperation. Commanders should seek to handle logistics on a coalition basis, with as much centralised control over logistics as interoperability and national command considerations permit – and as far as is ‘operationally desirable’. Creating a single coalition logistic command provides economy of scale and system efficiency. Even if coalition participants, for national command reasons, insist on maintaining a national logistic structure, assigning a lead for logistic responsibility precludes duplication of effort. As coalition commanders assume more responsibility for theatre-level logistics, including greater reliance on multinational solutions, there should be a corresponding reduction in the size of NSEs.
- 2.3.3. Importantly, multinational solutions can optimise the in-theatre logistic effort and encourage nations to reduce NSEs to conduct only those support functions that cannot be provided multinationally. Truly Joint and combined theatre logistics can increase efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness by avoiding competition between components and/or between contributing nations. Such arrangements allow commanders to prioritise and allocate possibly scarce resources where necessary to achieve the required operational effect. In order for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to optimise the logistic effort, the force will require integrated logistics with a C2 structure that can properly plan and coordinate theatre sustainability, as well as maintain visibility of assets.

3. LOGISTIC SUPPORT PRINCIPLES AND OPTIONS

3.1. Principles & Considerations

Nations and appointed coalition commanders are collectively responsible for logistic support and designing the coalition logistic framework that will deliver that support. In choosing an “operation specific” support solution there are a number of principles and key considerations which must be taken into account.

3.1.1. Primacy of Operations

Logistic support must be focussed towards ensuring the success of the operation, as described by the JFC. Logistics must function as an effective force multiplier, and should be seamlessly integrated into the operational structure.

3.1.2. Responsibility

3.1.2.1. General

Logistic support of FINABEL multinational operations should be the collective responsibility of contributing nations and the coalition commander. Nations must ensure, individually or by cooperative arrangements, the provision of logistic resources to support their forces allocated to coalition operations - each nation therefore bears ultimate responsibility for the logistic support of its forces allocated to FINABEL. Nations retain control over their resources, until such time as they are released to the JFC and to the extent of the authority granted to the coalition commander.

3.1.2.2. Common User Goods and Services

In the interests of efficiency, responsibility for, and provision of, common-user and cross-service goods and services should be conducted at the theatre level wherever possible. Any list will inevitably be incomplete and is likely to vary based on location, nations and services involved etc; but some of the potential candidates for theatre-level multinational logistic solutions are :

- Reception, Staging and Onward Movement activities
- Host Nation Support coordination and prioritisation
- Water and fresh rations provision
- Vehicle recovery
- Combined Joint Movement Control Units
- Intra-theatre Transportation
- Supply distribution
- Class V storage
- Fuel storage and distribution
- Contracting
- Medical (including Medical Evacuation [MEDEVAC])
- Camp Construction, Maintenance and Management
- Cargo Transfer

Nations, then, need only provide through the NSE those functions not carried out at the theatre level. Redundancy and competition for scarce resources will then be reduced.²

² Possible Multinational cooperation and specialisation considered in detail in FINABEL Studies C.33.R and C.34.R

3.1.2.3. Unit and Formation Level Logistics.³

The provision of Unit and Formation level logistic support for national combat formations is usually a national responsibility given the nature of that support is too critical and potentially dangerous to be relegated to a multinational support organisation or another nation. However, in certain cases, exceptions to this principle are possible depending largely on: the type and intensity of operational activity being undertaken; the level of multinational collective training carried out in the preparation phase of the coalition operation; and the level of interoperability between nations.⁴

3.1.2.4. Force Level Logistics.⁵

Multinational logistics work best at the force/theatre level which generally does not deliver critical or immediate battle support and conducts activity in generally more secure areas.

3.1.3. Authority

3.1.3.1. General

C2 arrangements should be developed for each operation and, in general, coalition commanders should have the same measure of control over logistic units in the AO as over combat forces. Within the developed logistic support framework, the JFC must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to enable him to employ and sustain forces in the most effective manner (authority must be aligned with responsibility) – maintaining unity of effort and, where possible, unity of command.

3.1.3.2. Transfer of Authority (TOA)

On Transfer of Authority (TOA) nations might be expected to limit the extent to which they are prepared to authorise the coalition commander to control national resources, due to either national imperatives or legal restrictions. In some cases the coalition force might exercise control over national logistic units whilst in other cases it might only act as the coordinating authority. The extent to which nations limit (perhaps by time) this authority will depend on national considerations and the type of operation.

³ Unit and Formation level logistics are analogous with 1st and 2nd line logistics nomenclature.

⁴ Three progressive level of interoperability might be considered: deconfliction, interoperate and integration. Theoretically 1st and 2nd Line Logistics might be possible for fully integrated units.

⁵ Force level logistics is analogous with 3rd line logistics nomenclature.

Nations may agree to a graduated TOA, ensuring that the JFC is assigned LOGCON early in the operation – to include control of the RSOM process, intra-theatre movements of the NSEs, and prioritisation of units designated to receive support from its respective NSE.

Unless specifically granted in the TOA agreement, the JFC will not, as a matter of routine, have control over nationally owned resources held by NSEs. TOA back to nations would normally be anticipated at the end of redeployment, unless otherwise agreed by the nations concerned. To effect unity of effort and/or control, the JFC may, aside from his Chief J4 (CJ4), establish a multinational logistic coordination and control centre headed by a senior logistic coordinator or commander to coordinate common logistic support within the AO.

3.1.4. Missions & Tasks

Logistic forces should be assigned coalition missions and task consistent with national policies.

3.1.5. Planning

Early in the planning process the coalition needs to establish a logistic planning group to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between coalition forces while designing the logistic support organisation/framework for the coalition and defining the command and support relationships. As no standing Headquarters, formations or units support FINABEL, an “Enabling” Logistic C2 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should be developed to help shape and guide early contingency planning in the event of a FINABEL-led coalition operation being mounted. In time, the development of Generic Operational Plans (including generic pre-arrangements for cooperative and multinational logistic support) might be considered.

3.1.6. Cooperation, Coordination and Synergy

Cooperation, coordination and synergy are fundamental to effective logistic support both among individual nations and within coalition frameworks and appropriate procedures must be in place to deliver operational effect. Cooperation at all levels helps ensure economy of effort, increased reserve capacity/capability and improved overall quality of support - but cooperation must be co-ordinated to be effective. The effectiveness of the relationship between multinational headquarters and individual Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), and their respective force elements, is key, requiring a near ‘real-time’ coordination capability. From a logistics perspective the C2 relationship between the NSEs and the MN Logistic Command structure is key. Recognising that C2 arrangements will vary between operations, the consensus of FINABEL WG CHARLIE is that this C2 relationship must at least confer the authority to coordinate logistic activity within the AO.

3.1.7. Balance

The coordination of the logistic effort must be balanced with the ultimate responsibility for provisioning of forces remaining with the individual TCNs.

3.1.8. Transparency and Visibility

Prior to, and during an operation, the JFC must have access to information which relates to the preparedness, deployability, status and sustainability of units that will come under command. This requirement will extend to national logistic assets when they are designated to provide logistic support to declared units. To be effective, the commander must develop a clear and accurate Common Operating Picture (COP) of available infrastructure and capability – in this way clear operational priorities can be both established and directed. Once logistic planning begins and the logistic C2 structure supporting an operation is developed then an Information Exchange Requirement (IER) will need to be developed to ensure the generation of an appropriate COP to inform decision making.

3.2. Logistic Support Options

Logistic support options for coalition operations might range from a totally integrated multinational logistic force to purely national support. Normally, however, a force might expect to be supported through a combination of the various options available.

3.2.1. Models

For the purposes of this analysis 4 models or methods for executing cooperative logistics within a coalition framework could be considered – these might be used either independently or concurrently. Regardless of the method employed, it is imperative that national decisions and commitment to lead or participate in such arrangements be provided early during the planning cycle. The chosen logistic option should be the most cost effective, while providing the requisite operational effectiveness – therefore an analysis of effectiveness and efficiency. The choice of option depends greatly on the time constraint, the degree of interoperability between the contributing nations and any bilateral or multilateral agreements already in place within the contributing nations. There will also be a requirement to balance operational efficiency (multinational solutions) with the management of operational risk (risk mitigation through dedicated national support structures). The 4 methods considered are :

3.2.1.1. National Responsibility

In this option each nation takes full responsibility for providing its own support – from national **home base** to foxhole. Short notice deployments and initial phases of an operation will most likely benefit from this method as it is the most simple to arrange and carries least risk.

However, once steady state has been achieved, the opportunity to switch to multinational operations should not be ignored. Even when contributing nations rely solely on national logistics, the JFC retains responsibility for the coordination of the overall logistic effort – not least to deconflict national activity in time and space (eg APOD/SPOD activity) and to establish and enforce clear operational priorities.

3.2.1.2. Logistic Lead Nation (LLN)

A Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) for logistic support has agreed to assume overall responsibility for coordinating and/or providing an agreed spectrum of logistic support for all or part of a multinational force within a defined geographical area. Reimbursement will then be subject to agreement between the parties involved. This model is obviously the purview of nations with a robust logistic capability, in particular a C2 capability.

3.2.1.3. Logistic Role Specialisation Nation (LRSN)

Logistic support may be provided by a single nation or service component within a key functional area or class of supply taking advantage of economies of scale and national strengths in areas where other nations may have capability gaps. A nation or service component assuming this responsibility will provide the logistic support with its own resources with reimbursement from other supported nations.

3.2.1.4. Multinational Integrated Logistic Support

Building a multinational integrated logistic support framework will take time and is likely to be most applicable to **mature theatres of operation**. Using “generic descriptors” rather than specific titles, the likely elements could include :

3.2.1.4.1. Multinational Integrated Headquarters and Staff

For command, control and planning purposes. Types of Multinational Integrated Headquarters could include: lead-nation Force Headquarters (including a J4 cell under a Chief J4 [CJ4]) ; Component Headquarters ; Theatre Support Commands ; Rear Support Commands ; and formation support commands – all of which will require individual augmentation from other nations to fulfil their multinational functions.

3.2.1.4.2. Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell

A Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC) (generic title) could be formed to facilitate and coordinate, at the operational level, various support options and execute the theatre level plans and policies of the CJ4 staff. Provision of this coordination capability assists the coalition commander discharge his collective responsibilities for logistics between the participating nations, component commands, HN and associated non-military organisations that may be involved in any combined and/or Joint operation. An existing example of such an organisation is the Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) which is enshrined in NATO logistic C2 doctrine. Current “Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations” work sees the development of a Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) (the core capability of which will be built around a cadre from the staff of the standing nucleus MJLC) reflecting a change in role from coordination to (increasingly) control of multinational logistic force elements in the deployed operating space. Scope may exist for the establishment of a similar such coordination organisation at Component level if a Joint/JOA level coordination cell is either not established or not appropriate.

3.2.1.4.3. Multinational Integrated Logistic Formations

Formations consisting of formed units⁶ from various nations under the operational control of an appointed formation commander/command HQ – the appointed formation being provided by a standing national structure augmented from other TCNs as appropriate.

3.2.1.4.4. Multinational Integrated Logistic Units

A multinational integrated logistic unit might be formed from elements of two or more nations that are detached under OPCON of the unit commander. This is a difficult level of integration to achieve unless the unit components train together regularly between periods of employment. Such integrated units could be established at theatre as well as component level. It is anticipated that the lowest level of command grouping from TCNs assigned to a MILU would be Troop/Platoon – although for certain specialist functions (eg Movements Detachments, Military Police, Ammunition Specialists et al) smaller groupings may be appropriate.

3.2.1.4.5. Multinational Logistic Units

A Multinational Logistic Unit may be composed of elements from several nations who collectively enter into a cooperative arrangement for mutual benefit (economy of scale, to cover national capability gaps etc). Multinational Logistic Units are established on a permanent basis overcoming the interoperability issues associated with ad-hoc, operation specific, Multinational Integrated Logistic Units and remain under national command authority although could be placed OPCON to the JFHQ dependant on TOA decisions.

These elements, which will be considered and discussed in greater detail later in the Paper, may be supplemented by Host Nation Support (HNS), Mutual Support Agreements (MSA) (bilateral or multilateral), Contractor Logistic Support and local resources.

⁶ At a level of command not less than Company/Squadron – although could be Troop/Platoon in the case of a specialist capability.

3.2.2. National Support Elements (NSEs)

Regardless of the level of multinational or national logistics a nation employs, as part of the wider operational planning process, NSEs will continue to provide the focus for national logistic activity – NSEs are a common feature of all models and provide the building blocks of any multinational support organisation built as part of a coalition. The level at which these are employed will depend on the nation's commitment to the multinational force. Each participating nation must ensure that the actions of their NSE are in consonance with the JFC's concept of operations and intent. NSEs have the following key functions :

3.2.2.1. Provision of national logistic support and coordination of logistic support functions with other participating nations, coalition headquarters and logistic organisations.

3.2.2.2. While remaining within their national chains of command, NSEs will be required to report (to maintain visibility/transparency) to the JFC and multinational C2 organisations critical operational assets and logistic activity in order to ensure continuity of the total logistic effort.

3.2.3. Joint Support Command/ Theatre Support Command Headquarters

To further increase the effectiveness, efficiency and unity of effort, theatre logistic operations will likely be grouped within a designated geographical area within a Joint Support Area (JSA)⁷ – this will also assist the management of operational, Force Protection and **geospatial** issues. The consolidation of theatre logistic functions into a common area will likely result in an increase in vulnerability for the logistic centre of gravity - to both symmetric and asymmetric activity.

Notwithstanding the core functional logistic coordination function associated with an MLCC, even where established, an MLCC is unlikely to be manned or equipped to carry out the multifunctional responsibilities of a Joint Support Command (JSC)⁸ or Theatre Support Command Headquarters – especially in respect of the Force Protection task. If a JSC/TSC is assigned, most of the logistic functions of the MLCC are likely to occur in the JSC/TSC's designated battle-space. As a result, it is essential that command relationships between the JSC/TSC and MLCC are designated in the Operational Plan.

⁷ Joint Support Area is a working title reflecting work in progress – the JSA is representative (in a non linear operating space) of the old RSA.

⁸ Joint Support Command is a working title reflecting work in progress – the JSC is representative (in a non-linear operating space) of the old RSC.

3.2.4. Risk Management

Multinational or cooperative logistics is a means not an end. The more complex the multinational arrangement established to support an operation, the higher the risk of failure. The more tactical the level of support involving multinational solutions, the higher the risk, and **Combat Service Support** (CSS) to formations (Brigades and Divisions) and below is probably best left to the nations themselves – exceptionally where multinational units and formations have been formed. The strive for efficiency needs to be carefully balanced against risk and the delivery of operational effectiveness.

4. LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL

4.1. General

4.1.1. Flexible C2 Structures

A flexible C2 structure must be established to coordinate national and multinational logistics and support the coalition commander's concept of operations. C2 activities must be organised based on the operational mission and coordinated with nations to obtain support and manning for the structure. The combined Joint logistic C2 structure must also provide the JFC with visibility over logistic implications that will have an impact on operations.

4.1.2. Operation Specific Structures

Unlike NATO, FINABEL operations are not buttressed by standing Headquarters, formations or units. Therefore the establishment of coalition C2 structures is a time and mission dependant process that is necessarily flexible and fluid. It is likely that a Logistic LN (LLN) will emerge in the coalition design process and will become the logistic framework nation.

4.1.3 Scalable Structures

This Study Paper seeks to articulate some C2 principles and options which are appropriate to operations conducted at any scale, albeit it is acknowledged that some of the organisation proposed here could be too large for smaller scale operations which underlines the need for "scalability". The complexity of the C2 structure will always be dependant on the requirements of the mission and the availability of time and resources. Future logistic C2 structures to support FINABEL-led operations must be both modular and infinitely scalable in design, allowing an ability to appropriately tailor to: the type of operation; the relative complexity and scale; and the geospatial lay-down of Force Elements.

4.1.4. Logistic C2 and Operational Phases

Much of this Study Paper is concerned with Logistic C2 during the Sustain phase of an operation; but there must be close coordination between the operations and logistic staffs of all Headquarters and nations, at all levels and at all stages of the operation – from force generation to deployment and RSOM, through sustainment to **recovery**. It is crucial that the Logistic C2 structure be established with sufficient authority and be functioning at the earliest stage of an operation in order to ensure: J4 informs the development of the J3 plan; appropriate management of the operational logistic planning process between nations; deconfliction of activities in time and space; and the adequate enforcement of the Commander's operational priorities. Early operational logistic planning is key to the establishment of flexible, detailed plans to support the force throughout all phases of an operation. The development of Generic Operation Plans will, in particular, be invaluable as the basis for planning scenarios during fast-track Crisis Response Planning for FINABEL-led operations. Mindful of the need to transition coherently between operating phases, the Logistic C2 arrangement should be seamless both vertically (from echelon to echelon) and horizontally (between components and nations). Logistic C2 must also be flexible as C2 arrangements may change according to the phase of an operation.

4.2. Command Relationships

Under routine coalition operational procedures, nations might expect to effect TOA over their national force contributions to a coalition commander at an agreed time. This transfer includes logistic forces that nations nominate through the force generation process and includes any limitation that may be imposed by individual nations.

4.2.1. OPCON

C2 arrangements should be developed for each operation and, as a general principle, coalition commanders should have the same measure of control over logistic units in the AO as over combat forces.

Normally national contingents to multinational operations are placed under Operational Control (OPCON⁹) of the coalition force commander and remain under command of their nations. The definition of OPCON will need to be agreed to by all nations, with a number of caveats in accordance with the wishes of each nation included in a TOA agreement. Changes to these relationships can only be done with national concurrence.

⁹ The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location.

4.2.2. LOGCON

Where national imperatives or legal restrictions prevent force contributions being placed OPCON to the coalition commander then Logistics Control (LOGCON) is the minimum C2 authority required to ensure seamless integration and reliable service provision. LOGCON has been developed as part of the NATO work (but has relevance within the context of a Finabel-led coalition operation) to produce a Logistic Support Concept for NRF Operations and is defined as :

“That authority granted to a NATO Commander over assigned logistics units and organisations in the theatre, including National Support Elements (NSE), that empowers him to synchronise, prioritise, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission. It does not confer authority over the nationally-owned resources held by an NSE, except as agreed in the Transfer of Authority or in accordance with the NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics.”

4.2.3. Coordination and Liaison

One of the key principles of logistics operations is the primacy of the operational requirement to ensure mission success. There must, therefore, be close coordination between operations and logistics staff at all levels and at all stages of the operation. The relationship, and flow of information, between coalition headquarters and individual nations, especially to/from NSEs, is key. Even if a nation elects to support forces through a national support system, it remains vital, just as in multinational logistic operations, that they interface (in near real-time) with the coalition multinational logistic planning and coordinating entity.

4.2.4. Support Relationships

Support relationships can exist between nations without the need to establish command relationships between them. This is especially the case at the theatre or operational level where various NSEs might establish working arrangements that do not necessitate formal regrouping of assets. Logistic elements could be assigned support missions that ensure the support is provided without changes to the command authority over them.

Within this context of ‘supporting’ and ‘supported’ relationships, the support missions, as generally understood on existing coalition operations, are :

4.2.4.1. Direct Support

“The support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.”

4.2.4.2. General Support

“That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.”

4.3. Logistic Command and Control Structures

4.3.1. General

The detailed C2 arrangements to support a FINABEL-led deployment would be ‘operation specific’ and tailored around the specific contingency requirements and limitations. Logistic C2 elements discussed in this section might usefully be considered within one of 2 categories: those charged with strategic and operational policy & planning ; and those responsible for the execution of force logistic policy & planning direction.

4.3.2. Coalition J4 Cell

Ultimately it is the JFC, through a CJ4 who is responsible for logistics planning, execution and coordination at the strategic and Joint Operational Area (JOA) level. In short the CJ4 develops the JFC’s logistic policy, plans and priorities, and provides any logistic coordinating executive established (ie an MLCC) with direction and guidance to execute operational level logistic tasking and coordination. The structure of the CJ4 will be dependant upon the type of operation to be supported, the scale of effort and relative complexity of logistic and operational activity. In the event that an MLCC type executive organisation is not deployed, the CJ4 staff could co-ordinate the execution of the operational level logistic plans; possibly with the addition of some functional staff that otherwise would be deployed in an MLCC type organisation. As an integral part of a coalition headquarters key CJ4 functions include :

- 4.3.2.1. Preparation of operational level logistic plans in support of operations.
- 4.3.2.2. Providing staff supervision and oversight of the JOA logistic effort.
- 4.3.2.3. Translation of the operational level commander’s intent into logistic policy and direction for the force.
- 4.3.2.4. Acting as the JOA level logistic coordinating authority.
- 4.3.2.5. Providing assessments of logistic capabilities and constraints, evaluating the impact on current and planned operations and providing feedback to the coalition commander.

4.3.2.6. Establishing logistic reporting requirements.

4.3.2.7. Functional direction of any logistic coordination cell, when formed.

4.3.2.8. Coordination of the NSEs and HNS and assessment of ICR.

4.3.3. Multinational Logistic Coordination Cell (MLCC)

4.3.3.1. General.

4.3.3.1.1. Whilst the CJ4 develops the coalition commander's policy and planning, an MLCC might be established as a logistic staff to conduct the detailed planning and execution of the JOA level plans and policies of the CJ4. Specifically a MLCC might be responsible for coordinating logistic support between participating nations, component commands, host nations and non-military organisations at the operational level. If established, it would also be responsible for routinely tasking: logistic units ; LNs, HNS and RSNs ; and contracted logistic support assigned by nations for the benefit of the overall force.

Note : It is assumed that individual Component command logistic staffs are responsible for their own detailed logistic plans and coordination – ie at the tactical and higher tactical level. Whilst an MLCC would not be responsible for individual component logistics, it might be utilised for “component-centric” operations as required by the JFC.

4.3.3.1.2. An MLCC is likely to have potential utility across the full spectrum of conflict. The decision to employ an MLCC type organisation should always be based upon the logistic operational requirements resulting from the operational planning process. The need or otherwise for a MLCC should not be an automatic assumption taken simply on the basis of a particular type of operation. In some instances where a particular component is dominant, that component could be tasked with cross-component coordination responsibilities.

4.3.3.2. Command Relationships

Regardless of the structure developed, a clear delineation must be established between the responsibilities of the CJ4 staff and any MLCC (or other logistic coordination option) established in the concept of operation and resulting plan. The MLCC should be seen as an ‘executing’ staff branch within the CJ4 Division. Its C2 authority is vested through the JFC who might usually be expected to have OPCON over forces assigned to the operation – or as a minimum LOGCON. The Commander of the MLCC might expect to have a Coordinating Authority (CA)¹⁰ delegated to him by the JFC through the CJ4. This would provide the authority to effect consultation between nations, components, and other agencies, but would not give authority to compel agreement – in the case of disagreement, issues would need to be referred back to the CJ4 for resolution.

Functional Linkages




Figure 1

4.3.3.3. Deployment Readiness

An MLCC would have a potential role to play in all phases of an operation including: Deployment (including RSOM), Operate/Sustain, and Recover – this includes contributing to the planning process.

¹⁰ The authority granted to an individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving the forces of two or more nations or components.


Advanced “enabling” logistic elements could be deployed early with initial entry forces requiring such elements being held at a level of readiness commensurate with the force elements they will be required to support. As FINABEL is not supported by any standing headquarters or permanently committed force elements, the core of any MLCC deployed should be found from an existing national capability (for example a Logistic Brigade Headquarters¹¹) provided by a LLN with command and functional augmentation from other TCNs (including the attachment of Liaison Officers [LOs] from all nations).

4.3.3.4. Structure

The size, structure and composition of any MLCC established is dependant upon the mission, environment and the organisation it is designed to support. Upon activation it must be rapidly deployed to the JOA and this suggests that the core element should be provided by a LLN augmented (with at least LOs) by all other nations. Generically, the MLCC should be based on a central command executive group supported by a number of modular cells responsible for different functional areas – this inherent flexibility allows cells to be added, shifted or deleted as the requirements of an operation change. An MLCC structure might thus comprise a Commander, a command executive and individual cells representing the functional areas of (but not limited to) Joint Movements and Transport (M&T), supply and services, medical, maintenance, infrastructure, HNS and contracting.

¹¹ The level of command would need to be appropriate to the type, scale and complexity of the operation but is unlikely to be at less than Battalion level.

Force Coordination Element



* Encompasses LN, RSN and MILU activities and includes both coordination and mission tasking.

Figure 2

4.3.3.5. Employment Options

Although essentially an executive staff branch within the CJ4 Division, an MLCC could operate from a number of different headquarter locations. These include :

4.3.3.5.1. Within The Joint Force Headquarters




Figure 3

4.3.3.5.2. Tenant With A Subordinate Headquarters




Figure 4

4.3.3.5.3. Standalone Headquarters




Figure 5

In all cases however, the MLCC would be directed and tasked by the JFHQ and not by subordinate HQs with which it may be collocated. In the event that there is no operational need to establish an MLCC, the flexibility should exist for individual functional cells or sections to be established as part of the CJ4 structure, and become attached to their respective functional staff branches.

4.4. Enablers of Logistic C2

4.4.1. Standard Logistic Procedures

The delivery of effective and efficient support relies on the coordination and synchronisation of procedures in the logistic functional areas. The standardisation of information and processes between coalition headquarters and nations in all areas increases the potential for efficiency, delivery of support through multinational sources, and consequently economies of scale.

In the absence of developed FINABEL specific logistic procedures, NATO logistic procedures should provide the basis, modified and/or developed as appropriate, for FINABEL logistic planning and execution. Standardisation and interoperability are key and consideration needs to be given to the level of interoperability that is sought – integration, inter-operate, or deconfliction.

4.4.2. Logistic Management Information Systems

The authority vested in a JFC over logistic force elements requires a corresponding visibility and transparency of those assets and logistic operations. The communication and information systems between coalition, national and multinational logistic staff must therefore provide efficient and compatible interfaces. The information infrastructure must support an agreed Information Exchange Requirement (IER) between national and multinational elements- this should be based on appropriate process-mapping of respective roles and responsibilities. Communication may include the use of liaison staff elements in addition to electronic communication means.

4.4.3. Reachout

For the future, exploitation of technology may enable new approaches to Logistic C2. In this respect Logistic C2 capability may be provided through the use of Remote Operational Support, or “Reachout” (that is operational support functions provided from outside the immediate theatre of operations), provided the requisite communications and Logistics Information Management (LIM) assets are in place and command relationships between the deployed and remote locations are agreed by their respective commanders. Most significantly, Remote Operational Support allows further opportunities to rationalise the deployed Logistic C2 footprint.

5. SUMMARY

5.1. General

- 5.1.1. Against the demands of future military operations which are likely to be conducted in the face of increasingly complex interconnected threats and challenges, the trend is towards coalition intervention operations conducted within an increasingly JIM framework. Every coalition is different and the logistic demands will differ according to the specific requirements of each operation and the composition of nations involved. Continued reliance on ad hoc multinational C2 solutions is, however, unlikely to deliver the efficiency and effectiveness sought by nations.

This suggests a need to examine future multinational logistic solutions and begin the process of designing and developing suitable cooperative and integrated logistic systems; specifically Logistic C2 - including organisational structures, responsibilities, interfaces and procedures - in order to promote successful coalition operations.

- 5.1.2. The aim of this paper is to define, within the framework of a Finabel-led multinational operation, possible organisational solutions for providing logistic support to a multinational force deployed on contingency operations. In particular the paper focuses on: the authority assigned to Commanders in the logistic sector; the organisation of logistic C2; and linkages between MN Logistic C2 Cells and TCNs.
- 5.1.3. In establishing logistic operating principles and developing logistic C2 policy and concepts for use on Finabel coalition operations, due account is taken within the paper of approaches, concepts, procedures, doctrine and standardisation agreements developed for use elsewhere – in particular those developed under the aegis of NATO and the EU. This is not to suggest that NATO and/or EU based solutions would be appropriate for application within a Finabel-led coalition framework for every eventuality; merely that where relevant, applicable and acceptable, previously agreed NATO and/or EU approaches and procedures should be exploited and/or used as the basis for further development within the FINABEL context.

5.2. The Operational and Logistic Support Requirement

- 5.2.1. In the layout of the battle-space, there must be a clear understanding among nations that national logistic organisations exist in a multinational framework in support of combined operations. Whilst nations would bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the appropriate provision of logistic support for their forces allocated to coalition operations, duplication of logistic functions should however be avoided wherever possible and economies of scale realised at every opportunity. Cooperative arrangements and mutual assistance among nations in the provision and use of logistic resources should ease the operational and financial burden on individual nations. Fundamentally, in a multinational operational context, logistic cooperation is dependant upon having appropriate and effective logistic C2 arrangements in place.
- 5.2.2. Within the broad goal of improved cooperation and coherent logistic C2 across all national force elements, a coalition can potentially gain significant benefits within the theatre of operations at the operational level. These benefits include: a reduced logistic footprint; reduced costs to all contributors; optimisation of resources; de-confliction in time and space; improved flexibility, versatility and agility; coherent RSOM&I, and; better plans and reduced time constraints.

- 5.2.3. To achieve these goals, coalitions must operate under the principle (as a minimum) of “unity of effort” with nations working together to identify requirements, prioritise them, and share capacity to provide the most effective and efficient support possible. This requires coordination not only between contributing nations, but also with the Host Nation (HN) and civilian agencies.

Beyond ‘unity of effort’, coalition logistics should also aspire (as far as possible and appropriate to the operational situation and national considerations) to ‘unity of command’ by reducing national or component support stovepipes and increasing multinational Joint logistics cooperation. Commanders should seek to handle logistics on a coalition basis, with as much centralised control over logistics as interoperability and national command considerations permit – and as far as is “operationally desirable”. In order for the JFC to optimise the logistic effort, the force will require integrated logistics with a C2 structure that can properly plan and coordinate theatre sustainability, as well as maintain visibility of assets.

5.3. Logistic Support Principles

In choosing an “operation specific” support solution a number of key considerations need to be taken into account, amongst these are :

5.3.1. Primacy of Operations

Logistic support must be focussed towards ensuring the success of the operation, as described by the JFC. Logistics must function as an effective force multiplier, and should be seamlessly integrated into the operational structure.

5.3.2. Unit and Formation Level Logistics

The provision of Unit and Formation level logistic support for national combat formations is usually a national responsibility given the nature of that support is too critical and potentially dangerous to be relegated to a multinational support organisation or another nation. However, in certain cases, exceptions to this principle are possible.

5.3.3. Force Level Logistics

Multinational logistics work best at the Force/Theatre level which generally does not deliver critical or immediate battle support and conducts activity in generally more secure areas.

5.3.4. Authority

C2 arrangements should be developed for each operation and, in general, coalition commanders should have the same measure of control over logistic units in the AO as over combat forces. Within the developed logistic support framework, the JFC must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to enable him to employ and sustain forces in the most effective manner (authority must be aligned with responsibility) – maintaining unity of effort and, where possible, unity of command.

To effect unity of effort and/or control, the JFC may, aside from his Chief J4 (CJ4), seek to establish a multinational logistic coordination and control centre headed by a senior logistic coordinator or commander to coordinate common logistic support within the AO.

5.3.5. Planning

Early in the planning process the coalition needs to establish a logistic planning group to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between coalition forces while designing the logistic support organisation/framework for the coalition and defining the command and support relationships. As no standing Headquarters, **formations or units** support FINABEL, an “Enabling” Logistic C2 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should be developed to help shape and guide early contingency planning in the event of a Finabel-led coalition operation being mounted.

5.4. Logistic Support Options

Logistic support options for coalition operations might range from a totally integrated multinational logistic force to purely national support. Normally, however, a force might expect to be supported through a combination of the various options available. For the purposes of this analysis, the paper considers 4 models or methods for executing cooperative logistics within a coalition framework could be considered -which might be used either independently or concurrently. The models considered are: National Responsibility; Logistic Lead Nation; Logistic Role Specialisation Nation; and Multinational Integrated Logistic Support. Regardless of the method employed, it is imperative that national decisions and commitment to lead or participate in such arrangements be provided early during the planning cycle. The chosen logistic option should be the most cost effective, while providing the requisite operational effectiveness. The choice of option depends greatly on the time constraint, the degree of interoperability between the contributing nations and any bilateral or multilateral agreements already in place within the contributing nations. There will also be a requirement to balance operational efficiency (multinational solutions) with the management of operational risk (risk mitigation through dedicated national support structures).

5.5. Logistic Command and Control

5.5.1. The complexity of the C2 structure will always be dependant on the requirements of the mission and the availability of time and resources. Future logistic C2 structures to support FINABEL-led operations must be both modular and infinitely scalable in design, allowing an ability to appropriately tailor to : the type of operation; the relative complexity and scale; and the geospatial lay-down of Force Elements. Key C2 elements are those charged with strategic and operational policy & planning and those responsible for the execution of force logistic policy & planning direction. Structural Logistic C2 options are considered in detail in the main body of the paper.

5.5.2. Command Relationships

Under routine coalition operational procedures, nations might expect to effect TOA over their national force contributions to a coalition commander at an agreed time. This transfer includes logistic forces that nations nominate through the force generation process and includes any limitation that may be imposed by individual nations.

5.5.2.1. OPCON

C2 arrangements should be developed for each operation and, as a general principle, coalition commanders should have the same measure of control over logistic units in the AO as over combat forces. Normally national contingents to multinational operations are placed under Operational Control (OPCON) of the coalition force commander and remain under command of their nations.

5.5.2.2. LOGCON

Where national imperatives or legal restrictions prevent force contributions being placed OPCON to the coalition commander then Logistics Control (LOGCON)¹² is the minimum C2 authority required to ensure seamless integration and reliable service provision.

5.6. Enablers of Logistic C2

The delivery of effective and efficient support relies on the coordination and synchronisation of procedures in the logistic functional areas. The standardisation of information and processes between coalition headquarters and nations in all areas increases the potential for efficiency, delivery of support through multinational sources, and consequently economies of scale. Standardisation and interoperability is key, as is the need to ensure the information infrastructure supports an agreed logistic IER between national and MN elements.

¹² Authority granted to synchronise, prioritise and integrate logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1. Based on analysis and FINABEL WG CHARLIE discussion to date it is recommended that :
- 6.1.1. This report should now be used as the basis to develop a Logistic Support C2 Concept for Finabel Operations; albeit there is a need to ensure coherence and synergy with wider Finabel conceptual development work – including the development of a “higher level” Finabel C4I Study.
 - 6.1.2. In establishing logistic operating principles and developing logistic C2 policy and concepts for use on Finabel coalition operations, due account should be taken of approaches, concepts, procedures, doctrine and standardisation agreements developed for use elsewhere – in particular those developed under the aegis of NATO and the EU which (where relevant, applicable and acceptable to Finabel nations) should be exploited and/or used as the basis for further development within the Finabel context.
 - 6.1.3. Logistic support of Finabel multinational operations should be a collective responsibility of contributing nations and the JFC – albeit each nation should bear ultimate responsibility for the logistic support of its forces allocated to Finabel.
 - 6.1.4. Operation specific Logistic C2 arrangements should be developed for each deployment and, where necessary for each phase of an operation, based on the specific requirements of the contingency and the requirements/limitations of TCNs.
 - 6.1.5. Coalition commanders should have the same measure of control over logistic units in the AO as over combat forces (routinely OPCON); but LOGCON is the minimum C2 authority required to ensure seamless interoperability and reliable service provision.
 - 6.1.6. As no standing Headquarters, formations or units support Finabel, an “Enabling” Logistic C2 Memorandum of Understanding should be developed to help shape and guide early contingency planning in the event of a Finabel-led coalition operation being mounted. In time, the development of Generic Operational Plans (including generic pre-arrangements for cooperative and multinational logistic support) might be considered.
 - 6.1.7. The tenets of any Logistic C2 Concept developed as part of this work should be validated through experimentation, exercises and/or operations. Logistic questions for analysis and experimentation should be developed to inform further conceptual development.